KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd

commit 62cd5d480b9762ce70d720a81fa5b373052ae05f upstream.

'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode'
but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob
into with a cleanup helper.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f221974525 ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jarkko Sakkinen 2025-10-18 13:30:36 +03:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 8a69b95bc8
commit 3fd7df4636

View File

@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
@ -388,6 +389,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* old form */
blob = payload->blob;
payload->old_format = 1;
} else {
/* Bind for cleanup: */
blob_ref = blob;
}
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
@ -446,8 +450,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out:
if (blob != payload->blob)
kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0)