spi: Introduce and use spi_bpw_to_bytes()

Merge series from Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>:

Recently in the discussion with David the idea of having
a common helper popped up. The helper converts the given
bits per word to bytes. The result will always be power-of-two
(e.g. for 37 bits it returns 8 bytes) or 0 for 0 input.
More details are in the respective code comment.

This mini-series introduces it and replaces current users
under drivers/spi and we expect more (and possibly some
lurking in other subsystems).
This commit is contained in:
Mark Brown 2025-04-18 05:11:47 +01:00
commit cbc9d9e108
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 24D68B725D5487D0
418 changed files with 5358 additions and 2913 deletions

View File

@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
srso
gather_data_sampling
reg-file-data-sampling
rsb

View File

@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
=======================
RSB-related mitigations
=======================
.. warning::
Please keep this document up-to-date, otherwise you will be
volunteered to update it and convert it to a very long comment in
bugs.c!
Since 2018 there have been many Spectre CVEs related to the Return Stack
Buffer (RSB) (sometimes referred to as the Return Address Stack (RAS) or
Return Address Predictor (RAP) on AMD).
Information about these CVEs and how to mitigate them is scattered
amongst a myriad of microarchitecture-specific documents.
This document attempts to consolidate all the relevant information in
once place and clarify the reasoning behind the current RSB-related
mitigations. It's meant to be as concise as possible, focused only on
the current kernel mitigations: what are the RSB-related attack vectors
and how are they currently being mitigated?
It's *not* meant to describe how the RSB mechanism operates or how the
exploits work. More details about those can be found in the references
below.
Rather, this is basically a glorified comment, but too long to actually
be one. So when the next CVE comes along, a kernel developer can
quickly refer to this as a refresher to see what we're actually doing
and why.
At a high level, there are two classes of RSB attacks: RSB poisoning
(Intel and AMD) and RSB underflow (Intel only). They must each be
considered individually for each attack vector (and microarchitecture
where applicable).
----
RSB poisoning (Intel and AMD)
=============================
SpectreRSB
~~~~~~~~~~
RSB poisoning is a technique used by SpectreRSB [#spectre-rsb]_ where
an attacker poisons an RSB entry to cause a victim's return instruction
to speculate to an attacker-controlled address. This can happen when
there are unbalanced CALLs/RETs after a context switch or VMEXIT.
* All attack vectors can potentially be mitigated by flushing out any
poisoned RSB entries using an RSB filling sequence
[#intel-rsb-filling]_ [#amd-rsb-filling]_ when transitioning between
untrusted and trusted domains. But this has a performance impact and
should be avoided whenever possible.
.. DANGER::
**FIXME**: Currently we're flushing 32 entries. However, some CPU
models have more than 32 entries. The loop count needs to be
increased for those. More detailed information is needed about RSB
sizes.
* On context switch, the user->user mitigation requires ensuring the
RSB gets filled or cleared whenever IBPB gets written [#cond-ibpb]_
during a context switch:
* AMD:
On Zen 4+, IBPB (or SBPB [#amd-sbpb]_ if used) clears the RSB.
This is indicated by IBPB_RET in CPUID [#amd-ibpb-rsb]_.
On Zen < 4, the RSB filling sequence [#amd-rsb-filling]_ must be
always be done in addition to IBPB [#amd-ibpb-no-rsb]_. This is
indicated by X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET.
* Intel:
IBPB always clears the RSB:
"Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control
the predicted targets of indirect branches executed after the
command on the same logical processor. The term indirect branch
in this context includes near return instructions, so these
predicted targets may come from the RSB." [#intel-ibpb-rsb]_
* On context switch, user->kernel attacks are prevented by SMEP. User
space can only insert user space addresses into the RSB. Even
non-canonical addresses can't be inserted due to the page gap at the
end of the user canonical address space reserved by TASK_SIZE_MAX.
A SMEP #PF at instruction fetch prevents the kernel from speculatively
executing user space.
* AMD:
"Finally, branches that are predicted as 'ret' instructions get
their predicted targets from the Return Address Predictor (RAP).
AMD recommends software use a RAP stuffing sequence (mitigation
V2-3 in [2]) and/or Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP)
to ensure that the addresses in the RAP are safe for
speculation. Collectively, we refer to these mitigations as "RAP
Protection"." [#amd-smep-rsb]_
* Intel:
"On processors with enhanced IBRS, an RSB overwrite sequence may
not suffice to prevent the predicted target of a near return
from using an RSB entry created in a less privileged predictor
mode. Software can prevent this by enabling SMEP (for
transitions from user mode to supervisor mode) and by having
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS set during VM exits." [#intel-smep-rsb]_
* On VMEXIT, guest->host attacks are mitigated by eIBRS (and PBRSB
mitigation if needed):
* AMD:
"When Automatic IBRS is enabled, the internal return address
stack used for return address predictions is cleared on VMEXIT."
[#amd-eibrs-vmexit]_
* Intel:
"On processors with enhanced IBRS, an RSB overwrite sequence may
not suffice to prevent the predicted target of a near return
from using an RSB entry created in a less privileged predictor
mode. Software can prevent this by enabling SMEP (for
transitions from user mode to supervisor mode) and by having
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS set during VM exits. Processors with
enhanced IBRS still support the usage model where IBRS is set
only in the OS/VMM for OSes that enable SMEP. To do this, such
processors will ensure that guest behavior cannot control the
RSB after a VM exit once IBRS is set, even if IBRS was not set
at the time of the VM exit." [#intel-eibrs-vmexit]_
Note that some Intel CPUs are susceptible to Post-barrier Return
Stack Buffer Predictions (PBRSB) [#intel-pbrsb]_, where the last
CALL from the guest can be used to predict the first unbalanced RET.
In this case the PBRSB mitigation is needed in addition to eIBRS.
AMD RETBleed / SRSO / Branch Type Confusion
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
On AMD, poisoned RSB entries can also be created by the AMD RETBleed
variant [#retbleed-paper]_ [#amd-btc]_ or by Speculative Return Stack
Overflow [#amd-srso]_ (Inception [#inception-paper]_). The kernel
protects itself by replacing every RET in the kernel with a branch to a
single safe RET.
----
RSB underflow (Intel only)
==========================
RSB Alternate (RSBA) ("Intel Retbleed")
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Some Intel Skylake-generation CPUs are susceptible to the Intel variant
of RETBleed [#retbleed-paper]_ (Return Stack Buffer Underflow
[#intel-rsbu]_). If a RET is executed when the RSB buffer is empty due
to mismatched CALLs/RETs or returning from a deep call stack, the branch
predictor can fall back to using the Branch Target Buffer (BTB). If a
user forces a BTB collision then the RET can speculatively branch to a
user-controlled address.
* Note that RSB filling doesn't fully mitigate this issue. If there
are enough unbalanced RETs, the RSB may still underflow and fall back
to using a poisoned BTB entry.
* On context switch, user->user underflow attacks are mitigated by the
conditional IBPB [#cond-ibpb]_ on context switch which effectively
clears the BTB:
* "The indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch
control mechanism that establishes a barrier, preventing software
that executed before the barrier from controlling the predicted
targets of indirect branches executed after the barrier on the same
logical processor." [#intel-ibpb-btb]_
* On context switch and VMEXIT, user->kernel and guest->host RSB
underflows are mitigated by IBRS or eIBRS:
* "Enabling IBRS (including enhanced IBRS) will mitigate the "RSBU"
attack demonstrated by the researchers. As previously documented,
Intel recommends the use of enhanced IBRS, where supported. This
includes any processor that enumerates RRSBA but not RRSBA_DIS_S."
[#intel-rsbu]_
However, note that eIBRS and IBRS do not mitigate intra-mode attacks.
Like RRSBA below, this is mitigated by clearing the BHB on kernel
entry.
As an alternative to classic IBRS, call depth tracking (combined with
retpolines) can be used to track kernel returns and fill the RSB when
it gets close to being empty.
Restricted RSB Alternate (RRSBA)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Some newer Intel CPUs have Restricted RSB Alternate (RRSBA) behavior,
which, similar to RSBA described above, also falls back to using the BTB
on RSB underflow. The only difference is that the predicted targets are
restricted to the current domain when eIBRS is enabled:
* "Restricted RSB Alternate (RRSBA) behavior allows alternate branch
predictors to be used by near RET instructions when the RSB is
empty. When eIBRS is enabled, the predicted targets of these
alternate predictors are restricted to those belonging to the
indirect branch predictor entries of the current prediction domain.
[#intel-eibrs-rrsba]_
When a CPU with RRSBA is vulnerable to Branch History Injection
[#bhi-paper]_ [#intel-bhi]_, an RSB underflow could be used for an
intra-mode BTI attack. This is mitigated by clearing the BHB on
kernel entry.
However if the kernel uses retpolines instead of eIBRS, it needs to
disable RRSBA:
* "Where software is using retpoline as a mitigation for BHI or
intra-mode BTI, and the processor both enumerates RRSBA and
enumerates RRSBA_DIS controls, it should disable this behavior."
[#intel-retpoline-rrsba]_
----
References
==========
.. [#spectre-rsb] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf>`_
.. [#intel-rsb-filling] "Empty RSB Mitigation on Skylake-generation" in `Retpoline: A Branch Target Injection Mitigation <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation.html#inpage-nav-5-1>`_
.. [#amd-rsb-filling] "Mitigation V2-3" in `Software Techniques for Managing Speculation <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/software-techniques-for-managing-speculation.pdf>`_
.. [#cond-ibpb] Whether IBPB is written depends on whether the prev and/or next task is protected from Spectre attacks. It typically requires opting in per task or system-wide. For more details see the documentation for the ``spectre_v2_user`` cmdline option in Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt.
.. [#amd-sbpb] IBPB without flushing of branch type predictions. Only exists for AMD.
.. [#amd-ibpb-rsb] "Function 8000_0008h -- Processor Capacity Parameters and Extended Feature Identification" in `AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 3: General-Purpose and System Instructions <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf>`_. SBPB behaves the same way according to `this email <https://lore.kernel.org/5175b163a3736ca5fd01cedf406735636c99a>`_.
.. [#amd-ibpb-no-rsb] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://comsec.ethz.ch/wp-content/files/ibpb_sp25.pdf>`_
.. [#intel-ibpb-rsb] "Introduction" in `Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer Predictions / CVE-2022-26373 / INTEL-SA-00706 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/post-barrier-return-stack-buffer-predictions.html>`_
.. [#amd-smep-rsb] "Existing Mitigations" in `Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/technical-guidance-for-mitigating-branch-type-confusion.pdf>`_
.. [#intel-smep-rsb] "Enhanced IBRS" in `Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/indirect-branch-restricted-speculation.html>`_
.. [#amd-eibrs-vmexit] "Extended Feature Enable Register (EFER)" in `AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24593.pdf>`_
.. [#intel-eibrs-vmexit] "Enhanced IBRS" in `Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/indirect-branch-restricted-speculation.html>`_
.. [#intel-pbrsb] `Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer Predictions / CVE-2022-26373 / INTEL-SA-00706 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/post-barrier-return-stack-buffer-predictions.html>`_
.. [#retbleed-paper] `RETBleed: Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instruction <https://comsec.ethz.ch/wp-content/files/retbleed_sec22.pdf>`_
.. [#amd-btc] `Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/technical-guidance-for-mitigating-branch-type-confusion.pdf>`_
.. [#amd-srso] `Technical Update Regarding Speculative Return Stack Overflow <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/corporate/cr/speculative-return-stack-overflow-whitepaper.pdf>`_
.. [#inception-paper] `Inception: Exposing New Attack Surfaces with Training in Transient Execution <https://comsec.ethz.ch/wp-content/files/inception_sec23.pdf>`_
.. [#intel-rsbu] `Return Stack Buffer Underflow / Return Stack Buffer Underflow / CVE-2022-29901, CVE-2022-28693 / INTEL-SA-00702 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/return-stack-buffer-underflow.html>`_
.. [#intel-ibpb-btb] `Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier' <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/indirect-branch-predictor-barrier.html>`_
.. [#intel-eibrs-rrsba] "Guidance for RSBU" in `Return Stack Buffer Underflow / Return Stack Buffer Underflow / CVE-2022-29901, CVE-2022-28693 / INTEL-SA-00702 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/return-stack-buffer-underflow.html>`_
.. [#bhi-paper] `Branch History Injection: On the Effectiveness of Hardware Mitigations Against Cross-Privilege Spectre-v2 Attacks <http://download.vusec.net/papers/bhi-spectre-bhb_sec22.pdf>`_
.. [#intel-bhi] `Branch History Injection and Intra-mode Branch Target Injection / CVE-2022-0001, CVE-2022-0002 / INTEL-SA-00598 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html>`_
.. [#intel-retpoline-rrsba] "Retpoline" in `Branch History Injection and Intra-mode Branch Target Injection / CVE-2022-0001, CVE-2022-0002 / INTEL-SA-00598 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html>`_

View File

@ -1407,18 +1407,15 @@
earlyprintk=serial[,0x...[,baudrate]]
earlyprintk=ttySn[,baudrate]
earlyprintk=dbgp[debugController#]
earlyprintk=mmio32,membase[,{nocfg|baudrate}]
earlyprintk=pciserial[,force],bus:device.function[,{nocfg|baudrate}]
earlyprintk=xdbc[xhciController#]
earlyprintk=bios
earlyprintk=mmio,membase[,{nocfg|baudrate}]
earlyprintk is useful when the kernel crashes before
the normal console is initialized. It is not enabled by
default because it has some cosmetic problems.
Only 32-bit memory addresses are supported for "mmio"
and "pciserial" devices.
Use "nocfg" to skip UART configuration, assume
BIOS/firmware has configured UART correctly.

View File

@ -79,8 +79,9 @@ feature flags.
How are feature flags created?
==============================
a: Feature flags can be derived from the contents of CPUID leaves.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Feature flags can be derived from the contents of CPUID leaves
--------------------------------------------------------------
These feature definitions are organized mirroring the layout of CPUID
leaves and grouped in words with offsets as mapped in enum cpuid_leafs
in cpufeatures.h (see arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h for details).
@ -89,8 +90,9 @@ cpufeatures.h, and if it is detected at run time, the flags will be
displayed accordingly in /proc/cpuinfo. For example, the flag "avx2"
comes from X86_FEATURE_AVX2 in cpufeatures.h.
b: Flags can be from scattered CPUID-based features.
----------------------------------------------------
Flags can be from scattered CPUID-based features
------------------------------------------------
Hardware features enumerated in sparsely populated CPUID leaves get
software-defined values. Still, CPUID needs to be queried to determine
if a given feature is present. This is done in init_scattered_cpuid_features().
@ -104,8 +106,9 @@ has only one feature and would waste 31 bits of space in the x86_capability[]
array. Since there is a struct cpuinfo_x86 for each possible CPU, the wasted
memory is not trivial.
c: Flags can be created synthetically under certain conditions for hardware features.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flags can be created synthetically under certain conditions for hardware features
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examples of conditions include whether certain features are present in
MSR_IA32_CORE_CAPS or specific CPU models are identified. If the needed
conditions are met, the features are enabled by the set_cpu_cap or
@ -114,8 +117,8 @@ the feature X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT will be enabled and
"split_lock_detect" will be displayed. The flag "ring3mwait" will be
displayed only when running on INTEL_XEON_PHI_[KNL|KNM] processors.
d: Flags can represent purely software features.
------------------------------------------------
Flags can represent purely software features
--------------------------------------------
These flags do not represent hardware features. Instead, they represent a
software feature implemented in the kernel. For example, Kernel Page Table
Isolation is purely software feature and its feature flag X86_FEATURE_PTI is
@ -130,14 +133,18 @@ x86_cap/bug_flags[] arrays in kernel/cpu/capflags.c. The names in the
resulting x86_cap/bug_flags[] are used to populate /proc/cpuinfo. The naming
of flags in the x86_cap/bug_flags[] are as follows:
a: The name of the flag is from the string in X86_FEATURE_<name> by default.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
By default, the flag <name> in /proc/cpuinfo is extracted from the respective
X86_FEATURE_<name> in cpufeatures.h. For example, the flag "avx2" is from
X86_FEATURE_AVX2.
Flags do not appear by default in /proc/cpuinfo
-----------------------------------------------
Feature flags are omitted by default from /proc/cpuinfo as it does not make
sense for the feature to be exposed to userspace in most cases. For example,
X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS is defined in cpufeatures.h but that flag is an internal
kernel feature used in the alternative runtime patching functionality. So the
flag does not appear in /proc/cpuinfo.
Specify a flag name if absolutely needed
----------------------------------------
b: The naming can be overridden.
--------------------------------
If the comment on the line for the #define X86_FEATURE_* starts with a
double-quote character (""), the string inside the double-quote characters
will be the name of the flags. For example, the flag "sse4_1" comes from
@ -148,36 +155,31 @@ needed. For instance, /proc/cpuinfo is a userspace interface and must remain
constant. If, for some reason, the naming of X86_FEATURE_<name> changes, one
shall override the new naming with the name already used in /proc/cpuinfo.
c: The naming override can be "", which means it will not appear in /proc/cpuinfo.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The feature shall be omitted from /proc/cpuinfo if it does not make sense for
the feature to be exposed to userspace. For example, X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS is
defined in cpufeatures.h but that flag is an internal kernel feature used
in the alternative runtime patching functionality. So, its name is overridden
with "". Its flag will not appear in /proc/cpuinfo.
Flags are missing when one or more of these happen
==================================================
a: The hardware does not enumerate support for it.
--------------------------------------------------
The hardware does not enumerate support for it
----------------------------------------------
For example, when a new kernel is running on old hardware or the feature is
not enabled by boot firmware. Even if the hardware is new, there might be a
problem enabling the feature at run time, the flag will not be displayed.
b: The kernel does not know about the flag.
-------------------------------------------
The kernel does not know about the flag
---------------------------------------
For example, when an old kernel is running on new hardware.
c: The kernel disabled support for it at compile-time.
------------------------------------------------------
The kernel disabled support for it at compile-time
--------------------------------------------------
For example, if 5-level-paging is not enabled when building (i.e.,
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL is not selected) the flag "la57" will not show up [#f1]_.
Even though the feature will still be detected via CPUID, the kernel disables
it by clearing via setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LA57).
d: The feature is disabled at boot-time.
----------------------------------------
The feature is disabled at boot-time
------------------------------------
A feature can be disabled either using a command-line parameter or because
it failed to be enabled. The command-line parameter clearcpuid= can be used
to disable features using the feature number as defined in
@ -190,8 +192,9 @@ disable specific features. The list of parameters includes, but is not limited
to, nofsgsbase, nosgx, noxsave, etc. 5-level paging can also be disabled using
"no5lvl".
e: The feature was known to be non-functional.
----------------------------------------------
The feature was known to be non-functional
------------------------------------------
The feature was known to be non-functional because a dependency was
missing at runtime. For example, AVX flags will not show up if XSAVE feature
is disabled since they depend on XSAVE feature. Another example would be broken

View File

@ -328,9 +328,13 @@ The ext4 superblock is laid out as follows in
- s_checksum_type
- Metadata checksum algorithm type. The only valid value is 1 (crc32c).
* - 0x176
- __le16
- s_reserved_pad
-
- \_\_u8
- s\_encryption\_level
- Versioning level for encryption.
* - 0x177
- \_\_u8
- s\_reserved\_pad
- Padding to next 32bits.
* - 0x178
- __le64
- s_kbytes_written
@ -466,9 +470,13 @@ The ext4 superblock is laid out as follows in
- s_last_error_time_hi
- Upper 8 bits of the s_last_error_time field.
* - 0x27A
- __u8
- s_pad[2]
- Zero padding.
- \_\_u8
- s\_first\_error\_errcode
-
* - 0x27B
- \_\_u8
- s\_last\_error\_errcode
-
* - 0x27C
- __le16
- s_encoding

View File

@ -338,10 +338,11 @@ operations directly under the netdev instance lock.
Devices drivers are encouraged to rely on the instance lock where possible.
For the (mostly software) drivers that need to interact with the core stack,
there are two sets of interfaces: ``dev_xxx`` and ``netif_xxx`` (e.g.,
``dev_set_mtu`` and ``netif_set_mtu``). The ``dev_xxx`` functions handle
acquiring the instance lock themselves, while the ``netif_xxx`` functions
assume that the driver has already acquired the instance lock.
there are two sets of interfaces: ``dev_xxx``/``netdev_xxx`` and ``netif_xxx``
(e.g., ``dev_set_mtu`` and ``netif_set_mtu``). The ``dev_xxx``/``netdev_xxx``
functions handle acquiring the instance lock themselves, while the
``netif_xxx`` functions assume that the driver has already acquired
the instance lock.
Notifiers and netdev instance lock
==================================
@ -354,6 +355,7 @@ For devices with locked ops, currently only the following notifiers are
running under the lock:
* ``NETDEV_REGISTER``
* ``NETDEV_UP``
* ``NETDEV_CHANGE``
The following notifiers are running without the lock:
* ``NETDEV_UNREGISTER``

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@ -10153,6 +10153,8 @@ F: include/linux/gpio.h
F: include/linux/gpio/
F: include/linux/of_gpio.h
K: (devm_)?gpio_(request|free|direction|get|set)
K: GPIOD_FLAGS_BIT_NONEXCLUSIVE
K: devm_gpiod_unhinge
GPIO UAPI
M: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl>

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
VERSION = 6
PATCHLEVEL = 15
SUBLEVEL = 0
EXTRAVERSION = -rc1
EXTRAVERSION = -rc2
NAME = Baby Opossum Posse
# *DOCUMENTATION*
@ -1068,6 +1068,9 @@ ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fconserve-stack
endif
# Ensure compilers do not transform certain loops into calls to wcslen()
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-builtin-wcslen
# change __FILE__ to the relative path to the source directory
ifdef building_out_of_srctree
KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-ffile-prefix-map=$(srcroot)/=)

View File

@ -232,7 +232,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AES=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_TDES=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_SHA=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
CONFIG_FONT_ACORN_8x8=y

View File

@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ CONFIG_ROMFS_FS=y
CONFIG_NLS_DEFAULT="cp437"
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_FONT_MINI_4x6=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set

View File

@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES=y

View File

@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MARVELL_CESA=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y

View File

@ -370,7 +370,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_BS=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_EXYNOS_RNG=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_S5P=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=96
CONFIG_FONTS=y

View File

@ -481,8 +481,6 @@ CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SAHARA=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=64
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y

View File

@ -147,7 +147,6 @@ CONFIG_EXT2_FS=y
# CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER is not set
CONFIG_JFFS2_FS=y
# CONFIG_NETWORK_FILESYSTEMS is not set
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_MUST_CHECK is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set

View File

@ -179,7 +179,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y

View File

@ -108,8 +108,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_BS=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=64
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y

View File

@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ CONFIG_NFS_V3=y
CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y

View File

@ -91,6 +91,5 @@ CONFIG_MSDOS_FS=y
CONFIG_VFAT_FS=y
CONFIG_CRAMFS=y
CONFIG_MINIX_FS=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
# CONFIG_FTRACE is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y

View File

@ -289,7 +289,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MARVELL_CESA=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y

View File

@ -187,7 +187,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MARVELL_CESA=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y

View File

@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_850=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_15=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP=y
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y

View File

@ -706,9 +706,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_OMAP=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_OMAP_SHAM=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_OMAP_AES=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_OMAP_DES=m
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y

View File

@ -136,7 +136,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MARVELL_CESA=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y

View File

@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ CONFIG_NFS_V3=y
CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y

View File

@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ CONFIG_NFS_V3=y
CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y

View File

@ -663,8 +663,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM=m
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x16=y

View File

@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y

View File

@ -227,8 +227,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AES=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_TDES=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_SHA=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=32
CONFIG_CMA_ALIGNMENT=9

View File

@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=m
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x16=y

View File

@ -74,7 +74,6 @@ CONFIG_EXT3_FS=y
# CONFIG_DNOTIFY is not set
# CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER is not set
CONFIG_NLS=y
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y

View File

@ -191,8 +191,6 @@ CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y
CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y

View File

@ -121,6 +121,15 @@
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(n) (0x14 + (n))
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC (0x18)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(n) (0x1c + (n))
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ (0x00)
/*
* Annoyingly, the negative levels for Address size faults aren't laid out
* contiguously (or in the desired order)
*/
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_nL(n) ((n) == -1 ? 0x25 : 0x2C)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(n) ((n) < 0 ? ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_nL(n) : \
(ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ + (n)))
/* Status codes for individual page table levels */
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS_L(n) (ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS + (n))
@ -161,8 +170,6 @@
#define ESR_ELx_Xs_MASK (GENMASK_ULL(4, 0))
/* ISS field definitions for exceptions taken in to Hyp */
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ (0x00)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(n) (ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ + (n))
#define ESR_ELx_CV (UL(1) << 24)
#define ESR_ELx_COND_SHIFT (20)
#define ESR_ELx_COND_MASK (UL(0xF) << ESR_ELx_COND_SHIFT)
@ -464,6 +471,39 @@ static inline bool esr_fsc_is_access_flag_fault(unsigned long esr)
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS_L(0));
}
static inline bool esr_fsc_is_addr_sz_fault(unsigned long esr)
{
esr &= ESR_ELx_FSC;
return (esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(3)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(2)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(1)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(0)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(-1));
}
static inline bool esr_fsc_is_sea_ttw(unsigned long esr)
{
esr = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC;
return (esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(3)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(2)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(1)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(0)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(-1));
}
static inline bool esr_fsc_is_secc_ttw(unsigned long esr)
{
esr = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC;
return (esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(3)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(2)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(1)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(0)) ||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(-1));
}
/* Indicate whether ESR.EC==0x1A is for an ERETAx instruction */
static inline bool esr_iss_is_eretax(unsigned long esr)
{

View File

@ -305,7 +305,12 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(const struct kvm_vcpu *vc
static __always_inline phys_addr_t kvm_vcpu_get_fault_ipa(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return ((phys_addr_t)vcpu->arch.fault.hpfar_el2 & HPFAR_MASK) << 8;
u64 hpfar = vcpu->arch.fault.hpfar_el2;
if (unlikely(!(hpfar & HPFAR_EL2_NS)))
return INVALID_GPA;
return FIELD_GET(HPFAR_EL2_FIPA, hpfar) << 12;
}
static inline u64 kvm_vcpu_get_disr(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* Was this synchronous external abort a RAS notification?
* Returns '0' for errors handled by some RAS subsystem, or -ENOENT.
*/
static inline int kvm_handle_guest_sea(phys_addr_t addr, u64 esr)
static inline int kvm_handle_guest_sea(void)
{
/* apei_claim_sea(NULL) expects to mask interrupts itself */
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();

View File

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
#endif
#define res_smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c) smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c, 0, 1)
#define res_smp_cond_load_acquire(v, c) smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c, 0, 1)
#include <asm-generic/rqspinlock.h>

View File

@ -12,6 +12,16 @@
#include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
static inline bool __fault_safe_to_translate(u64 esr)
{
u64 fsc = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC;
if (esr_fsc_is_sea_ttw(esr) || esr_fsc_is_secc_ttw(esr))
return false;
return !(fsc == ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT && (esr & ESR_ELx_FnV));
}
static inline bool __translate_far_to_hpfar(u64 far, u64 *hpfar)
{
int ret;
@ -44,34 +54,50 @@ static inline bool __translate_far_to_hpfar(u64 far, u64 *hpfar)
return true;
}
/*
* Checks for the conditions when HPFAR_EL2 is written, per ARM ARM R_FKLWR.
*/
static inline bool __hpfar_valid(u64 esr)
{
/*
* CPUs affected by ARM erratum #834220 may incorrectly report a
* stage-2 translation fault when a stage-1 permission fault occurs.
*
* Re-walk the page tables to determine if a stage-1 fault actually
* occurred.
*/
if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220) &&
esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr))
return false;
if (esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr) || esr_fsc_is_access_flag_fault(esr))
return true;
if ((esr & ESR_ELx_S1PTW) && esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr))
return true;
return esr_fsc_is_addr_sz_fault(esr);
}
static inline bool __get_fault_info(u64 esr, struct kvm_vcpu_fault_info *fault)
{
u64 hpfar, far;
u64 hpfar;
far = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_FAR);
fault->far_el2 = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_FAR);
fault->hpfar_el2 = 0;
if (__hpfar_valid(esr))
hpfar = read_sysreg(hpfar_el2);
else if (unlikely(!__fault_safe_to_translate(esr)))
return true;
else if (!__translate_far_to_hpfar(fault->far_el2, &hpfar))
return false;
/*
* The HPFAR can be invalid if the stage 2 fault did not
* happen during a stage 1 page table walk (the ESR_EL2.S1PTW
* bit is clear) and one of the two following cases are true:
* 1. The fault was due to a permission fault
* 2. The processor carries errata 834220
*
* Therefore, for all non S1PTW faults where we either have a
* permission fault or the errata workaround is enabled, we
* resolve the IPA using the AT instruction.
* Hijack HPFAR_EL2.NS (RES0 in Non-secure) to indicate a valid
* HPFAR value.
*/
if (!(esr & ESR_ELx_S1PTW) &&
(cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220) ||
esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr))) {
if (!__translate_far_to_hpfar(far, &hpfar))
return false;
} else {
hpfar = read_sysreg(hpfar_el2);
}
fault->far_el2 = far;
fault->hpfar_el2 = hpfar;
fault->hpfar_el2 = hpfar | HPFAR_EL2_NS;
return true;
}

View File

@ -730,10 +730,10 @@ static void do_ffa_version(struct arm_smccc_res *res,
hyp_ffa_version = ffa_req_version;
}
if (hyp_ffa_post_init())
if (hyp_ffa_post_init()) {
res->a0 = FFA_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED;
else {
has_version_negotiated = true;
} else {
smp_store_release(&has_version_negotiated, true);
res->a0 = hyp_ffa_version;
}
unlock:
@ -809,7 +809,8 @@ bool kvm_host_ffa_handler(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt, u32 func_id)
if (!is_ffa_call(func_id))
return false;
if (!has_version_negotiated && func_id != FFA_VERSION) {
if (func_id != FFA_VERSION &&
!smp_load_acquire(&has_version_negotiated)) {
ffa_to_smccc_error(&res, FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
goto out_handled;
}

View File

@ -578,7 +578,14 @@ void handle_host_mem_abort(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
return;
}
addr = (fault.hpfar_el2 & HPFAR_MASK) << 8;
/*
* Yikes, we couldn't resolve the fault IPA. This should reinject an
* abort into the host when we figure out how to do that.
*/
BUG_ON(!(fault.hpfar_el2 & HPFAR_EL2_NS));
addr = FIELD_GET(HPFAR_EL2_FIPA, fault.hpfar_el2) << 12;
ret = host_stage2_idmap(addr);
BUG_ON(ret && ret != -EAGAIN);
}

View File

@ -1794,9 +1794,28 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
gfn_t gfn;
int ret, idx;
/* Synchronous External Abort? */
if (kvm_vcpu_abt_issea(vcpu)) {
/*
* For RAS the host kernel may handle this abort.
* There is no need to pass the error into the guest.
*/
if (kvm_handle_guest_sea())
kvm_inject_vabt(vcpu);
return 1;
}
esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
/*
* The fault IPA should be reliable at this point as we're not dealing
* with an SEA.
*/
ipa = fault_ipa = kvm_vcpu_get_fault_ipa(vcpu);
if (KVM_BUG_ON(ipa == INVALID_GPA, vcpu->kvm))
return -EFAULT;
is_iabt = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu);
if (esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr)) {
@ -1818,18 +1837,6 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
/* Synchronous External Abort? */
if (kvm_vcpu_abt_issea(vcpu)) {
/*
* For RAS the host kernel may handle this abort.
* There is no need to pass the error into the guest.
*/
if (kvm_handle_guest_sea(fault_ipa, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu)))
kvm_inject_vabt(vcpu);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_guest_fault(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu),
kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu), fault_ipa);

View File

@ -3536,3 +3536,10 @@ Field 5 F
Field 4 P
Field 3:0 Align
EndSysreg
Sysreg HPFAR_EL2 3 4 6 0 4
Field 63 NS
Res0 62:48
Field 47:4 FIPA
Res0 3:0
EndSysreg

View File

@ -72,9 +72,6 @@ CONFIG_INET=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC16=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=0
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y

View File

@ -89,4 +89,3 @@ CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECHAINIV is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC16=y

View File

@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ CONFIG_LEDS_GPIO=y
# CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT is not set
# CONFIG_DNOTIFY is not set
# CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR is not set
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
CONFIG_STRIP_ASM_SYMS=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
# CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG is not set

View File

@ -238,7 +238,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT=y
CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y

View File

@ -218,4 +218,3 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y

View File

@ -326,5 +326,4 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT=y

View File

@ -317,4 +317,3 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m

View File

@ -179,4 +179,3 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD160=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m

View File

@ -177,7 +177,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x16=y

View File

@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_KOI8_U=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=y
CONFIG_CRC16=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y

View File

@ -155,5 +155,4 @@ CONFIG_JFFS2_COMPRESSION_OPTIONS=y
CONFIG_SQUASHFS=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC16=m
CONFIG_STRIP_ASM_SYMS=y

View File

@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ CONFIG_SQUASHFS=y
# CONFIG_SQUASHFS_ZLIB is not set
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_XZ=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARC4=m
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_X86 is not set
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_POWERPC is not set
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_IA64 is not set

View File

@ -99,4 +99,3 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC16=m

View File

@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_KOI8_U=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=y
CONFIG_CRC16=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y

View File

@ -140,7 +140,6 @@ CONFIG_SQUASHFS=y
# CONFIG_SQUASHFS_ZLIB is not set
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_XZ=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARC4=m
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_STRIP_ASM_SYMS=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y

View File

@ -264,8 +264,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_FONTS=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y

View File

@ -292,7 +292,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_STRIP_ASM_SYMS=y

View File

@ -91,5 +91,4 @@ CONFIG_AFFS_FS=m
# CONFIG_NETWORK_FILESYSTEMS is not set
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y

View File

@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_15=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y

View File

@ -73,6 +73,5 @@ CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_932=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_8=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m

View File

@ -80,5 +80,4 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m

View File

@ -75,6 +75,5 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m

View File

@ -221,8 +221,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_15=y
CONFIG_NLS_KOI8_R=m
CONFIG_NLS_KOI8_U=m
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=y

View File

@ -60,8 +60,6 @@ CONFIG_CRAMFS=m
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_NLS=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
CONFIG_BDI_SWITCH=y

View File

@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_NFSD=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y

View File

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ CONFIG_BROADCOM_PHY=y
# CONFIG_CARDBUS is not set
CONFIG_CHR_DEV_SG=y
CONFIG_CHR_DEV_ST=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y
CONFIG_DS1682=y
CONFIG_EEPROM_LEGACY=y

View File

@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_AFFS_FS=m
CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y

View File

@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ CONFIG_PROC_KCORE=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y

View File

@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT=y
CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED=y
CONFIG_CGROUPS=y
# CONFIG_CORE_DUMP_DEFAULT_ELF_HEADERS is not set
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CPUSETS=y
CONFIG_CRAMFS=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=y

View File

@ -231,7 +231,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_15=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y

View File

@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CIFS=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y

View File

@ -125,8 +125,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_932=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=m
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=m
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y

View File

@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512=y

View File

@ -38,4 +38,3 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_CRAMFS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y

View File

@ -107,8 +107,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_932=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=m
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=m
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y

View File

@ -159,7 +159,6 @@ CONFIG_NFSD=y
CONFIG_NFSD_V4=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y

View File

@ -276,7 +276,6 @@ CONFIG_NFSD_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NFSD_V4=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y

View File

@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB=y

View File

@ -207,7 +207,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE=y

View File

@ -148,8 +148,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y

View File

@ -278,8 +278,6 @@ CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY=y
# CONFIG_INTEGRITY is not set
CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity"
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
CONFIG_CRC16=y
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_X86 is not set
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_IA64 is not set
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_ARM is not set

View File

@ -75,4 +75,3 @@ CONFIG_NLS_DEFAULT="utf8"
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y

View File

@ -114,7 +114,6 @@ CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_CIFS=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y

View File

@ -332,6 +332,10 @@ config HAVE_MARCH_Z16_FEATURES
def_bool n
select HAVE_MARCH_Z15_FEATURES
config HAVE_MARCH_Z17_FEATURES
def_bool n
select HAVE_MARCH_Z16_FEATURES
choice
prompt "Processor type"
default MARCH_Z196
@ -397,6 +401,14 @@ config MARCH_Z16
Select this to enable optimizations for IBM z16 (3931 and
3932 series).
config MARCH_Z17
bool "IBM z17"
select HAVE_MARCH_Z17_FEATURES
depends on $(cc-option,-march=z17)
help
Select this to enable optimizations for IBM z17 (9175 and
9176 series).
endchoice
config MARCH_Z10_TUNE
@ -420,6 +432,9 @@ config MARCH_Z15_TUNE
config MARCH_Z16_TUNE
def_bool TUNE_Z16 || MARCH_Z16 && TUNE_DEFAULT
config MARCH_Z17_TUNE
def_bool TUNE_Z17 || MARCH_Z17 && TUNE_DEFAULT
choice
prompt "Tune code generation"
default TUNE_DEFAULT
@ -464,6 +479,10 @@ config TUNE_Z16
bool "IBM z16"
depends on $(cc-option,-mtune=z16)
config TUNE_Z17
bool "IBM z17"
depends on $(cc-option,-mtune=z17)
endchoice
config 64BIT

View File

@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z13) := -march=z13
mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z14) := -march=z14
mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z15) := -march=z15
mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z16) := -march=z16
mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z17) := -march=z17
export CC_FLAGS_MARCH := $(mflags-y)
@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z13_TUNE) += -mtune=z13
cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z14_TUNE) += -mtune=z14
cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z15_TUNE) += -mtune=z15
cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z16_TUNE) += -mtune=z16
cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z17_TUNE) += -mtune=z17
cflags-y += -Wa,-I$(srctree)/arch/$(ARCH)/include

View File

@ -33,6 +33,10 @@
#define MARCH_HAS_Z16_FEATURES 1
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_MARCH_Z17_FEATURES
#define MARCH_HAS_Z17_FEATURES 1
#endif
#endif /* __DECOMPRESSOR */
#endif /* __ASM_S390_MARCH_H */

View File

@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static void cpum_cf_make_setsize(enum cpumf_ctr_set ctrset)
ctrset_size = 48;
else if (cpumf_ctr_info.csvn >= 3 && cpumf_ctr_info.csvn <= 5)
ctrset_size = 128;
else if (cpumf_ctr_info.csvn == 6 || cpumf_ctr_info.csvn == 7)
else if (cpumf_ctr_info.csvn >= 6 && cpumf_ctr_info.csvn <= 8)
ctrset_size = 160;
break;
case CPUMF_CTR_SET_MT_DIAG:
@ -858,18 +858,13 @@ static int cpumf_pmu_event_type(struct perf_event *event)
static int cpumf_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
unsigned int type = event->attr.type;
int err;
int err = -ENOENT;
if (type == PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE || type == PERF_TYPE_RAW)
err = __hw_perf_event_init(event, type);
else if (event->pmu->type == type)
/* Registered as unknown PMU */
err = __hw_perf_event_init(event, cpumf_pmu_event_type(event));
else
return -ENOENT;
if (unlikely(err) && event->destroy)
event->destroy(event);
return err;
}
@ -1819,8 +1814,6 @@ static int cfdiag_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
event->destroy = hw_perf_event_destroy;
err = cfdiag_event_init2(event);
if (unlikely(err))
event->destroy(event);
out:
return err;
}

View File

@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z14, TX_C_TABORT_NO_SPECIAL, 0x00f4);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z14, TX_C_TABORT_SPECIAL, 0x00f5);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z14, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_ONE_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c0);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z14, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_TWO_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c1);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z15, L1D_RO_EXCL_WRITES, 0x0080);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z15, DTLB2_WRITES, 0x0081);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z15, DTLB2_MISSES, 0x0082);
@ -365,6 +364,83 @@ CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z16, NNPA_WAIT_LOCK, 0x010d);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z16, NNPA_HOLD_LOCK, 0x010e);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z16, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_ONE_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c0);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z16, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_TWO_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c1);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, L1D_RO_EXCL_WRITES, 0x0080);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_WRITES, 0x0081);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_MISSES, 0x0082);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, CRSTE_1MB_WRITES, 0x0083);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_GPAGE_WRITES, 0x0084);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ITLB2_WRITES, 0x0086);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ITLB2_MISSES, 0x0087);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TLB2_PTE_WRITES, 0x0089);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TLB2_CRSTE_WRITES, 0x008a);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TLB2_ENGINES_BUSY, 0x008b);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TEND, 0x008c);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_NC_TEND, 0x008d);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, L1C_TLB2_MISSES, 0x008f);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ, 0x0091);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_IV, 0x0092);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_CHIP_HIT, 0x0093);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_DRAWER_HIT, 0x0094);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP, 0x0095);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_IV, 0x0096);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_CHIP_HIT, 0x0097);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_DRAWER_HIT, 0x0098);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_MODULE, 0x0099);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_DRAWER, 0x009a);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_OFF_DRAWER, 0x009b);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_MEMORY, 0x009c);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_MODULE_MEMORY, 0x009d);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_DRAWER_MEMORY, 0x009e);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_OFF_DRAWER_MEMORY, 0x009f);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_IV, 0x00a0);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_CHIP_HIT, 0x00a1);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00a2);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_IV, 0x00a3);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_CHIP_HIT, 0x00a4);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00a5);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_IV, 0x00a6);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_CHIP_HIT, 0x00a7);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00a8);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ, 0x00a9);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_IV, 0x00aa);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_CHIP_HIT, 0x00ab);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00ac);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP, 0x00ad);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_IV, 0x00ae);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_CHIP_HIT, 0x00af);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00b0);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_MODULE, 0x00b1);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_DRAWER, 0x00b2);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_OFF_DRAWER, 0x00b3);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, CYCLES_SAMETHRD, 0x00ca);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, CYCLES_DIFFTHRD, 0x00cb);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, INST_SAMETHRD, 0x00cc);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, INST_DIFFTHRD, 0x00cd);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, WRONG_BRANCH_PREDICTION, 0x00ce);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, VX_BCD_EXECUTION_SLOTS, 0x00e1);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DECIMAL_INSTRUCTIONS, 0x00e2);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, LAST_HOST_TRANSLATIONS, 0x00e8);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_NC_TABORT, 0x00f4);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TABORT_NO_SPECIAL, 0x00f5);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TABORT_SPECIAL, 0x00f6);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DFLT_ACCESS, 0x00f8);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CYCLES, 0x00fd);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, SORTL, 0x0100);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CC, 0x0109);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CCFINISH, 0x010a);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INVOCATIONS, 0x010b);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_COMPLETIONS, 0x010c);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_WAIT_LOCK, 0x010d);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_HOLD_LOCK, 0x010e);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_ONCHIP, 0x0110);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_OFFCHIP, 0x0111);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_DIFF, 0x0112);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_4K_PREFETCH, 0x0114);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_COMPL_LOCK, 0x0115);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_RETRY_LOCK, 0x0116);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_RETRY_LOCK_WITH_PLO, 0x0117);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_ONE_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c0);
CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_TWO_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c1);
static struct attribute *cpumcf_fvn1_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_fvn1, CPU_CYCLES),
@ -414,7 +490,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpumcf_svn_12345_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
NULL,
};
static struct attribute *cpumcf_svn_67_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
static struct attribute *cpumcf_svn_678_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_svn_12345, PRNG_FUNCTIONS),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_svn_12345, PRNG_CYCLES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_svn_12345, PRNG_BLOCKED_FUNCTIONS),
@ -779,6 +855,87 @@ static struct attribute *cpumcf_z16_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
NULL,
};
static struct attribute *cpumcf_z17_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, L1D_RO_EXCL_WRITES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_WRITES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_MISSES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, CRSTE_1MB_WRITES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_GPAGE_WRITES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ITLB2_WRITES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ITLB2_MISSES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TLB2_PTE_WRITES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TLB2_CRSTE_WRITES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TLB2_ENGINES_BUSY),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TEND),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_NC_TEND),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, L1C_TLB2_MISSES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_IV),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_CHIP_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_DRAWER_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_IV),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_CHIP_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_DRAWER_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_MODULE),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_DRAWER),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_OFF_DRAWER),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_MEMORY),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_MODULE_MEMORY),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_DRAWER_MEMORY),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_OFF_DRAWER_MEMORY),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_IV),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_CHIP_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_DRAWER_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_IV),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_CHIP_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_DRAWER_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_IV),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_CHIP_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_DRAWER_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_IV),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_CHIP_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_DRAWER_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_IV),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_CHIP_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_DRAWER_HIT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_MODULE),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_DRAWER),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_OFF_DRAWER),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, CYCLES_SAMETHRD),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, CYCLES_DIFFTHRD),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, INST_SAMETHRD),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, INST_DIFFTHRD),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, WRONG_BRANCH_PREDICTION),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, VX_BCD_EXECUTION_SLOTS),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DECIMAL_INSTRUCTIONS),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, LAST_HOST_TRANSLATIONS),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_NC_TABORT),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TABORT_NO_SPECIAL),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TABORT_SPECIAL),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DFLT_ACCESS),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CYCLES),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, SORTL),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CC),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CCFINISH),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INVOCATIONS),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_COMPLETIONS),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_WAIT_LOCK),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_HOLD_LOCK),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_ONCHIP),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_OFFCHIP),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_DIFF),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_4K_PREFETCH),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_COMPL_LOCK),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_RETRY_LOCK),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_RETRY_LOCK_WITH_PLO),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_ONE_THR_ACTIVE),
CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_TWO_THR_ACTIVE),
NULL,
};
/* END: CPUM_CF COUNTER DEFINITIONS ===================================== */
static struct attribute_group cpumcf_pmu_events_group = {
@ -859,7 +1016,7 @@ __init const struct attribute_group **cpumf_cf_event_group(void)
if (ci.csvn >= 1 && ci.csvn <= 5)
csvn = cpumcf_svn_12345_pmu_event_attr;
else if (ci.csvn >= 6)
csvn = cpumcf_svn_67_pmu_event_attr;
csvn = cpumcf_svn_678_pmu_event_attr;
/* Determine model-specific counter set(s) */
get_cpu_id(&cpu_id);
@ -892,6 +1049,10 @@ __init const struct attribute_group **cpumf_cf_event_group(void)
case 0x3932:
model = cpumcf_z16_pmu_event_attr;
break;
case 0x9175:
case 0x9176:
model = cpumcf_z17_pmu_event_attr;
break;
default:
model = none;
break;

View File

@ -885,9 +885,6 @@ static int cpumsf_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
event->attr.exclude_idle = 0;
err = __hw_perf_event_init(event);
if (unlikely(err))
if (event->destroy)
event->destroy(event);
return err;
}

View File

@ -294,6 +294,10 @@ static int __init setup_elf_platform(void)
case 0x3932:
strcpy(elf_platform, "z16");
break;
case 0x9175:
case 0x9176:
strcpy(elf_platform, "z17");
break;
}
return 0;
}

View File

@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int handle_validity(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->stat.exit_validity++;
trace_kvm_s390_intercept_validity(vcpu, viwhy);
KVM_EVENT(3, "validity intercept 0x%x for pid %u (kvm 0x%pK)", viwhy,
KVM_EVENT(3, "validity intercept 0x%x for pid %u (kvm 0x%p)", viwhy,
current->pid, vcpu->kvm);
/* do not warn on invalid runtime instrumentation mode */

View File

@ -3161,7 +3161,7 @@ void kvm_s390_gisa_clear(struct kvm *kvm)
if (!gi->origin)
return;
gisa_clear_ipm(gi->origin);
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%pK cleared", gi->origin);
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%p cleared", gi->origin);
}
void kvm_s390_gisa_init(struct kvm *kvm)
@ -3177,7 +3177,7 @@ void kvm_s390_gisa_init(struct kvm *kvm)
hrtimer_setup(&gi->timer, gisa_vcpu_kicker, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
memset(gi->origin, 0, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_gisa));
gi->origin->next_alert = (u32)virt_to_phys(gi->origin);
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%pK initialized", gi->origin);
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%p initialized", gi->origin);
}
void kvm_s390_gisa_enable(struct kvm *kvm)
@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ void kvm_s390_gisa_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
process_gib_alert_list();
hrtimer_cancel(&gi->timer);
gi->origin = NULL;
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%pK destroyed", gisa);
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%p destroyed", gisa);
}
void kvm_s390_gisa_disable(struct kvm *kvm)
@ -3467,7 +3467,7 @@ int __init kvm_s390_gib_init(u8 nisc)
}
}
KVM_EVENT(3, "gib 0x%pK (nisc=%d) initialized", gib, gib->nisc);
KVM_EVENT(3, "gib 0x%p (nisc=%d) initialized", gib, gib->nisc);
goto out;
out_unreg_gal:

View File

@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_set_mem_control(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *att
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "SET: max guest address: %lu", new_limit);
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "New guest asce: 0x%pK",
VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "New guest asce: 0x%p",
(void *) kvm->arch.gmap->asce);
break;
}
@ -3466,7 +3466,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
kvm_s390_gisa_init(kvm);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.pv.need_cleanup);
kvm->arch.pv.set_aside = NULL;
KVM_EVENT(3, "vm 0x%pK created by pid %u", kvm, current->pid);
KVM_EVENT(3, "vm 0x%p created by pid %u", kvm, current->pid);
return 0;
out_err:
@ -3529,7 +3529,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
kvm_s390_destroy_adapters(kvm);
kvm_s390_clear_float_irqs(kvm);
kvm_s390_vsie_destroy(kvm);
KVM_EVENT(3, "vm 0x%pK destroyed", kvm);
KVM_EVENT(3, "vm 0x%p destroyed", kvm);
}
/* Section: vcpu related */
@ -3650,7 +3650,7 @@ static int sca_switch_to_extended(struct kvm *kvm)
free_page((unsigned long)old_sca);
VM_EVENT(kvm, 2, "Switched to ESCA (0x%pK -> 0x%pK)",
VM_EVENT(kvm, 2, "Switched to ESCA (0x%p -> 0x%p)",
old_sca, kvm->arch.sca);
return 0;
}
@ -4027,7 +4027,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
goto out_free_sie_block;
}
VM_EVENT(vcpu->kvm, 3, "create cpu %d at 0x%pK, sie block at 0x%pK",
VM_EVENT(vcpu->kvm, 3, "create cpu %d at 0x%p, sie block at 0x%p",
vcpu->vcpu_id, vcpu, vcpu->arch.sie_block);
trace_kvm_s390_create_vcpu(vcpu->vcpu_id, vcpu, vcpu->arch.sie_block);

View File

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_s390_create_vcpu,
__entry->sie_block = sie_block;
),
TP_printk("create cpu %d at 0x%pK, sie block at 0x%pK",
TP_printk("create cpu %d at 0x%p, sie block at 0x%p",
__entry->id, __entry->vcpu, __entry->sie_block)
);
@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_s390_enable_css,
__entry->kvm = kvm;
),
TP_printk("enabling channel I/O support (kvm @ %pK)\n",
TP_printk("enabling channel I/O support (kvm @ %p)\n",
__entry->kvm)
);

View File

@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ static struct facility_def facility_defs[] = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_MARCH_Z15_FEATURES
61, /* miscellaneous-instruction-extension 3 */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_MARCH_Z17_FEATURES
84, /* miscellaneous-instruction-extension 4 */
#endif
-1 /* END */
}

View File

@ -99,4 +99,3 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG is not set
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y

View File

@ -128,4 +128,3 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG is not set
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More