mirror of
git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git
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v6.6/standard/intel-sdk-6.6/intel-socfpga
76372 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Bruce Ashfield
|
a05382452c |
This is the 6.6.94 stable release
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||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
1380f68517 |
calipso: unlock rcu before returning -EAFNOSUPPORT
commit 3cae906e1a6184cdc9e4d260e4dbdf9a118d94ad upstream.
syzbot reported that a recent patch forgot to unlock rcu
in the error path.
Adopt the convention that netlbl_conn_setattr() is already using.
Fixes: 6e9f2df1c550 ("calipso: Don't call calipso functions for AF_INET sk.")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250604133826.1667664-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
0383b25488 |
net_sched: ets: fix a race in ets_qdisc_change()
[ Upstream commit d92adacdd8c2960be856e0b82acc5b7c5395fddb ]
Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in ETS, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
|
| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
|
[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
057f7a61b0 |
net_sched: tbf: fix a race in tbf_change()
[ Upstream commit 43eb466041216d25dedaef1c383ad7bd89929cbc ]
Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in TBF, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
|
| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
|
[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
2a71924ca4 |
net_sched: red: fix a race in __red_change()
[ Upstream commit 85a3e0ede38450ea3053b8c45d28cf55208409b8 ]
Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in RED, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
|
| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
|
[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
46c15c9d0f |
net_sched: prio: fix a race in prio_tune()
[ Upstream commit d35acc1be3480505b5931f17e4ea9b7617fea4d3 ]
Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in PRIO, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
|
| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
|
[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
3c40cfcbf1 |
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix sparse errors
[ Upstream commit 7dd38ba4acbea9875b4ee061e20a26413e39d9f4 ]
This fixes the following errors:
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5400:59: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 3
(different base types) @@ expected unsigned short [usertype] handle @@
got restricted __le16 [usertype] monitor_handle @@
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5400:59: sparse: expected unsigned short [usertype] handle
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5400:59: sparse: got restricted __le16 [usertype] monitor_handle
Fixes: e6ed54e86aae ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix UAF on mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_complete")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202506060347.ux2O1p7L-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
c621211b30 |
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix broadcast/PA when using an existing instance
[ Upstream commit 5725bc608252050ed8a4d47d59225b7dd73474c8 ]
When using and existing adv_info instance for broadcast source it
needs to be updated to periodic first before it can be reused, also in
case the existing instance already have data hci_set_adv_instance_data
cannot be used directly since it would overwrite the existing data so
this reappend the original data after the Broadcast ID, if one was
generated.
Example:
bluetoothctl># Add PBP to EA so it can be later referenced as the BIS ID
bluetoothctl> advertise.service 0x1856 0x00 0x00
bluetoothctl> advertise on
...
< HCI Command: LE Set Extended Advertising Data (0x08|0x0037) plen 13
Handle: 0x01
Operation: Complete extended advertising data (0x03)
Fragment preference: Minimize fragmentation (0x01)
Data length: 0x09
Service Data: Public Broadcast Announcement (0x1856)
Data[2]: 0000
Flags: 0x06
LE General Discoverable Mode
BR/EDR Not Supported
...
bluetoothctl># Attempt to acquire Broadcast Source transport
bluetoothctl>transport.acquire /org/bluez/hci0/pac_bcast0/fd0
...
< HCI Command: LE Set Extended Advertising Data (0x08|0x0037) plen 255
Handle: 0x01
Operation: Complete extended advertising data (0x03)
Fragment preference: Minimize fragmentation (0x01)
Data length: 0x0e
Service Data: Broadcast Audio Announcement (0x1852)
Broadcast ID: 11371620 (0xad8464)
Service Data: Public Broadcast Announcement (0x1856)
Data[2]: 0000
Flags: 0x06
LE General Discoverable Mode
BR/EDR Not Supported
Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/1117
Fixes:
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
4bf2991057 |
Bluetooth: Fix NULL pointer deference on eir_get_service_data
[ Upstream commit 20a2aa01f5aeb6daad9aeaa7c33dd512c58d81eb ]
The len parameter is considered optional so it can be NULL so it cannot
be used for skipping to next entry of EIR_SERVICE_DATA.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
b4e9bab601 |
net_sched: sch_sfq: fix a potential crash on gso_skb handling
[ Upstream commit 82ffbe7776d0ac084031f114167712269bf3d832 ]
SFQ has an assumption of always being able to queue at least one packet.
However, after the blamed commit, sch->q.len can be inflated by packets
in sch->gso_skb, and an enqueue() on an empty SFQ qdisc can be followed
by an immediate drop.
Fix sfq_drop() to properly clear q->tail in this situation.
Tested:
ip netns add lb
ip link add dev to-lb type veth peer name in-lb netns lb
ethtool -K to-lb tso off # force qdisc to requeue gso_skb
ip netns exec lb ethtool -K in-lb gro on # enable NAPI
ip link set dev to-lb up
ip -netns lb link set dev in-lb up
ip addr add dev to-lb 192.168.20.1/24
ip -netns lb addr add dev in-lb 192.168.20.2/24
tc qdisc replace dev to-lb root sfq limit 100
ip netns exec lb netserver
netperf -H 192.168.20.2 -l 100 &
netperf -H 192.168.20.2 -l 100 &
netperf -H 192.168.20.2 -l 100 &
netperf -H 192.168.20.2 -l 100 &
Fixes:
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
bdd56875c6 |
Bluetooth: MGMT: Protect mgmt_pending list with its own lock
[ Upstream commit 6fe26f694c824b8a4dbf50c635bee1302e3f099c ]
This uses a mutex to protect from concurrent access of mgmt_pending
list which can cause crashes like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_sock_get_channel+0x60/0x68 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:91
Read of size 2 at addr ffff0000c48885b2 by task syz.4.334/7318
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7318 Comm: syz.4.334 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-g187899f4124a #0 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call trace:
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C)
__dump_stack+0x30/0x40 lib/dump_stack.c:94
dump_stack_lvl+0xd8/0x12c lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0xa8/0x254 mm/kasan/report.c:408
print_report+0x68/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0xb0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
__asan_report_load2_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:379
hci_sock_get_channel+0x60/0x68 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:91
mgmt_pending_find+0x7c/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:223
pending_find net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:947 [inline]
remove_adv_monitor+0x44/0x1a4 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5445
hci_mgmt_cmd+0x780/0xc00 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1712
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x544/0xbb0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1832
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:727 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x25c/0x378 net/socket.c:1131
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:591 [inline]
vfs_write+0x62c/0x97c fs/read_write.c:684
ksys_write+0x120/0x210 fs/read_write.c:736
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:747 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:744 [inline]
__arm64_sys_write+0x7c/0x90 fs/read_write.c:744
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x58/0x17c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:767
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
Allocated by task 7037:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x54 mm/kasan/generic.c:562
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x9c/0xb4 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4327 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2fc/0x4c8 mm/slub.c:4339
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline]
sk_prot_alloc+0xc4/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2198
sk_alloc+0x44/0x3ac net/core/sock.c:2254
bt_sock_alloc+0x4c/0x300 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:148
hci_sock_create+0xa8/0x194 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:2202
bt_sock_create+0x14c/0x24c net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132
__sock_create+0x43c/0x91c net/socket.c:1541
sock_create net/socket.c:1599 [inline]
__sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1636 [inline]
__sys_socket+0xd4/0x1c0 net/socket.c:1683
__do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1697 [inline]
__se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1695 [inline]
__arm64_sys_socket+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1695
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x58/0x17c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:767
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
Freed by task 6607:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x68/0x88 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2380 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4642 [inline]
kfree+0x17c/0x474 mm/slub.c:4841
sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2237 [inline]
__sk_destruct+0x4f4/0x760 net/core/sock.c:2332
sk_destruct net/core/sock.c:2360 [inline]
__sk_free+0x320/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2371
sk_free+0x60/0xc8 net/core/sock.c:2382
sock_put include/net/sock.h:1944 [inline]
mgmt_pending_free+0x88/0x118 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:290
mgmt_pending_remove+0xec/0x104 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:298
mgmt_set_powered_complete+0x418/0x5cc net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1355
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x204/0x33c net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334
process_one_work+0x7e8/0x156c kernel/workqueue.c:3238
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline]
worker_thread+0x958/0xed8 kernel/workqueue.c:3400
kthread+0x5fc/0x75c kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:847
Fixes:
|
||
|
Dr. David Alan Gilbert
|
5e64376da2 |
Bluetooth: MGMT: Remove unused mgmt_pending_find_data
[ Upstream commit 276af34d82f13bda0b2a4d9786c90b8bbf1cd064 ]
mgmt_pending_find_data() last use was removed in 2021 by
commit
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
9f66b6531c |
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix UAF on mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_complete
[ Upstream commit e6ed54e86aae9e4f7286ce8d5c73780f91b48d1c ]
This reworks MGMT_OP_REMOVE_ADV_MONITOR to not use mgmt_pending_add to
avoid crashes like bellow:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_complete+0xe5/0x540 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5406
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801c53f318 by task kworker/u5:5/5341
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5341 Comm: kworker/u5:5 Not tainted 6.15.0-syzkaller-10402-g4cb6c8af8591 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634
mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_complete+0xe5/0x540 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5406
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x261/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5987:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4358
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x240 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:252
mgmt_pending_add+0x34/0x120 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:279
remove_adv_monitor+0x103/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5454
hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:727
sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1131
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x548/0xa90 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 5989:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2380 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4642 [inline]
kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4841
mgmt_pending_foreach+0xc9/0x120 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:242
mgmt_index_removed+0x10d/0x2f0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9366
hci_sock_bind+0xbe9/0x1000 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1314
__sys_bind_socket net/socket.c:1810 [inline]
__sys_bind+0x2c3/0x3e0 net/socket.c:1841
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1846 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1844 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1844
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fixes:
|
||
|
Pauli Virtanen
|
6edb171845 |
Bluetooth: hci_core: fix list_for_each_entry_rcu usage
[ Upstream commit 308a3a8ce8ea41b26c46169f3263e50f5997c28e ]
Releasing + re-acquiring RCU lock inside list_for_each_entry_rcu() loop
body is not correct.
Fix by taking the update-side hdev->lock instead.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Ido Schimmel
|
d2507aeea4 |
seg6: Fix validation of nexthop addresses
[ Upstream commit 7632fedb266d93ed0ed9f487133e6c6314a9b2d1 ]
The kernel currently validates that the length of the provided nexthop
address does not exceed the specified length. This can lead to the
kernel reading uninitialized memory if user space provided a shorter
length than the specified one.
Fix by validating that the provided length exactly matches the specified
one.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Florian Westphal
|
1c7a023b0c |
netfilter: nf_nat: also check reverse tuple to obtain clashing entry
[ Upstream commit 50d9ce9679dd50df2dc51ada717fa875bc248fad ]
The logic added in the blamed commit was supposed to only omit nat source
port allocation if neither the existing nor the new entry are subject to
NAT.
However, its not enough to lookup the conntrack based on the proposed
tuple, we must also check the reverse direction.
Otherwise there are esoteric cases where the collision is in the reverse
direction because that colliding connection has a port rewrite, but the
new entry doesn't. In this case, we only check the new entry and then
erronously conclude that no clash exists anymore.
The existing (udp) tuple is:
a:p -> b:P, with nat translation to s:P, i.e. pure daddr rewrite,
reverse tuple in conntrack table is s:P -> a:p.
When another UDP packet is sent directly to s, i.e. a:p->s:P, this is
correctly detected as a colliding entry: tuple is taken by existing reply
tuple in reverse direction.
But the colliding conntrack is only searched for with unreversed
direction, and we can't find such entry matching a:p->s:P.
The incorrect conclusion is that the clashing entry has timed out and
that no port address translation is required.
Such conntrack will then be discarded at nf_confirm time because the
proposed reverse direction clashes with an existing mapping in the
conntrack table.
Search for the reverse tuple too, this will then check the NAT bits of
the colliding entry and triggers port reallocation.
Followp patch extends nft_nat.sh selftest to cover this scenario.
The IPS_SEQ_ADJUST change is also a bug fix:
Instead of checking for SEQ_ADJ this tested for SEEN_REPLY and ASSURED
by accident -- _BIT is only for use with the test_bit() API.
This bug has little consequence in practice, because the sequence number
adjustments are only useful for TCP which doesn't support clash resolution.
The existing test case (conntrack_reverse_clash.sh) exercise a race
condition path (parallel conntrack creation on different CPUs), so
the colliding entries have neither SEEN_REPLY nor ASSURED set.
Thanks to Yafang Shao and Shaun Brady for an initial investigation
of this bug.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Florian Westphal
|
39bab2d351 |
netfilter: nf_set_pipapo_avx2: fix initial map fill
[ Upstream commit ea77c397bff8b6d59f6d83dae1425b08f465e8b5 ]
If the first field doesn't cover the entire start map, then we must zero
out the remainder, else we leak those bits into the next match round map.
The early fix was incomplete and did only fix up the generic C
implementation.
A followup patch adds a test case to nft_concat_range.sh.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Shiming Cheng
|
85eef1748c |
net: fix udp gso skb_segment after pull from frag_list
[ Upstream commit 3382a1ed7f778db841063f5d7e317ac55f9e7f72 ] Commit |
||
|
Álvaro Fernández Rojas
|
2e02edb664 |
net: dsa: tag_brcm: legacy: fix pskb_may_pull length
[ Upstream commit efdddc4484859082da6c7877ed144c8121c8ea55 ]
BRCM_LEG_PORT_ID was incorrectly used for pskb_may_pull length.
The correct check is BRCM_LEG_TAG_LEN + VLAN_HLEN, or 10 bytes.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
55dd722521 |
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not responding with L2CAP_CR_LE_ENCRYPTION
[ Upstream commit 03dba9cea72f977e873e4e60e220fa596959dd8f ]
Depending on the security set the response to L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ shall be
just L2CAP_CR_LE_ENCRYPTION if only encryption when BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM
is selected since that means security mode 2 which doesn't require
authentication which is something that is covered in the qualification
test L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-25-C.
Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/1270
Fixes:
|
||
|
Charalampos Mitrodimas
|
acab7ca5ff |
net: tipc: fix refcount warning in tipc_aead_encrypt
[ Upstream commit f29ccaa07cf3d35990f4d25028cc55470d29372b ]
syzbot reported a refcount warning [1] caused by calling get_net() on
a network namespace that is being destroyed (refcount=0). This happens
when a TIPC discovery timer fires during network namespace cleanup.
The recently added get_net() call in commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc:
fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") attempts to
hold a reference to the network namespace. However, if the namespace
is already being destroyed, its refcount might be zero, leading to the
use-after-free warning.
Replace get_net() with maybe_get_net(), which safely checks if the
refcount is non-zero before incrementing it. If the namespace is being
destroyed, return -ENODEV early, after releasing the bearer reference.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68342b55.a70a0220.253bc2.0091.GAE@google.com/T/#m12019cf9ae77e1954f666914640efa36d52704a2
Reported-by: syzbot+f0c4a4aba757549ae26c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68342b55.a70a0220.253bc2.0091.GAE@google.com/T/#m12019cf9ae77e1954f666914640efa36d52704a2
Fixes: e27902461713 ("net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done")
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charmitro@posteo.net>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250527-net-tipc-warning-v2-1-df3dc398a047@posteo.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Faicker Mo
|
8ebcd311b4 |
net: openvswitch: Fix the dead loop of MPLS parse
[ Upstream commit 0bdc924bfb319fb10d1113cbf091fc26fb7b1f99 ]
The unexpected MPLS packet may not end with the bottom label stack.
When there are many stacks, The label count value has wrapped around.
A dead loop occurs, soft lockup/CPU stuck finally.
stack backtrace:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /build/linux-0Pa0xK/linux-5.15.0/net/openvswitch/flow.c:662:26
index -1 is out of range for type '__be32 [3]'
CPU: 34 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/34 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-121-generic #131-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge C6420/0JP9TF, BIOS 2.12.2 07/14/2021
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
show_stack+0x52/0x5c
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x16
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x36
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
key_extract_l3l4+0x82a/0x840 [openvswitch]
? kfree_skbmem+0x52/0xa0
key_extract+0x9c/0x2b0 [openvswitch]
ovs_flow_key_extract+0x124/0x350 [openvswitch]
ovs_vport_receive+0x61/0xd0 [openvswitch]
? kernel_init_free_pages.part.0+0x4a/0x70
? get_page_from_freelist+0x353/0x540
netdev_port_receive+0xc4/0x180 [openvswitch]
? netdev_port_receive+0x180/0x180 [openvswitch]
netdev_frame_hook+0x1f/0x40 [openvswitch]
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x23a/0xf00
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0xfa/0x240
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x18e/0x2a0
napi_complete_done+0x7a/0x1c0
bnxt_poll+0x155/0x1c0 [bnxt_en]
__napi_poll+0x30/0x180
net_rx_action+0x126/0x280
? bnxt_msix+0x67/0x80 [bnxt_en]
handle_softirqs+0xda/0x2d0
irq_exit_rcu+0x96/0xc0
common_interrupt+0x8e/0xa0
</IRQ>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
946bfdfcb7 |
calipso: Don't call calipso functions for AF_INET sk.
[ Upstream commit 6e9f2df1c550ead7cecb3e450af1105735020c92 ]
syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in txopt_get(). [0]
The offset 0x70 was of struct ipv6_txoptions in struct ipv6_pinfo,
so struct ipv6_pinfo was NULL there.
However, this never happens for IPv6 sockets as inet_sk(sk)->pinet6
is always set in inet6_create(), meaning the socket was not IPv6 one.
The root cause is missing validation in netlbl_conn_setattr().
netlbl_conn_setattr() switches branches based on struct
sockaddr.sa_family, which is passed from userspace. However,
netlbl_conn_setattr() does not check if the address family matches
the socket.
The syzkaller must have called connect() for an IPv6 address on
an IPv4 socket.
We have a proper validation in tcp_v[46]_connect(), but
security_socket_connect() is called in the earlier stage.
Let's copy the validation to netlbl_conn_setattr().
[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 12928 Comm: syz.9.1677 Not tainted 6.12.0 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:txopt_get include/net/ipv6.h:390 [inline]
RIP: 0010:
Code: 02 00 00 49 8b ac 24 f8 02 00 00 e8 84 69 2a fd e8 ff 00 16 fd 48 8d 7d 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 53 02 00 00 48 8b 6d 70 48 85 ed 0f 84 ab 01 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88811b8afc48 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff11023715f8a RCX: ffffffff841ab00c
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffc90007d9e000 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed1023715f9d R09: ffffed1023715f9e
R10: ffffed1023715f9d R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff888123075f00
R13: ffff88810245bd80 R14: ffff888113646780 R15: ffff888100578a80
FS: 00007f9019bd7640(0000) GS:ffff8882d2d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f901b927bac CR3: 0000000104788003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
calipso_sock_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:557
netlbl_conn_setattr+0x10c/0x280 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1177
selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper+0xd3/0x1b0 security/selinux/netlabel.c:569
selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked security/selinux/netlabel.c:597 [inline]
selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xb6/0x100 security/selinux/netlabel.c:615
selinux_socket_connect+0x5f/0x80 security/selinux/hooks.c:4931
security_socket_connect+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4598
__sys_connect_file+0xa4/0x190 net/socket.c:2067
__sys_connect+0x12c/0x170 net/socket.c:2088
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2098 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2095 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:2095
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xaa/0x1b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f901b61a12d
Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9019bd6fa8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f901b925fa0 RCX: 00007f901b61a12d
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000200000000140 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f901b701505 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f901b5b62a0 R15: 00007f9019bb7000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
Fixes:
|
||
|
Fernando Fernandez Mancera
|
68b69b50df |
netfilter: nft_tunnel: fix geneve_opt dump
[ Upstream commit 22a9613de4c29d7d0770bfb8a5a9d73eb8df7dad ]
When dumping a nft_tunnel with more than one geneve_opt configured the
netlink attribute hierarchy should be as follow:
NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_OPTS
|
|--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_OPTS_GENEVE
| |
| |--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_GENEVE_CLASS
| |--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_GENEVE_TYPE
| |--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_GENEVE_DATA
|
|--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_OPTS_GENEVE
| |
| |--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_GENEVE_CLASS
| |--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_GENEVE_TYPE
| |--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_GENEVE_DATA
|
|--NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_OPTS_GENEVE
...
Otherwise, userspace tools won't be able to fetch the geneve options
configured correctly.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jiayuan Chen
|
4c6fa65ab2 |
bpf, sockmap: Avoid using sk_socket after free when sending
[ Upstream commit 8259eb0e06d8f64c700f5fbdb28a5c18e10de291 ]
The sk->sk_socket is not locked or referenced in backlog thread, and
during the call to skb_send_sock(), there is a race condition with
the release of sk_socket. All types of sockets(tcp/udp/unix/vsock)
will be affected.
Race conditions:
'''
CPU0 CPU1
backlog::skb_send_sock
sendmsg_unlocked
sock_sendmsg
sock_sendmsg_nosec
close(fd):
...
ops->release() -> sock_map_close()
sk_socket->ops = NULL
free(socket)
sock->ops->sendmsg
^
panic here
'''
The ref of psock become 0 after sock_map_close() executed.
'''
void sock_map_close()
{
...
if (likely(psock)) {
...
// !! here we remove psock and the ref of psock become 0
sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock)
psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
if (unlikely(!psock))
goto no_psock; <=== Control jumps here via goto
...
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&psock->work); <=== not executed
sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
...
}
'''
Based on the fact that we already wait for the workqueue to finish in
sock_map_close() if psock is held, we simply increase the psock
reference count to avoid race conditions.
With this patch, if the backlog thread is running, sock_map_close() will
wait for the backlog thread to complete and cancel all pending work.
If no backlog running, any pending work that hasn't started by then will
fail when invoked by sk_psock_get(), as the psock reference count have
been zeroed, and sk_psock_drop() will cancel all jobs via
cancel_delayed_work_sync().
In summary, we require synchronization to coordinate the backlog thread
and close() thread.
The panic I catched:
'''
Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000521fad8 RCX: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x40/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x14c/0x230
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440
? sock_sendmsg+0x3e0/0x440
? __pfx_sock_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
__skb_send_sock+0x543/0xb70
sk_psock_backlog+0x247/0xb80
...
'''
Fixes:
|
||
|
Dmitry Antipov
|
9c73afd7f1 |
Bluetooth: MGMT: iterate over mesh commands in mgmt_mesh_foreach()
[ Upstream commit 3bb88524b7d030160bb3c9b35f928b2778092111 ]
In 'mgmt_mesh_foreach()', iterate over mesh commands
rather than generic mgmt ones. Compile tested only.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Florian Westphal
|
cf008d9a08 |
netfilter: nf_tables: nft_fib_ipv6: fix VRF ipv4/ipv6 result discrepancy
[ Upstream commit 8b53f46eb430fe5b42d485873b85331d2de2c469 ]
With a VRF, ipv4 and ipv6 FIB expression behave differently.
fib daddr . iif oif
Will return the input interface name for ipv4, but the real device
for ipv6. Example:
If VRF device name is tvrf and real (incoming) device is veth0.
First round is ok, both ipv4 and ipv6 will yield 'veth0'.
But in the second round (incoming device will be set to "tvrf"), ipv4
will yield "tvrf" whereas ipv6 returns "veth0" for the second round too.
This makes ipv6 behave like ipv4.
A followup patch will add a test case for this, without this change
it will fail with:
get element inet t fibif6iif { tvrf . dead:1::99 . tvrf }
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
FAIL: did not find tvrf . dead:1::99 . tvrf in fibif6iif
Alternatively we could either not do anything at all or change
ipv4 to also return the lower/real device, however, nft (userspace)
doc says "iif: if fib lookup provides a route then check its output
interface is identical to the packets input interface." which is what
the nft fib ipv4 behaviour is.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jiayuan Chen
|
07680e38b7 |
ktls, sockmap: Fix missing uncharge operation
[ Upstream commit 79f0c39ae7d3dc628c01b02f23ca5d01f9875040 ]
When we specify apply_bytes, we divide the msg into multiple segments,
each with a length of 'send', and every time we send this part of the data
using tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(), we use sk_msg_return_zero() to uncharge the
memory of the specified 'send' size.
However, if the first segment of data fails to send, for example, the
peer's buffer is full, we need to release all of the msg. When releasing
the msg, we haven't uncharged the memory of the subsequent segments.
This modification does not make significant logical changes, but only
fills in the missing uncharge places.
This issue has existed all along, until it was exposed after we added the
apply test in test_sockmap:
commit 3448ad23b34e ("selftests/bpf: Add apply_bytes test to test_txmsg_redir_wait_sndmem in test_sockmap")
Fixes:
|
||
|
Zhongqiu Duan
|
5e4519d8cd |
netfilter: nft_quota: match correctly when the quota just depleted
[ Upstream commit bfe7cfb65c753952735c3eed703eba9a8b96a18d ]
The xt_quota compares skb length with remaining quota, but the nft_quota
compares it with consumed bytes.
The xt_quota can match consumed bytes up to quota at maximum. But the
nft_quota break match when consumed bytes equal to quota.
i.e., nft_quota match consumed bytes in [0, quota - 1], not [0, quota].
Fixes:
|
||
|
Huajian Yang
|
585c9ed565 |
netfilter: bridge: Move specific fragmented packet to slow_path instead of dropping it
[ Upstream commit aa04c6f45b9224b949aa35d4fa5f8d0ba07b23d4 ]
The config NF_CONNTRACK_BRIDGE will change the bridge forwarding for
fragmented packets.
The original bridge does not know that it is a fragmented packet and
forwards it directly, after NF_CONNTRACK_BRIDGE is enabled, function
nf_br_ip_fragment and br_ip6_fragment will check the headroom.
In original br_forward, insufficient headroom of skb may indeed exist,
but there's still a way to save the skb in the device driver after
dev_queue_xmit.So droping the skb will change the original bridge
forwarding in some cases.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Cosmin Ratiu
|
6aa81fc0d6 |
xfrm: Use xdo.dev instead of xdo.real_dev
[ Upstream commit 25ac138f58e7d5c8bffa31e8891418d2819180c4 ] The policy offload struct was reused from the state offload and real_dev was copied from dev, but it was never set to anything else. Simplify the code by always using xdo.dev for policies. Signed-off-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Hari Kalavakunta
|
0e9c13ed85 |
net: ncsi: Fix GCPS 64-bit member variables
[ Upstream commit e8a1bd8344054ce27bebf59f48e3f6bc10bc419b ] Correct Get Controller Packet Statistics (GCPS) 64-bit wide member variables, as per DSP0222 v1.0.0 and forward specs. The Driver currently collects these stats, but they are yet to be exposed to the user. Therefore, no user impact. Statistics fixes: Total Bytes Received (byte range 28..35) Total Bytes Transmitted (byte range 36..43) Total Unicast Packets Received (byte range 44..51) Total Multicast Packets Received (byte range 52..59) Total Broadcast Packets Received (byte range 60..67) Total Unicast Packets Transmitted (byte range 68..75) Total Multicast Packets Transmitted (byte range 76..83) Total Broadcast Packets Transmitted (byte range 84..91) Valid Bytes Received (byte range 204..11) Signed-off-by: Hari Kalavakunta <kalavakunta.hari.prasad@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Fertser <fercerpav@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250410012309.1343-1-kalavakunta.hari.prasad@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Jiayuan Chen
|
db1d15a26f |
bpf, sockmap: Fix panic when calling skb_linearize
[ Upstream commit 5ca2e29f6834c64c0e5a9ccf1278c21fb49b827e ]
The panic can be reproduced by executing the command:
./bench sockmap -c 2 -p 1 -a --rx-verdict-ingress --rx-strp 100000
Then a kernel panic was captured:
'''
[ 657.460555] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2178!
[ 657.462680] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 657.463287] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
...
[ 657.469610] <TASK>
[ 657.469738] ? die+0x36/0x90
[ 657.469916] ? do_trap+0x1d0/0x270
[ 657.470118] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.470376] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.470620] ? do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
[ 657.470846] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.471092] ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
[ 657.471335] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.471579] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2d/0x40
[ 657.471805] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 657.472052] ? pskb_expand_head+0xd1/0xf40
[ 657.472292] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.472540] ? lock_acquire+0x18f/0x4e0
[ 657.472766] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
[ 657.472999] ? __pfx_pskb_expand_head+0x10/0x10
[ 657.473263] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x5b/0x470
[ 657.473537] ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10
[ 657.473826] __pskb_pull_tail+0xfd/0x1d20
[ 657.474062] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x90
[ 657.474707] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x3bf/0x510
[ 657.475392] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[ 657.476010] sk_psock_backlog+0x5cf/0xd70
[ 657.476637] process_one_work+0x858/0x1a20
'''
The panic originates from the assertion BUG_ON(skb_shared(skb)) in
skb_linearize(). A previous commit(see Fixes tag) introduced skb_get()
to avoid race conditions between skb operations in the backlog and skb
release in the recvmsg path. However, this caused the panic to always
occur when skb_linearize is executed.
The "--rx-strp 100000" parameter forces the RX path to use the strparser
module which aggregates data until it reaches 100KB before calling sockmap
logic. The 100KB payload exceeds MAX_MSG_FRAGS, triggering skb_linearize.
To fix this issue, just move skb_get into sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue.
'''
sk_psock_backlog:
sk_psock_handle_skb
skb_get(skb) <== we move it into 'sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue'
sk_psock_skb_ingress____________
↓
|
| → sk_psock_skb_ingress_self
| sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
sk_psock_verdict_apply_________________↑ skb_linearize
'''
Note that for verdict_apply path, the skb_get operation is unnecessary so
we add 'take_ref' param to control it's behavior.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jiayuan Chen
|
34837ae8cd |
bpf, sockmap: fix duplicated data transmission
[ Upstream commit 3b4f14b794287be137ea2c6158765d1ea1e018a4 ]
In the !ingress path under sk_psock_handle_skb(), when sending data to the
remote under snd_buf limitations, partial skb data might be transmitted.
Although we preserved the partial transmission state (offset/length), the
state wasn't properly consumed during retries. This caused the retry path
to resend the entire skb data instead of continuing from the previous
offset, resulting in data overlap at the receiver side.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jiayuan Chen
|
2e36a81d38 |
bpf: fix ktls panic with sockmap
[ Upstream commit 54a3ecaeeeae8176da8badbd7d72af1017032c39 ]
[ 2172.936997] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2172.936999] kernel BUG at lib/iov_iter.c:629!
......
[ 2172.944996] PKRU: 55555554
[ 2172.945155] Call Trace:
[ 2172.945299] <TASK>
[ 2172.945428] ? die+0x36/0x90
[ 2172.945601] ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100
[ 2172.945795] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946031] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946267] ? do_error_trap+0x7d/0x110
[ 2172.946499] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946736] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
[ 2172.946961] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.947197] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 2172.947446] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.947683] ? iov_iter_revert+0x5c/0x180
[ 2172.947913] tls_sw_sendmsg_locked.isra.0+0x794/0x840
[ 2172.948206] tls_sw_sendmsg+0x52/0x80
[ 2172.948420] ? inet_sendmsg+0x1f/0x70
[ 2172.948634] __sys_sendto+0x1cd/0x200
[ 2172.948848] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 2172.949072] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270
[ 2172.949330] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5e/0x170
[ 2172.949595] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 2172.949817] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270
[ 2172.950211] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190
[ 2172.950632] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xc2/0xd0
[ 2172.951036] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
[ 2172.951382] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x170
......
After calling bpf_exec_tx_verdict(), the size of msg_pl->sg may increase,
e.g., when the BPF program executes bpf_msg_push_data().
If the BPF program sets cork_bytes and sg.size is smaller than cork_bytes,
it will return -ENOSPC and attempt to roll back to the non-zero copy
logic. However, during rollback, msg->msg_iter is reset, but since
msg_pl->sg.size has been increased, subsequent executions will exceed the
actual size of msg_iter.
'''
iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
'''
The changes in this commit are based on the following considerations:
1. When cork_bytes is set, rolling back to non-zero copy logic is
pointless and can directly go to zero-copy logic.
2. We can not calculate the correct number of bytes to revert msg_iter.
Assume the original data is "abcdefgh" (8 bytes), and after 3 pushes
by the BPF program, it becomes 11-byte data: "abc?de?fgh?".
Then, we set cork_bytes to 6, which means the first 6 bytes have been
processed, and the remaining 5 bytes "?fgh?" will be cached until the
length meets the cork_bytes requirement.
However, some data in "?fgh?" is not within 'sg->msg_iter'
(but in msg_pl instead), especially the data "?" we pushed.
So it doesn't seem as simple as just reverting through an offset of
msg_iter.
3. For non-TLS sockets in tcp_bpf_sendmsg, when a "cork" situation occurs,
the user-space send() doesn't return an error, and the returned length is
the same as the input length parameter, even if some data is cached.
Additionally, I saw that the current non-zero-copy logic for handling
corking is written as:
'''
line 1177
else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
if (ret == -ENOSPC)
ret = 0;
goto send_end;
'''
So it's ok to just return 'copied' without error when a "cork" situation
occurs.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Bruce Ashfield
|
dbc2820565 |
This is the 6.6.93 stable release
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||
|
Pedro Tammela
|
295f7c579b |
net_sched: hfsc: Address reentrant enqueue adding class to eltree twice
commit ac9fe7dd8e730a103ae4481147395cc73492d786 upstream.
Savino says:
"We are writing to report that this recent patch
(141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547) [1]
can be bypassed, and a UAF can still occur when HFSC is utilized with
NETEM.
The patch only checks the cl->cl_nactive field to determine whether
it is the first insertion or not [2], but this field is only
incremented by init_vf [3].
By using HFSC_RSC (which uses init_ed) [4], it is possible to bypass the
check and insert the class twice in the eltree.
Under normal conditions, this would lead to an infinite loop in
hfsc_dequeue for the reasons we already explained in this report [5].
However, if TBF is added as root qdisc and it is configured with a
very low rate,
it can be utilized to prevent packets from being dequeued.
This behavior can be exploited to perform subsequent insertions in the
HFSC eltree and cause a UAF."
To fix both the UAF and the infinite loop, with netem as an hfsc child,
check explicitly in hfsc_enqueue whether the class is already in the eltree
whenever the HFSC_RSC flag is set.
[1] https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1572
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L677
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1574
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/T/#u
Fixes:
|
||
|
Shigeru Yoshida
|
ea61eda1f4 |
af_unix: Fix uninit-value in __unix_walk_scc()
commit |
||
|
Michal Luczaj
|
ed14f8ae9b |
af_unix: Fix garbage collection of embryos carrying OOB with SCM_RIGHTS
commit |
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
c0c8d419da |
af_unix: Add dead flag to struct scm_fp_list.
commit |
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
a288920ff9 |
af_unix: Don't access successor in unix_del_edges() during GC.
commit |
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
3600729b7f |
af_unix: Try not to hold unix_gc_lock during accept().
commit |
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
7b1ffbd3b2 |
af_unix: Remove lock dance in unix_peek_fds().
commit
|
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
de7921631f |
af_unix: Replace garbage collection algorithm.
commit
|
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
2c2d0c662d |
af_unix: Detect dead SCC.
commit
|
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
324005012f |
af_unix: Assign a unique index to SCC.
commit
|
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
d23802221f |
af_unix: Avoid Tarjan's algorithm if unnecessary.
commit
|
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
cdaa3499a8 |
af_unix: Skip GC if no cycle exists.
commit
|
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
e0e23fc499 |
af_unix: Save O(n) setup of Tarjan's algo.
commit
|
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
27a07364ce |
af_unix: Fix up unix_edge.successor for embryo socket.
commit
|