[ Upstream commit 91a79b792204313153e1bdbbe5acbfc28903b3a5 ]
recent patches to add a WARN() when replacing skb dst entry found an
old bug:
WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 skb_dst_check_unset include/linux/skbuff.h:1164 [inline]
WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 skb_dst_set include/linux/skbuff.h:1210 [inline]
WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 nf_reject_fill_skb_dst+0x2a4/0x330 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c:234
[..]
Call Trace:
nf_send_unreach+0x17b/0x6e0 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c:325
nft_reject_inet_eval+0x4bc/0x690 net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c:27
expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:237 [inline]
..
This is because blamed commit forgot about loopback packets.
Such packets already have a dst_entry attached, even at PRE_ROUTING stage.
Instead of checking hook just check if the skb already has a route
attached to it.
Fixes: f53b9b0bdc ("netfilter: introduce support for reject at prerouting stage")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250820123707.10671-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2c2192e5f9c7c2892fe2363244d1387f62710d83 ]
The WARN_ON trigger based on !cl->leaf.q->q.qlen is unnecessary in
htb_activate. htb_dequeue_tree already accounts for that scenario.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: William Liu <will@willsroot.io>
Reviewed-by: Savino Dicanosa <savy@syst3mfailure.io>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819033632.579854-1-will@willsroot.io
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 15de71d06a400f7fdc15bf377a2552b0ec437cf5 ]
The following setup can trigger a WARNING in htb_activate due to
the condition: !cl->leaf.q->q.qlen
tc qdisc del dev lo root
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: htb default 1
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 \
htb rate 64bit
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle f: \
cake memlimit 1b
ping -I lo -f -c1 -s64 -W0.001 127.0.0.1
This is because the low memlimit leads to a low buffer_limit, which
causes packet dropping. However, cake_enqueue still returns
NET_XMIT_SUCCESS, causing htb_enqueue to call htb_activate with an
empty child qdisc. We should return NET_XMIT_CN when packets are
dropped from the same tin and flow.
I do not believe return value of NET_XMIT_CN is necessary for packet
drops in the case of ack filtering, as that is meant to optimize
performance, not to signal congestion.
Fixes: 046f6fd5da ("sched: Add Common Applications Kept Enhanced (cake) qdisc")
Signed-off-by: William Liu <will@willsroot.io>
Reviewed-by: Savino Dicanosa <savy@syst3mfailure.io>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819033601.579821-1-will@willsroot.io
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 84967deee9d9870b15bc4c3acb50f1d401807902 ]
The seg6_genl_sethmac() directly uses the algorithm ID provided by the
userspace without verifying whether it is an HMAC algorithm supported
by the system.
If an unsupported HMAC algorithm ID is configured, packets using SRv6 HMAC
will be dropped during encapsulation or decapsulation.
Fixes: 4f4853dc1c ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure")
Signed-off-by: Minhong He <heminhong@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815063845.85426-1-heminhong@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 864e3396976ef41de6cc7bc366276bf4e084fff2 ]
When performing Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) on an IPv6 packet that
contains extension headers, the kernel incorrectly requests checksum offload
if the egress device only advertises NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM feature, which has
a strict contract: it supports checksum offload only for plain TCP or UDP
over IPv6 and explicitly does not support packets with extension headers.
The current GSO logic violates this contract by failing to disable the feature
for packets with extension headers, such as those used in GREoIPv6 tunnels.
This violation results in the device being asked to perform an operation
it cannot support, leading to a `skb_warn_bad_offload` warning and a collapse
of network throughput. While device TSO/USO is correctly bypassed in favor
of software GSO for these packets, the GSO stack must be explicitly told not
to request checksum offload.
Mask NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM, NETIF_F_TSO6 and NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_L4
in gso_features_check if the IPv6 header contains extension headers to compute
checksum in software.
The exception is a BIG TCP extension, which, as stated in commit
68e068cabd ("net: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets"):
"The feature is only enabled on devices that support BIG TCP TSO.
The header is only present for PF_PACKET taps like tcpdump,
and not transmitted by physical devices."
kernel log output (truncated):
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5273 at net/core/dev.c:3535 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x81/0x140
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_checksum_help+0x12a/0x1f0
validate_xmit_skb+0x1a3/0x2d0
validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4f/0x80
sch_direct_xmit+0x1a2/0x380
__dev_xmit_skb+0x242/0x670
__dev_queue_xmit+0x3fc/0x7f0
ip6_finish_output2+0x25e/0x5d0
ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0
ip6_tnl_xmit+0x608/0xc00 [ip6_tunnel]
ip6gre_tunnel_xmit+0x1c0/0x390 [ip6_gre]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x63/0x1c0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6d0/0x7f0
ip6_finish_output2+0x214/0x5d0
ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0
ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0
ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0
ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0
inet6_csk_xmit+0xeb/0x150
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x555/0xa80
tcp_write_xmit+0x32a/0xe90
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x437/0x1110
tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50
...
skb linear: 00000000: e4 3d 1a 7d ec 30 e4 3d 1a 7e 5d 90 86 dd 60 0e
skb linear: 00000010: 00 0a 1b 34 3c 40 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
skb linear: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
skb linear: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 11 2f 00 04 01 04 01 01 00 00 00
skb linear: 00000040: 86 dd 60 0e 00 0a 1b 00 06 40 20 23 00 00 00 00
skb linear: 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 23 00 00 00 00
skb linear: 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 bf 96 14 51 13 f9
skb linear: 00000070: ae 27 a0 a8 2b e3 80 18 00 40 5b 6f 00 00 01 01
skb linear: 00000080: 08 0a 42 d4 50 d5 4b 70 f8 1a
Fixes: 04c20a9356 ("net: skip offload for NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM if ipv6 header contains extension")
Reported-by: Tianhao Zhao <tizhao@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Ramaseuski <jramaseu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250814105119.1525687-1-jramaseu@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0eaf7c7e85da7495c0e03a99375707fc954f5e7b ]
The commit e07a06b4eb ("Bluetooth: Convert SCO configure_datapath to
hci_sync") missed to update the *return* statement under the *case* of
BT_CODEC_TRANSPARENT in hci_enhanced_setup_sync(), which led to returning
success (0) instead of the negative error code (-EINVAL). However, the
result of hci_enhanced_setup_sync() seems to be ignored anyway, since NULL
gets passed to hci_cmd_sync_queue() as the last argument in that case and
the only function interested in that result is specified by that argument.
Fixes: e07a06b4eb ("Bluetooth: Convert SCO configure_datapath to hci_sync")
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0b3725dbf61b51e7c663834811b3691157ae17d6 ]
BN == 0x00 in CIS Established means no isochronous data for the
corresponding direction (Core v6.1 pp. 2394). In this case SDU MTU
should be 0.
However, the specification does not say the Max_PDU_C_To_P or P_To_C are
then zero. Intel AX210 in Framed CIS mode sets nonzero Max_PDU for
direction with zero BN. This causes failure later when we try to LE
Setup ISO Data Path for disabled direction, which is disallowed (Core
v6.1 pp. 2750).
Fix by setting SDU MTU to 0 if BN == 0.
Fixes: 2be22f1941 ("Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix parsing of CIS Established Event")
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ca88be1a2725a42f8dbad579181611d9dcca8e88 ]
Passive scanning is used to program the address of the peer to be
synchronized, so once HCI_EV_LE_PA_SYNC_ESTABLISHED is received it
needs to be updated after clearing HCI_PA_SYNC then call
hci_update_passive_scan_sync to return it to its original state.
Fixes: 6d0417e4e1 ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not setting conn_timeout for Broadcast Receiver")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d1547bf460baec718b3398365f8de33d25c5f36f ]
When set multicast_query_interval to a large value, the local variable
'time' in br_multicast_send_query() may overflow. If the time is smaller
than jiffies, the timer will expire immediately, and then call mod_timer()
again, which creates a loop and may trigger the following soft lockup
issue.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 221s! [rb_consumer:66]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 66 Comm: rb_consumer Not tainted 6.16.0+ #259 PREEMPT(none)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__netdev_alloc_skb+0x2e/0x3a0
br_ip6_multicast_alloc_query+0x212/0x1b70
__br_multicast_send_query+0x376/0xac0
br_multicast_send_query+0x299/0x510
br_multicast_query_expired.constprop.0+0x16d/0x1b0
call_timer_fn+0x3b/0x2a0
__run_timers+0x619/0x950
run_timer_softirq+0x11c/0x220
handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x560
__irq_exit_rcu+0x158/0x1a0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0x90
</IRQ>
This issue can be reproduced with:
ip link add br0 type bridge
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/br0/bridge/multicast_querier
echo 0xffffffffffffffff >
/sys/class/net/br0/bridge/multicast_query_interval
ip link set dev br0 up
The multicast_startup_query_interval can also cause this issue. Similar to
the commit 99b4061095 ("net: bridge: mcast: add and enforce query
interval minimum"), add check for the query interval maximum to fix this
issue.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250806094941.1285944-1-wangliang74@huawei.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250812091818.542238-1-wangliang74@huawei.com/
Fixes: d902eee43f ("bridge: Add multicast count/interval sysfs entries")
Suggested-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250813021054.1643649-1-wangliang74@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 62708b9452f8eb77513115b17c4f8d1a22ebf843 upstream.
Each recvmsg() call must process either
- only contiguous DATA records (any number of them)
- one non-DATA record
If the next record has different type than what has already been
processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record
has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where
we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record
to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.
Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible,
since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer,
and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext
skb for access to metadata like length).
Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing
loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and
then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case
we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's
zero length.
Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Reported-by: Billy Jheng Bing-Jhong <billy@starlabs.sg>
Fixes: 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250820021952.143068-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f5ce0714623cffd00bf2a83e890d09c609b7f50a upstream.
When add_addr_timeout was set to 0, this caused the ADD_ADDR to be
retransmitted immediately, which looks like a buggy behaviour. Instead,
interpret 0 as "no retransmissions needed".
The documentation is updated to explicitly state that setting the timeout
to 0 disables retransmission.
Fixes: 93f323b9cc ("mptcp: add a new sysctl add_addr_timeout")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Matthieu Baerts <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-17-rc2-v1-5-521fe9957892@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Before commit e4c28e3d5c ("mptcp: pm: move generic PM helpers to
pm.c"), mptcp_pm_alloc_anno_list() was in pm_netlink.c. The same patch
can be applied there without conflicts. ]
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5d13349472ac8abcbcb94407969aa0fdc2e1f1be upstream.
sk_reset_timer() was called twice in mptcp_pm_alloc_anno_list.
Simplify the code by using a 'goto' statement to eliminate the
duplication.
Note that this is not a fix, but it will help backporting the following
patch. The same "Fixes" tag has been added for this reason.
Fixes: 93f323b9cc ("mptcp: add a new sysctl add_addr_timeout")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-17-rc2-v1-4-521fe9957892@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Before commit e4c28e3d5c ("mptcp: pm: move generic PM helpers to
pm.c"), mptcp_pm_alloc_anno_list() was in pm_netlink.c. The same patch
can be applied there without conflicts. ]
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 68fc0f4b0d25692940cdc85c68e366cae63e1757 upstream.
A flush of the MPTCP endpoints should not affect the MPTCP limits. In
other words, 'ip mptcp endpoint flush' should not change 'ip mptcp
limits'.
But it was the case: the MPTCP_PM_ATTR_RCV_ADD_ADDRS (add_addr_accepted)
limit was reset by accident. Removing the reset of this counter during a
flush fixes this issue.
Fixes: 01cacb00b3 ("mptcp: add netlink-based PM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Thomas Dreibholz <dreibh@simula.no>
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/579
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-17-rc2-v1-2-521fe9957892@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ccab044697980c6c01ab51f43f48f13b8a3e5c33 upstream.
When skb_ext_add(skb, SKB_EXT_MPTCP) fails in mptcp_incoming_options(),
we used to return true, letting the segment proceed through the TCP
receive path without a DSS mapping. Such segments can leave inconsistent
mapping state and trigger a mid-stream fallback to TCP, which in testing
collapsed (by artificially forcing failures in skb_ext_add) throughput
to zero.
Return false instead so the TCP input path drops the skb (see
tcp_data_queue() and step-7 processing). This is the safer choice
under memory pressure: it preserves MPTCP correctness and provides
backpressure to the sender.
Control packets remain unaffected: ACK updates and DATA_FIN handling
happen before attempting the extension allocation, and tcp_reset()
continues to ignore the return value.
With this change, MPTCP continues to work at high throughput if we
artificially inject failures into skb_ext_add.
Fixes: 6787b7e350 ("mptcp: avoid processing packet if a subflow reset")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@openai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-17-rc2-v1-1-521fe9957892@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa upstream.
To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time.
Use the appropriate helper function for this.
Fixes: bf355b8d2c ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818202724.15713-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7af76e9d18a9fd6f8611b3313c86c190f9b6a5a7 upstream.
Receiving HSR frame with insufficient space to hold HSR tag in the skb
can result in a crash (kernel BUG):
[ 45.390915] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff86f32cac len:26 put:14 head:ffff888042418000 data:ffff888042417ff4 tail:0xe end:0x180 dev:bridge_slave_1
[ 45.392559] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 45.392912] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:211!
[ 45.393276] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[ 45.393809] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2496 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.15.0 #12 PREEMPT(undef)
[ 45.394433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 45.395273] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15b/0x1d0
<snip registers, remove unreliable trace>
[ 45.402911] Call Trace:
[ 45.403105] <IRQ>
[ 45.404470] skb_push+0xcd/0xf0
[ 45.404726] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x7c/0x6c0
[ 45.406513] br_forward_finish+0x128/0x260
[ 45.408483] __br_forward+0x42d/0x590
[ 45.409464] maybe_deliver+0x2eb/0x420
[ 45.409763] br_flood+0x174/0x4a0
[ 45.410030] br_handle_frame_finish+0xc7c/0x1bc0
[ 45.411618] br_handle_frame+0xac3/0x1230
[ 45.413674] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x808/0x3df0
[ 45.422966] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb4/0x1f0
[ 45.424478] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x170
[ 45.424806] process_backlog+0x242/0x6d0
[ 45.425116] __napi_poll+0xbb/0x630
[ 45.425394] net_rx_action+0x4d1/0xcc0
[ 45.427613] handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x580
[ 45.427926] do_softirq+0x74/0x90
[ 45.428196] </IRQ>
This issue was found by syzkaller.
The panic happens in br_dev_queue_push_xmit() once it receives a
corrupted skb with ETH header already pushed in linear data. When it
attempts the skb_push() call, there's not enough headroom and
skb_push() panics.
The corrupted skb is put on the queue by HSR layer, which makes a
sequence of unintended transformations when it receives a specific
corrupted HSR frame (with incomplete TAG).
Fix it by dropping and consuming frames that are not long enough to
contain both ethernet and hsr headers.
Alternative fix would be to check for enough headroom before skb_push()
in br_dev_queue_push_xmit().
In the reproducer, this is injected via AF_PACKET, but I don't easily
see why it couldn't be sent over the wire from adjacent network.
Further Details:
In the reproducer, the following network interface chain is set up:
┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
│ veth0_to_hsr ├───┤ hsr_slave0 ┼───┐
└────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │
│ ┌──────┐
├─┤ hsr0 ├───┐
│ └──────┘ │
┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ │┌────────┐
│ veth1_to_hsr ┼───┤ hsr_slave1 ├───┘ └┤ │
└────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ ┌┼ bridge │
││ │
│└────────┘
│
┌───────┐ │
│ ... ├──────┘
└───────┘
To trigger the events leading up to crash, reproducer sends a corrupted
HSR frame with incomplete TAG, via AF_PACKET socket on 'veth0_to_hsr'.
The first HSR-layer function to process this frame is
hsr_handle_frame(). It and then checks if the
protocol is ETH_P_PRP or ETH_P_HSR. If it is, it calls
skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN), without checking that
the skb is long enough. For the crashing frame it is not, and hence the
skb->network_header and skb->mac_len fields are set incorrectly,
pointing after the end of the linear buffer.
I will call this a BUG#1 and it is what is addressed by this patch. In
the crashing scenario before the fix, the skb continues to go down the
hsr path as follows.
hsr_handle_frame() then calls this sequence
hsr_forward_skb()
fill_frame_info()
hsr->proto_ops->fill_frame_info()
hsr_fill_frame_info()
hsr_fill_frame_info() contains a check that intends to check whether the
skb actually contains the HSR header. But the check relies on the
skb->mac_len field which was erroneously setup due to BUG#1, so the
check passes and the execution continues back in the hsr_forward_skb():
hsr_forward_skb()
hsr_forward_do()
hsr->proto_ops->get_untagged_frame()
hsr_get_untagged_frame()
create_stripped_skb_hsr()
In create_stripped_skb_hsr(), a copy of the skb is created and is
further corrupted by operation that attempts to strip the HSR tag in a
call to __pskb_copy().
The skb enters create_stripped_skb_hsr() with ethernet header pushed in
linear buffer. The skb_pull(skb_in, HSR_HLEN) thus pulls 6 bytes of
ethernet header into the headroom, creating skb_in with a headroom of
size 8. The subsequent __pskb_copy() then creates an skb with headroom
of just 2 and skb->len of just 12, this is how it looks after the copy:
gdb) p skb->len
$10 = 12
(gdb) p skb->data
$11 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45382 "\252\252\252\252\252!\210\373",
(gdb) p skb->head
$12 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45380 ""
It seems create_stripped_skb_hsr() assumes that ETH header is pulled
in the headroom when it's entered, because it just pulls HSR header on
top. But that is not the case in our code-path and we end up with the
corrupted skb instead. I will call this BUG#2
*I got confused here because it seems that under no conditions can
create_stripped_skb_hsr() work well, the assumption it makes is not true
during the processing of hsr frames - since the skb_push() in
hsr_handle_frame to skb_pull in hsr_deliver_master(). I wonder whether I
missed something here.*
Next, the execution arrives in hsr_deliver_master(). It calls
skb_pull(ETH_HLEN), which just returns NULL - the SKB does not have
enough space for the pull (as it only has 12 bytes in total at this
point).
*The skb_pull() here further suggests that ethernet header is meant
to be pushed through the whole hsr processing and
create_stripped_skb_hsr() should pull it before doing the HSR header
pull.*
hsr_deliver_master() then puts the corrupted skb on the queue, it is
then picked up from there by bridge frame handling layer and finally
lands in br_dev_queue_push_xmit where it panics.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 48b491a5cc ("net: hsr: fix mac_len checks")
Reported-by: syzbot+a81f2759d022496b40ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819082842.94378-1-acsjakub@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0dab924844 upstream.
When receiving a vsock packet in the guest, only the virtqueue buffer
size is validated prior to virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put(). Unfortunately,
virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put() uses the length from the packet header as the
length argument to skb_put(), potentially resulting in SKB overflow if
the host has gone wonky.
Validate the length as advertised by the packet header before calling
virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 71dc9ec9ac ("virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20250717090116.11987-3-will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e57a632021 ]
net_drop_ns() is NULL when CONFIG_NET_NS is disabled.
The next patch introduces a function that increments
and decrements net->passive.
As a prep, let's rename and export net_free() to
net_passive_dec() and add net_passive_inc().
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+oUCt2VGvrbrweniTendZFEh+nwS=uonc004-aPkWy-Q@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250217191129.19967-2-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 59b33fab4c ("smb: client: fix netns refcount leak after net_passive changes")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 16ee3ea8fa upstream.
When userspace sets supported rates for a new station via
NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION, it might send a list that's empty
or contains only invalid values. Currently, we process these
values in sta_link_apply_parameters() without checking the result of
ieee80211_parse_bitrates(), which can lead to an empty rates bitmap.
A similar issue was addressed for NL80211_CMD_SET_BSS in commit
ce04abc3fc ("wifi: mac80211: check basic rates validity").
This patch applies the same approach in sta_link_apply_parameters()
for NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION, ensuring there is at least one valid
rate by inspecting the result of ieee80211_parse_bitrates().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: b95eb7f0ee ("wifi: cfg80211/mac80211: separate link params from station params")
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Lobanov <m.lobanov@rosa.ru>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250317103139.17625-1-m.lobanov@rosa.ru
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hanne-Lotta Mäenpää <hannelotta@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 03a92f036a ]
When allocating receive buffers for the vsock virtio RX virtqueue, an
SKB is allocated with a 4140 data payload (the 44-byte packet header +
VIRTIO_VSOCK_DEFAULT_RX_BUF_SIZE). Even when factoring in the SKB
overhead, the resulting 8KiB allocation thanks to the rounding in
kmalloc_reserve() is wasteful (~3700 unusable bytes) and results in a
higher-order page allocation on systems with 4KiB pages just for the
sake of a few hundred bytes of packet data.
Limit the vsock virtio RX buffers to 4KiB per SKB, resulting in much
better memory utilisation and removing the need to allocate higher-order
pages entirely.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20250717090116.11987-5-will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8e16170ae9 ]
In NC-SI spec v1.2 section 8.4.44.2, the firmware name doesn't
need to be null terminated while its size occupies the full size
of the field. Fix the buffer overflow issue by adding one
additional byte for null terminator.
Signed-off-by: Hari Kalavakunta <kalavakunta.hari.prasad@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Fertser <fercerpav@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610193338.1368-1-kalavakunta.hari.prasad@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c7d78566bb ]
As discussesd before in [0] proxy entries (which are more configuration
than runtime data) should stay when the link (carrier) goes does down.
This is what happens for regular neighbour entries.
So lets fix this by:
- storing in proxy entries the fact that it was added as NUD_PERMANENT
- not removing NUD_PERMANENT proxy entries when the carrier goes down
(same as how it's done in neigh_flush_dev() for regular neigh entries)
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/c584ef7e-6897-01f3-5b80-12b53f7b4bf4@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Escande <nico.escande@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617141334.3724863-1-nico.escande@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 140c6a61d8 ]
Currently, when a non-DFS channel is brought up and the bandwidth is
expanded from 80 MHz to 160 MHz, where the primary 80 MHz is non-DFS
and the secondary 80 MHz consists of DFS channels, radar detection
fails if radar occurs in the secondary 80 MHz.
When the channel is switched from 80 MHz to 160 MHz, with the primary
80 MHz being non-DFS and the secondary 80 MHz consisting of DFS
channels, the radar required flag in the channel switch parameters
is set to true. However, when using a reserved channel context,
it is not updated in sdata, which disables radar detection in the
secondary 80 MHz DFS channels.
Update the radar required flag in sdata to fix this issue when using
a reserved channel context.
Signed-off-by: Ramya Gnanasekar <ramya.gnanasekar@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ramasamy Kaliappan <ramasamy.kaliappan@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250608140324.1687117-1-ramasamy.kaliappan@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 21deb2d966 ]
_Static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(map) != IEEE8021Q_TT_MAX - 1) rejects only a
length of 7 and allows any other mismatch. Replace it with a strict
equality test via a helper macro so that every mapping table must have
exactly IEEE8021Q_TT_MAX (8) entries.
Signed-off-by: RubenKelevra <rubenkelevra@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250626205907.1566384-1-rubenkelevra@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 94f39804d8 ]
The issue originates when Strongswan initiates an XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI
Netlink message, which triggers the kernel function xfrm_alloc_spi().
This function is expected to ensure uniqueness of the Security Parameter
Index (SPI) for inbound Security Associations (SAs). However, it can
return success even when the requested SPI is already in use, leading
to duplicate SPIs assigned to multiple inbound SAs, differentiated
only by their destination addresses.
This behavior causes inconsistencies during SPI lookups for inbound packets.
Since the lookup may return an arbitrary SA among those with the same SPI,
packet processing can fail, resulting in packet drops.
According to RFC 4301 section 4.4.2 , for inbound processing a unicast SA
is uniquely identified by the SPI and optionally protocol.
Reproducing the Issue Reliably:
To consistently reproduce the problem, restrict the available SPI range in
charon.conf : spi_min = 0x10000000 spi_max = 0x10000002
This limits the system to only 2 usable SPI values.
Next, create more than 2 Child SA. each using unique pair of src/dst address.
As soon as the 3rd Child SA is initiated, it will be assigned a duplicate
SPI, since the SPI pool is already exhausted.
With a narrow SPI range, the issue is consistently reproducible.
With a broader/default range, it becomes rare and unpredictable.
Current implementation:
xfrm_spi_hash() lookup function computes hash using daddr, proto, and family.
So if two SAs have the same SPI but different destination addresses, then
they will:
a. Hash into different buckets
b. Be stored in different linked lists (byspi + h)
c. Not be seen in the same hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() iteration.
As a result, the lookup will result in NULL and kernel allows that Duplicate SPI
Proposed Change:
xfrm_state_lookup_spi_proto() does a truly global search - across all states,
regardless of hash bucket and matches SPI and proto.
Signed-off-by: Aakash Kumar S <saakashkumar@marvell.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cc2b722132 ]
Currently, ieee80211_rx_data_set_sta() does not correctly handle the
case where the interface supports multiple links (MLO), but the station
does not (non-MLO). This can lead to incorrect link assignment or
unexpected warnings when accessing link information.
Hence, add a fix to check if the station lacks valid link support and
use its default link ID for rx->link assignment. If the station
unexpectedly has valid links, fall back to the default link.
This ensures correct link association and prevents potential issues
in mixed MLO/non-MLO environments.
Signed-off-by: Hari Chandrakanthan <quic_haric@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sarika Sharma <quic_sarishar@quicinc.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250630084119.3583593-1-quic_sarishar@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dbd40f318c ]
Since commit 63ed8de4be ("mld: add mc_lock for protecting
per-interface mld data"), every multicast resource is protected
by inet6_dev->mc_lock.
RTNL is unnecessary in terms of protection but still needed for
synchronisation between addrconf_ifdown() and __ipv6_dev_mc_inc().
Once we removed RTNL, there would be a race below, where we could
add a multicast address to a dead inet6_dev.
CPU1 CPU2
==== ====
addrconf_ifdown() __ipv6_dev_mc_inc()
if (idev->dead) <-- false
dead = true return -ENODEV;
ipv6_mc_destroy_dev() / ipv6_mc_down()
mutex_lock(&idev->mc_lock)
...
mutex_unlock(&idev->mc_lock)
mutex_lock(&idev->mc_lock)
...
mutex_unlock(&idev->mc_lock)
The race window can be easily closed by checking inet6_dev->dead
under inet6_dev->mc_lock in __ipv6_dev_mc_inc() as addrconf_ifdown()
will acquire it after marking inet6_dev dead.
Let's check inet6_dev->dead under mc_lock in __ipv6_dev_mc_inc().
Note that now __ipv6_dev_mc_inc() no longer depends on RTNL and
we can remove ASSERT_RTNL() there and the RTNL comment above
addrconf_join_solict().
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250702230210.3115355-4-kuni1840@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit be1ba9ed22 ]
If we get to the error path of ieee80211_prep_connection, for example
because of a FW issue, then ieee80211_vif_set_links is called
with 0.
But the call to drv_change_vif_links from ieee80211_vif_update_links
will probably fail as well, for the same reason.
In this case, the valid_links and active_links bitmaps will be reverted
to the value of the failing connection.
Then, in the next connection, due to the logic of
ieee80211_set_vif_links_bitmaps, valid_links will be set to the ID of
the new connection assoc link, but the active_links will remain with the
ID of the old connection's assoc link.
If those IDs are different, we get into a weird state of valid_links and
active_links being different. One of the consequences of this state is
to call drv_change_vif_links with new_links as 0, since the & operation
between the bitmaps will be 0.
Since a removal of a link should always succeed, ignore the return value
of drv_change_vif_links if it was called to only remove links, which is
the case for the ieee80211_prep_connection's error path.
That way, the bitmaps will not be reverted to have the value from the
failing connection and will have 0, so the next connection will have a
good state.
Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250609213231.ba2011fb435f.Id87ff6dab5e1cf757b54094ac2d714c656165059@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6b04716cdc ]
When SAE commit is sent and received in response, there's no
ordering for the SAE confirm messages. As such, don't call
drivers to stop listening on the channel when the confirm
message is still expected.
This fixes an issue if the local confirm is transmitted later
than the AP's confirm, for iwlwifi (and possibly mt76) the
AP's confirm would then get lost since the device isn't on
the channel at the time the AP transmit the confirm.
For iwlwifi at least, this also improves the overall timing
of the authentication handshake (by about 15ms according to
the report), likely since the session protection won't be
aborted and rescheduled.
Note that even before this, mgd_complete_tx() wasn't always
called for each call to mgd_prepare_tx() (e.g. in the case
of WEP key shared authentication), and the current drivers
that have the complete callback don't seem to mind. Document
this as well though.
Reported-by: Jan Hendrik Farr <kernel@jfarr.cc>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aB30Ea2kRG24LINR@archlinux/
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250609213232.12691580e140.I3f1d3127acabcd58348a110ab11044213cf147d3@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9e30ecf23b ]
Currently, __mkroute_output overrules the MTU value configured for
broadcast routes.
This buggy behaviour can be reproduced with:
ip link set dev eth1 mtu 9000
ip route del broadcast 192.168.0.255 dev eth1 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.0.2
ip route add broadcast 192.168.0.255 dev eth1 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.0.2 mtu 1500
The maximum packet size should be 1500, but it is actually 8000:
ping -b 192.168.0.255 -s 8000
Fix __mkroute_output to allow MTU values to be configured for
for broadcast routes (to support a mixed-MTU local-area-network).
Signed-off-by: Oscar Maes <oscmaes92@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250710142714.12986-1-oscmaes92@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a6d521bafc ]
If a link has no chanctx, indicating it is an inactive link
that we tracked CSA for, then attempting to unreserve the
reserved chanctx will throw a warning and fail, since there
never was a reserved chanctx. Skip the unreserve.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250709233537.022192f4b1ae.Ib58156ac13e674a9f4d714735be0764a244c0aae@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3954502377 ]
Disallow bind() calls that have the same arguments as existing bound
sockets. Previously multiple sockets could bind() to the same
type/local address, with an arbitrary socket receiving matched messages.
This is only a partial fix, a future commit will define precedence order
for MCTP_ADDR_ANY versus specific EID bind(), which are allowed to exist
together.
Signed-off-by: Matt Johnston <matt@codeconstruct.com.au>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250710-mctp-bind-v4-2-8ec2f6460c56@codeconstruct.com.au
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4d7936e8a5 ]
Reset cookie value to 0 instead of 0xffffffff in hci_sock_free_cookie()
since:
0 : means cookie has not been assigned yet
0xffffffff: means cookie assignment failure
Also fix generating cookie failure with usage shown below:
hci_sock_gen_cookie(sk) // generate cookie
hci_sock_free_cookie(sk) // free cookie
hci_sock_gen_cookie(sk) // Can't generate cookie any more
Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <zijun.hu@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 897eefee2e ]
The scratchmap size depends on the number of elements in the set.
For huge sets, each scratch map can easily require very large
allocations, e.g. for 100k entries each scratch map will require
close to 64kbyte of memory.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6db015fc4b5d5f63a64a193f65d98da3a7fc811d ]
TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket.
This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket
entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard
read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy
early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real
error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry.
We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock,
so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read
(not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len).
If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue
we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record.
Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting
a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash
should take place.
Reported-by: William Liu <will@willsroot.io>
Reported-by: Savino Dicanosa <savy@syst3mfailure.io>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/tFjq_kf7sWIG3A7CrCg_egb8CVsT_gsmHAK0_wxDPJXfIzxFAMxqmLwp3MlU5EHiet0AwwJldaaFdgyHpeIUCS-3m3llsmRzp9xIOBR4lAI=@syst3mfailure.io
Fixes: 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250807232907.600366-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit de788b2e6227462b6dcd0e07474e72c089008f74 ]
There is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table():
if (res < 0) {
nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general); // HERE
cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;
...
While its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last.
If this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented.
This 2nd increment is never undone.
This prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn
keeps prevents cnet->count from dropping back to 0.
This will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as
nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.
This can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop.
It takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before
I see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.
One fix would to change this to:
if (res < 0) {
if (ct != last)
nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);
But this reference counting isn't needed in the first place.
We can just store a cookie value instead.
A followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,
it looks to me as if this has the same problem and like
ctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a 'skip hint', not the actual
object so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.
Fixes: d205dc4079 ("[NETFILTER]: ctnetlink: fix deadlock in table dumping")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1118aaa3b35157777890fffab91d8c1da841b20b ]
Commit b40c5f4fde ("udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in
IPsec case") tried to fix checksumming in UFO when the packets are
going through IPsec, so that we can't rely on offloads because the UDP
header and payload will be encrypted.
But when doing a TCP test over VXLAN going through IPsec transport
mode with GSO enabled (esp4_offload module loaded), I'm seeing broken
UDP checksums on the encap after successful decryption.
The skbs get to udp4_ufo_fragment/__skb_udp_tunnel_segment via
__dev_queue_xmit -> validate_xmit_skb -> skb_gso_segment and at this
point we've already dropped the dst (unless the device sets
IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE, which is not common), so need_ipsec is false and
we proceed with checksum offload.
Make need_ipsec also check the secpath, which is not dropped on this
callpath.
Fixes: b40c5f4fde ("udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in IPsec case")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 759dfc7d04 upstream.
netlink_attachskb() checks for the socket's read memory allocation
constraints. Firstly, it has:
rmem < READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)
to check if the just increased rmem value fits into the socket's receive
buffer. If not, it proceeds and tries to wait for the memory under:
rmem + skb->truesize > READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)
The checks don't cover the case when skb->truesize + sk->sk_rmem_alloc is
equal to sk->sk_rcvbuf. Thus the function neither successfully accepts
these conditions, nor manages to reschedule the task - and is called in
retry loop for indefinite time which is caught as:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
rcu: 0-....: (25999 ticks this GP) idle=ef2/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=262269/262269 fqs=6212
(t=26000 jiffies g=230833 q=259957)
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: kauditd Not tainted 5.10.240 #68
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold lib/nmi_backtrace.c:105
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
rcu_dump_cpu_stacks kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h:335
rcu_sched_clock_irq.cold kernel/rcu/tree.c:2590
update_process_times kernel/time/timer.c:1953
tick_sched_handle kernel/time/tick-sched.c:227
tick_sched_timer kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1399
__hrtimer_run_queues kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1652
hrtimer_interrupt kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1717
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1113
asm_call_irq_on_stack arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:808
</IRQ>
netlink_attachskb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1234
netlink_unicast net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1349
kauditd_send_queue kernel/audit.c:776
kauditd_thread kernel/audit.c:897
kthread kernel/kthread.c:328
ret_from_fork arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
Restore the original behavior of the check which commit in Fixes
accidentally missed when restructuring the code.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: ae8f160e7e ("netlink: Fix wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250728080727.255138-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit aba0c94f61ec05315fa7815d21aefa4c87f6a9f4 upstream.
It is possible for a vsock to autobind to VMADDR_PORT_ANY. This can
cause a use-after-free when a connection is made to the bound socket.
The socket returned by accept() also has port VMADDR_PORT_ANY but is not
on the list of unbound sockets. Binding it will result in an extra
refcount decrement similar to the one fixed in fcdd2242c0 (vsock: Keep
the binding until socket destruction).
Modify the check in __vsock_bind_connectible() to also prevent binding
to VMADDR_PORT_ANY.
Fixes: d021c34405 ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Reported-by: Budimir Markovic <markovicbudimir@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Budimir Markovic <markovicbudimir@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250807041811.678-1-markovicbudimir@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 01d3c8417b upstream.
When packet_set_ring() releases po->bind_lock, another thread can
run packet_notifier() and process an NETDEV_UP event.
This race and the fix are both similar to that of commit 15fe076ede
("net/packet: fix a race in packet_bind() and packet_notifier()").
There too the packet_notifier NETDEV_UP event managed to run while a
po->bind_lock critical section had to be temporarily released. And
the fix was similarly to temporarily set po->num to zero to keep
the socket unhooked until the lock is retaken.
The po->bind_lock in packet_set_ring and packet_notifier precede the
introduction of git history.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Quang Le <quanglex97@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250801175423.2970334-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bee47cb026e762841f3faece47b51f985e215edb upstream.
Scott Mayhew discovered a security exploit in NFS over TLS in
tls_alert_recv() due to its assumption it can read data from
the msg iterator's kvec..
kTLS implementation splits TLS non-data record payload between
the control message buffer (which includes the type such as TLS
aler or TLS cipher change) and the rest of the payload (say TLS
alert's level/description) which goes into the msg payload buffer.
This patch proposes to rework how control messages are setup and
used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and
process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a
kvec backed msg buffer and read in the control message such as a
TLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of
the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling
into the tls_alert_recv.
Reported-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Fixes: 5e052dda12 ("SUNRPC: Recognize control messages in server-side TCP socket code")
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ffd2dc4c6c ]
TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX is validated using
NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U32, TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE), which allows the value
TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE (16). This leads to a 4-byte out-of-bounds stack
write in the fp[] array, which only has room for 16 elements (0–15).
Fix this by changing the policy to allow only up to TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE - 1.
Fixes: f62af20bed ("net/sched: mqprio: allow per-TC user input of FP adminStatus")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maher Azzouzi <maherazz04@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250802001857.2702497-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cc5d59081f ]
A security exploit was discovered in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv
due to its assumption that there is valid data in the msghdr's
iterator's kvec.
Instead, this patch proposes the rework how control messages are
setup and used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and
process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec
backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS
alert. Scott found that a msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer
as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator
before calling into the tls_alert_recv.
Fixes: dea034b963 ("SUNRPC: Capture CMSG metadata on client-side receive")
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Suggested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250731180058.4669-3-okorniev@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
