[ Upstream commit 6aba0cb5bb ]
As-per the SBI specification, an SBI remote fence operation applies
to the entire address space if either:
1) start_addr and size are both 0
2) size is equal to 2^XLEN-1
>From the above, only #1 is checked by SBI SFENCE calls so fix the
size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls to cover #2 as well.
Fixes: 13acfec2db ("RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests")
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605061458.196003-2-apatel@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit f754f27e98 upstream.
In sparse vmemmap model, the virtual address of vmemmap is calculated as:
((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT)).
And the struct page's va can be calculated with an offset:
(vmemmap + (pfn)).
However, when initializing struct pages, kernel actually starts from the
first page from the same section that phys_ram_base belongs to. If the
first page's physical address is not (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT), then
we get an va below VMEMMAP_START when calculating va for it's struct page.
For example, if phys_ram_base starts from 0x82000000 with pfn 0x82000, the
first page in the same section is actually pfn 0x80000. During
init_unavailable_range(), we will initialize struct page for pfn 0x80000
with virtual address ((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - 0x2000), which is
below VMEMMAP_START as well as PCI_IO_END.
This commit fixes this bug by introducing a new variable
'vmemmap_start_pfn' which is aligned with memory section size and using
it to calculate vmemmap address instead of phys_ram_base.
Fixes: a11dd49dcb ("riscv: Sparse-Memory/vmemmap out-of-bounds fix")
Signed-off-by: Xu Lu <luxu.kernel@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241209122617.53341-1-luxu.kernel@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhaoyang Li <lizy04@hust.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit adf53771a3 upstream.
When building with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y and W=1, there is a warning
because of the memcpy() in syscall_get_arguments():
In file included from include/linux/string.h:392,
from include/linux/bitmap.h:13,
from include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
from arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h:55,
from include/linux/sched.h:13,
from kernel/ptrace.c:13:
In function 'fortify_memcpy_chk',
inlined from 'syscall_get_arguments.isra' at arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h:66:2:
include/linux/fortify-string.h:580:25: error: call to '__read_overflow2_field' declared with attribute warning: detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Werror=attribute-warning]
580 | __read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
The fortified memcpy() routine enforces that the source is not overread
and the destination is not overwritten if the size of either field and
the size of the copy are known at compile time. The memcpy() in
syscall_get_arguments() intentionally overreads from a1 to a5 in
'struct pt_regs' but this is bigger than the size of a1.
Normally, this could be solved by wrapping a1 through a5 with
struct_group() but there was already a struct_group() applied to these
members in commit bba547810c ("riscv: tracing: Fix
__write_overflow_field in ftrace_partial_regs()").
Just avoid memcpy() altogether and write the copying of args from regs
manually, which clears up the warning at the expense of three extra
lines of code.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
Fixes: e2c0cdfba7 ("RISC-V: User-facing API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250409-riscv-avoid-fortify-warning-syscall_get_arguments-v1-1-7853436d4755@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 550c2aa787 ]
[ Quoting Samuel Holland: ]
This is a separate issue, but using ".option rvc" here is a bug.
It will unconditionally enable the C extension for the rest of
the file, even if the kernel is being built with CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C=n.
[ Quoting Palmer Dabbelt: ]
We're just looking at the address of kgdb_compiled_break, so it's
fine if it ends up as a c.ebreak.
[ Quoting Alexandre Ghiti: ]
.option norvc is used to prevent the assembler from using compressed
instructions, but it's generally used when we need to ensure the
size of the instructions that are used, which is not the case here
as noted by Palmer since we only care about the address. So yes
it will work fine with C enabled :)
So let's just remove them all.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4b4187c1-77e5-44b7-885f-d6826723dd9a@sifive.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/mhng-69513841-5068-441d-be8f-2aeebdc56a08@palmer-ri-x1c9a/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/23693e7f-4fff-40f3-a437-e06d827278a5@ghiti.fr/
Fixes: fe89bd2be8 ("riscv: Add KGDB support")
Cc: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8B431C6A4626225C+20250411073222.56820-2-wangyuli@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e94eb7ea6f ]
The /proc/iomem represents the kernel's memory map. Regions marked
with "Reserved" tells the user that the range should not be tampered
with. Kexec-tools, when using the older kexec_load syscall relies on
the "Reserved" regions to build the memory segments, that will be the
target of the new kexec'd kernel.
The RISC-V port tries to expose all reserved regions to userland, but
some regions were not properly exposed: Regions that resided in both
the "regular" and reserved memory block, e.g. the EFI Memory Map. A
missing entry could result in reserved memory being overwritten.
It turns out, that arm64, and loongarch had a similar issue a while
back:
commit d91680e687 ("arm64: Fix /proc/iomem for reserved but not memory regions")
commit 50d7ba36b9 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem")
Similar to the other ports, resolve the issue by splitting the regions
in an arch initcall, since we need a working allocator.
Fixes: ffe0e52612 ("RISC-V: Improve init_resources()")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250409182129.634415-1-bjorn@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5f1a58ed91 ]
This patch adds parentheses to parameters caller and callee of macros
make_call_t0 and make_call_ra. Every existing invocation of these two
macros uses a single variable for each argument, so the absence of the
parentheses seems okay. However, future invocations might use more
complex expressions as arguments. For example, a future invocation might
look like this: make_call_t0(a - b, c, call). Without parentheses in the
macro definition, the macro invocation expands to:
...
unsigned int offset = (unsigned long) c - (unsigned long) a - b;
...
which is clearly wrong.
The use of parentheses ensures arguments are correctly evaluated and
potentially saves future users of make_call_t0 and make_call_ra debugging
trouble.
Fixes: 6724a76cff ("riscv: ftrace: Reduce the detour code size to half")
Signed-off-by: Juhan Jin <juhan.jin@foxmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_AE90AA59903A628E87E9F80E563DA5BA5508@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 599c44cd21 upstream.
Make sure the compare value in the lr/sc loop is sign extended to match
what lr.w does. Fortunately, due to the compiler keeping the register
contents sign extended anyway the lack of the explicit extension didn't
result in wrong code so far, but this cannot be relied upon.
Fixes: b90edb3301 ("RISC-V: Add futex support.")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/mvmfrkv2vhz.fsf@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6a97f4118a upstream.
die() can be called in exception handler, and therefore cannot sleep.
However, die() takes spinlock_t which can sleep with PREEMPT_RT enabled.
That causes the following warning:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 285, name: mutex
preempt_count: 110001, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 285 Comm: mutex Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-00022-ge19049cf7d56-dirty #234
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
Call Trace:
dump_backtrace+0x1c/0x24
show_stack+0x2c/0x38
dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x72
dump_stack+0x14/0x1c
__might_resched+0x130/0x13a
rt_spin_lock+0x2a/0x5c
die+0x24/0x112
do_trap_insn_illegal+0xa0/0xea
_new_vmalloc_restore_context_a0+0xcc/0xd8
Oops - illegal instruction [#1]
Switch to use raw_spinlock_t, which does not sleep even with PREEMPT_RT
enabled.
Fixes: 76d2a0493a ("RISC-V: Init and Halt Code")
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241118091333.1185288-1-namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fb197c5d2f upstream.
When alignment handling is delegated to the kernel, everything must be
word-aligned in purgatory, since the trap handler is then set to the
kexec one. Without the alignment, hitting the exception would
ultimately crash. On other occasions, the kernel's handler would take
care of exceptions.
This has been tested on a JH7110 SoC with oreboot and its SBI delegating
unaligned access exceptions and the kernel configured to handle them.
Fixes: 736e30af58 ("RISC-V: Add purgatory")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Maslowski <cyrevolt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719170437.247457-1-cyrevolt@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 46d4e5ac6f ]
The macro is not used in the current version of kernel, it looks like
can be removed to avoid a build warning:
../arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c: At top level:
../arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c:7: warning: macro "GENERATING_ASM_OFFSETS" is not used [-Wunused-macros]
7 | #define GENERATING_ASM_OFFSETS
Fixes: 9639a44394 ("RISC-V: Provide a cleaner raw_smp_processor_id()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang <zhangchunyan@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008094141.549248-2-zhangchunyan@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d41373a4b9 ]
The IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT informs the firmware that the
EFI binary does not rely on pages that are both executable and
writable.
The flag is used by some distro versions of GRUB to decide if the EFI
binary may be executed.
As the Linux kernel neither has RWX sections nor needs RWX pages for
relocation we should set the flag.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Renner Berthing <emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com>
Fixes: cb7d2dd561 ("RISC-V: Add PE/COFF header for EFI stub")
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240929140233.211800-1-heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bf40167d54 ]
The compiler is smart enough to insert a call to memset() in
riscv_vdso_get_cpus(), which generates a dynamic relocation.
So prevent this by using -fno-builtin option.
Fixes: e2c0cdfba7 ("RISC-V: User-facing API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241016083625.136311-2-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e025ab842e ]
Most architectures (except arm64/x86/sparc) simply return 1 for
kern_addr_valid(), which is only used in read_kcore(), and it calls
copy_from_kernel_nofault() which could check whether the address is a
valid kernel address. So as there is no need for kern_addr_valid(), let's
remove it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221018074014.185687-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k]
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> [s390]
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> [parisc]
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc]
Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> [csky]
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64]
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Xuerui Wang <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.osdn.me>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: 3d5854d75e ("fs/proc/kcore.c: allow translation of physical memory addresses")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e59db0623f ]
According to the prototype formal BPF memory consistency model
discussed e.g. in [1] and following the ordering properties of
the C/in-kernel macro atomic_cmpxchg(), a BPF atomic operation
with the BPF_CMPXCHG modifier is fully ordered. However, the
current RISC-V JIT lowerings fail to meet such memory ordering
property. This is illustrated by the following litmus test:
BPF BPF__MP+success_cmpxchg+fence
{
0:r1=x; 0:r3=y; 0:r5=1;
1:r2=y; 1:r4=f; 1:r7=x;
}
P0 | P1 ;
*(u64 *)(r1 + 0) = 1 | r1 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0) ;
r2 = cmpxchg_64 (r3 + 0, r4, r5) | r3 = atomic_fetch_add((u64 *)(r4 + 0), r5) ;
| r6 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) ;
exists (1:r1=1 /\ 1:r6=0)
whose "exists" clause is not satisfiable according to the BPF
memory model. Using the current RISC-V JIT lowerings, the test
can be mapped to the following RISC-V litmus test:
RISCV RISCV__MP+success_cmpxchg+fence
{
0:x1=x; 0:x3=y; 0:x5=1;
1:x2=y; 1:x4=f; 1:x7=x;
}
P0 | P1 ;
sd x5, 0(x1) | ld x1, 0(x2) ;
L00: | amoadd.d.aqrl x3, x5, 0(x4) ;
lr.d x2, 0(x3) | ld x6, 0(x7) ;
bne x2, x4, L01 | ;
sc.d x6, x5, 0(x3) | ;
bne x6, x4, L00 | ;
fence rw, rw | ;
L01: | ;
exists (1:x1=1 /\ 1:x6=0)
where the two stores in P0 can be reordered. Update the RISC-V
JIT lowerings/implementation of BPF_CMPXCHG to emit an SC with
RELEASE ("rl") annotation in order to meet the expected memory
ordering guarantees. The resulting RISC-V JIT lowerings of
BPF_CMPXCHG match the RISC-V lowerings of the C atomic_cmpxchg().
Other lowerings were fixed via 20a759df3b ("riscv, bpf: make
some atomic operations fully ordered").
Fixes: dd642ccb45 ("riscv, bpf: Implement more atomic operations for RV64")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Link: https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1949/attachments/1665/3441/bpfmemmodel.2024.09.19p.pdf [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241017143628.2673894-1-parri.andrea@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ad380f6a0a ]
I recently ended up with a warning on some compilers along the lines of
CC kernel/resource.o
In file included from include/linux/ioport.h:16,
from kernel/resource.c:15:
kernel/resource.c: In function 'gfr_start':
include/linux/minmax.h:49:37: error: conversion from 'long long unsigned int' to 'resource_size_t' {aka 'unsigned int'} changes value from '17179869183' to '4294967295' [-Werror=overflow]
49 | ({ type ux = (x); type uy = (y); __cmp(op, ux, uy); })
| ^
include/linux/minmax.h:52:9: note: in expansion of macro '__cmp_once_unique'
52 | __cmp_once_unique(op, type, x, y, __UNIQUE_ID(x_), __UNIQUE_ID(y_))
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/minmax.h:161:27: note: in expansion of macro '__cmp_once'
161 | #define min_t(type, x, y) __cmp_once(min, type, x, y)
| ^~~~~~~~~~
kernel/resource.c:1829:23: note: in expansion of macro 'min_t'
1829 | end = min_t(resource_size_t, base->end,
| ^~~~~
kernel/resource.c: In function 'gfr_continue':
include/linux/minmax.h:49:37: error: conversion from 'long long unsigned int' to 'resource_size_t' {aka 'unsigned int'} changes value from '17179869183' to '4294967295' [-Werror=overflow]
49 | ({ type ux = (x); type uy = (y); __cmp(op, ux, uy); })
| ^
include/linux/minmax.h:52:9: note: in expansion of macro '__cmp_once_unique'
52 | __cmp_once_unique(op, type, x, y, __UNIQUE_ID(x_), __UNIQUE_ID(y_))
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/minmax.h:161:27: note: in expansion of macro '__cmp_once'
161 | #define min_t(type, x, y) __cmp_once(min, type, x, y)
| ^~~~~~~~~~
kernel/resource.c:1847:24: note: in expansion of macro 'min_t'
1847 | addr <= min_t(resource_size_t, base->end,
| ^~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
which looks like a real problem: our phys_addr_t is only 32 bits now, so
having 34-bit masks is just going to result in overflows.
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240731162159.9235-2-palmer@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 5c178472af upstream.
This is used in poison.h for poison pointer offset. Based on current
SV39, SV48 and SV57 vm layout, 0xdead000000000000 is a proper value
that is not mappable, this can avoid potentially turning an oops to
an expolit.
Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Fixes: fbe934d69e ("RISC-V: Build Infrastructure")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240705170210.3236-1-jszhang@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 6b7b282e6b ]
When forwarding SBI calls to userspace ensure sbiret.error is
initialized to SBI_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED first, in case userspace
neglects to set it to anything. If userspace neglects it then we
can't be sure it did anything else either, so we just report it
didn't do or try anything. Just init sbiret.value to zero, which is
the preferred value to return when nothing special is specified.
KVM was already initializing both sbiret.error and sbiret.value, but
the values used appear to come from a copy+paste of the __sbi_ecall()
implementation, i.e. a0 and a1, which don't apply prior to the call
being executed, nor at all when forwarding to userspace.
Fixes: dea8ee31a0 ("RISC-V: KVM: Add SBI v0.1 support")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240807154943.150540-2-ajones@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6ad8735994 ]
The exception vector of the booting hart is not set before enabling
the mmu and then still points to the value of the previous firmware,
typically _start. That makes it hard to debug setup_vm() when bad
things happen. So fix that by setting the exception vector earlier.
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: yang.zhang <yang.zhang@hexintek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508022445.6131-1-gaoshanliukou@163.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 57d76bc51f upstream.
With XIP kernel, kernel_map.size is set to be only the size of data part of
the kernel. This is inconsistent with "normal" kernel, who sets it to be
the size of the entire kernel.
More importantly, XIP kernel fails to boot if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL is
enabled, because there are checks on virtual addresses with the assumption
that kernel_map.size is the size of the entire kernel (these checks are in
arch/riscv/mm/physaddr.c).
Change XIP's kernel_map.size to be the size of the entire kernel.
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.1+
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508191917.2892064-1-namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 0c710050c4 ]
Handle VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV in the page fault path so that we correctly
kill the process and we don't BUG() the kernel.
Fixes: 07037db5d4 ("RISC-V: Paging and MMU")
Signed-off-by: Zhe Qiao <qiaozhe@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240731084547.85380-1-qiaozhe@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 393da6cbb2 ]
ftrace_graph_ret_addr() takes an `idx` integer pointer that is used to
optimize the stack unwinding. Pass it a valid pointer to utilize the
optimizations that might be available in the future.
The commit is making riscv's usage of ftrace_graph_ret_addr() match
x86_64.
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240618145820.62112-1-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c562ba719d ]
If the kexec crash code is called in the interrupt context, the
machine_kexec_mask_interrupts() function will trigger a deadlock while
trying to acquire the irqdesc spinlock and then deactivate irqchip in
irq_set_irqchip_state() function.
Unlike arm64, riscv only requires irq_eoi handler to complete EOI and
keeping irq_set_irqchip_state() will only leave this possible deadlock
without any use. So we simply remove it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20231208111015.173237-1-songshuaishuai@tinylab.org/
Fixes: b17d19a531 ("riscv: kexec: Fixup irq controller broken in kexec crash path")
Signed-off-by: Song Shuai <songshuaishuai@tinylab.org>
Reviewed-by: Ryo Takakura <takakura@valinux.co.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240626023316.539971-1-songshuaishuai@tinylab.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 23b2188920 ]
arch_stack_walk() is called intensively in function_graph when the
kernel is compiled with CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS. As a result, the kernel
logs a lot of arch_stack_walk and its sub-functions into the ftrace
buffer. However, these functions should not appear on the trace log
because they are part of the ftrace itself. This patch references what
arm64 does for the smae function. So it further prevent the re-enter
kprobe issue, which is also possible on riscv.
Related-to: commit 0fbcd8abf3 ("arm64: Prohibit instrumentation on arch_stack_walk()")
Fixes: 680341382d ("riscv: add CALLER_ADDRx support")
Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613-dev-andyc-dyn-ftrace-v4-v1-1-1a538e12c01e@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit fb1cf08783 upstream.
__kernel_map_pages() is a debug function which clears the valid bit in page
table entry for deallocated pages to detect illegal memory accesses to
freed pages.
This function set/clear the valid bit using __set_memory(). __set_memory()
acquires init_mm's semaphore, and this operation may sleep. This is
problematic, because __kernel_map_pages() can be called in atomic context,
and thus is illegal to sleep. An example warning that this causes:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1578
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 2, name: kthreadd
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
CPU: 0 PID: 2 Comm: kthreadd Not tainted 6.9.0-g1d4c6d784ef6 #37
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff800060dc>] dump_backtrace+0x1c/0x24
[<ffffffff8091ef6e>] show_stack+0x2c/0x38
[<ffffffff8092baf8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x72
[<ffffffff8092bb24>] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c
[<ffffffff8003b7ac>] __might_resched+0x104/0x10e
[<ffffffff8003b7f4>] __might_sleep+0x3e/0x62
[<ffffffff8093276a>] down_write+0x20/0x72
[<ffffffff8000cf00>] __set_memory+0x82/0x2fa
[<ffffffff8000d324>] __kernel_map_pages+0x5a/0xd4
[<ffffffff80196cca>] __alloc_pages_bulk+0x3b2/0x43a
[<ffffffff8018ee82>] __vmalloc_node_range+0x196/0x6ba
[<ffffffff80011904>] copy_process+0x72c/0x17ec
[<ffffffff80012ab4>] kernel_clone+0x60/0x2fe
[<ffffffff80012f62>] kernel_thread+0x82/0xa0
[<ffffffff8003552c>] kthreadd+0x14a/0x1be
[<ffffffff809357de>] ret_from_fork+0xe/0x1c
Rewrite this function with apply_to_existing_page_range(). It is fine to
not have any locking, because __kernel_map_pages() works with pages being
allocated/deallocated and those pages are not changed by anyone else in the
meantime.
Fixes: 5fde3db5eb ("riscv: add ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC support")
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1289ecba9606a19917bc12b6c27da8aa23e1e5ae.1715750938.git.namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 994af1825a upstream.
On riscv32, it is possible for the last page in virtual address space
(0xfffff000) to be allocated. This page overlaps with PTR_ERR, so that
shouldn't happen.
There is already some code to ensure memblock won't allocate the last page.
However, buddy allocator is left unchecked.
Fix this by reserving physical memory that would be mapped at virtual
addresses greater than 0xfffff000.
Reported-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/878r1ibpdn.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong.to.us
Fixes: 76d2a0493a ("RISC-V: Init and Halt Code")
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425115201.3044202-1-namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ce4f78f1b5 upstream.
In the current riscv implementation, blocking syscalls like read() may
not correctly restart after being interrupted by ptrace. This problem
arises when the syscall restart process in arch_do_signal_or_restart()
is bypassed due to changes to the regs->cause register, such as an
ebreak instruction.
Steps to reproduce:
1. Interrupt the tracee process with PTRACE_SEIZE & PTRACE_INTERRUPT.
2. Backup original registers and instruction at new_pc.
3. Change pc to new_pc, and inject an instruction (like ebreak) to this
address.
4. Resume with PTRACE_CONT and wait for the process to stop again after
executing ebreak.
5. Restore original registers and instructions, and detach from the
tracee process.
6. Now the read() syscall in tracee will return -1 with errno set to
ERESTARTSYS.
Specifically, during an interrupt, the regs->cause changes from
EXC_SYSCALL to EXC_BREAKPOINT due to the injected ebreak, which is
inaccessible via ptrace so we cannot restore it. This alteration breaks
the syscall restart condition and ends the read() syscall with an
ERESTARTSYS error. According to include/linux/errno.h, it should never
be seen by user programs. X86 can avoid this issue as it checks the
syscall condition using a register (orig_ax) exposed to user space.
Arm64 handles syscall restart before calling get_signal, where it could
be paused and inspected by ptrace/debugger.
This patch adjusts the riscv implementation to arm64 style, which also
checks syscall using a kernel register (syscallno). It ensures the
syscall restart process is not bypassed when changes to the cause
register occur, providing more consistent behavior across various
architectures.
For a simplified reproduction program, feel free to visit:
https://github.com/ancientmodern/riscv-ptrace-bug-demo.
Signed-off-by: Haorong Lu <ancientmodern4@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803224458.4156006-1-ancientmodern4@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Conor Dooley <conor@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a638b0461b ]
Top of the kernel thread stack should be reserved for pt_regs. However
this is not the case for the idle threads of the secondary boot harts.
Their stacks overlap with their pt_regs, so both may get corrupted.
Similar issue has been fixed for the primary hart, see c7cdd96eca
("riscv: prevent stack corruption by reserving task_pt_regs(p) early").
However that fix was not propagated to the secondary harts. The problem
has been noticed in some CPU hotplug tests with V enabled. The function
smp_callin stored several registers on stack, corrupting top of pt_regs
structure including status field. As a result, kernel attempted to save
or restore inexistent V context.
Fixes: 9a2451f186 ("RISC-V: Avoid using per cpu array for ordered booting")
Fixes: 2875fe0561 ("RISC-V: Add cpu_ops and modify default booting method")
Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich@syntacore.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523084327.2013211-1-geomatsi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a2a4d4a6a0 ]
If the load access fault occures in a leaf function (with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y), when wrong stack trace will be displayed:
[<ffffffff804853c2>] regmap_mmio_read32le+0xe/0x1c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Registers dump:
ra 0xffffffff80485758 <regmap_mmio_read+36>
sp 0xffffffc80200b9a0
fp 0xffffffc80200b9b0
pc 0xffffffff804853ba <regmap_mmio_read32le+6>
Stack dump:
0xffffffc80200b9a0: 0xffffffc80200b9e0 0xffffffc80200b9e0
0xffffffc80200b9b0: 0xffffffff8116d7e8 0x0000000000000100
0xffffffc80200b9c0: 0xffffffd8055b9400 0xffffffd8055b9400
0xffffffc80200b9d0: 0xffffffc80200b9f0 0xffffffff8047c526
0xffffffc80200b9e0: 0xffffffc80200ba30 0xffffffff8047fe9a
The assembler dump of the function preambula:
add sp,sp,-16
sd s0,8(sp)
add s0,sp,16
In the fist stack frame, where ra is not stored on the stack we can
observe:
0(sp) 8(sp)
.---------------------------------------------.
sp->| frame->fp | frame->ra (saved fp) |
|---------------------------------------------|
fp->| .... | .... |
|---------------------------------------------|
| | |
and in the code check is performed:
if (regs && (regs->epc == pc) && (frame->fp & 0x7))
I see no reason to check frame->fp value at all, because it is can be
uninitialized value on the stack. A better way is to check frame->ra to
be an address on the stack. After the stacktrace shows as expect:
[<ffffffff804853c2>] regmap_mmio_read32le+0xe/0x1c
[<ffffffff80485758>] regmap_mmio_read+0x24/0x52
[<ffffffff8047c526>] _regmap_bus_reg_read+0x1a/0x22
[<ffffffff8047fe9a>] _regmap_read+0x5c/0xea
[<ffffffff80480376>] _regmap_update_bits+0x76/0xc0
...
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
As pointed by Samuel Holland it is incorrect to remove check of the stackframe
entirely.
Changes since v2 [2]:
- Add accidentally forgotten curly brace
Changes since v1 [1]:
- Instead of just dropping frame->fp check, replace it with validation of
frame->ra, which should be a stack address.
- Move frame pointer validation into the separate function.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20240426072701.6463-1-dev.mbstr@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20240521131314.48895-1-dev.mbstr@gmail.com/
Fixes: f766f77a74 ("riscv/stacktrace: Fix stack output without ra on the stack top")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Bystrin <dev.mbstr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240521191727.62012-1-dev.mbstr@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 20a759df3b ]
The BPF atomic operations with the BPF_FETCH modifier along with
BPF_XCHG and BPF_CMPXCHG are fully ordered but the RISC-V JIT implements
all atomic operations except BPF_CMPXCHG with relaxed ordering.
Section 8.1 of the "The RISC-V Instruction Set Manual Volume I:
Unprivileged ISA" [1], titled, "Specifying Ordering of Atomic
Instructions" says:
| To provide more efficient support for release consistency [5], each
| atomic instruction has two bits, aq and rl, used to specify additional
| memory ordering constraints as viewed by other RISC-V harts.
and
| If only the aq bit is set, the atomic memory operation is treated as
| an acquire access.
| If only the rl bit is set, the atomic memory operation is treated as a
| release access.
|
| If both the aq and rl bits are set, the atomic memory operation is
| sequentially consistent.
Fix this by setting both aq and rl bits as 1 for operations with
BPF_FETCH and BPF_XCHG.
[1] https://riscv.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/riscv-spec-v2.2.pdf
Fixes: dd642ccb45 ("riscv, bpf: Implement more atomic operations for RV64")
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240505201633.123115-1-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6065e736f8 ]
On NOMMU, userspace memory can come from anywhere in physical RAM. The
current definition of TASK_SIZE is wrong if any RAM exists above 4G,
causing spurious failures in the userspace access routines.
Fixes: 6bd33e1ece ("riscv: add nommu support")
Fixes: c3f896dcf1 ("mm: switch the test_vmalloc module to use __vmalloc_node")
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganboing@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227003630.3634533-2-samuel.holland@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ac88ff6b9d ]
When below config items are set, compiler complained:
--------------------
CONFIG_CRASH_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
......
-----------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------
arch/riscv/kernel/crash_core.c: In function 'arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo':
arch/riscv/kernel/crash_core.c:11:58: warning: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'int' [-Wformat=]
11 | vmcoreinfo_append_str("NUMBER(VMALLOC_START)=0x%lx\n", VMALLOC_START);
| ~~^
| |
| long unsigned int
| %x
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This is because on riscv macro VMALLOC_START has different type when
CONFIG_MMU is set or unset.
arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h:
--------------------------------------------------
Changing it to _AC(0, UL) in case CONFIG_MMU=n can fix the warning.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZW7OsX4zQRA3mO4+@MiWiFi-R3L-srv
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Cc: Eric DeVolder <eric_devolder@yahoo.com>
Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: 6065e736f8 ("riscv: Fix TASK_SIZE on 64-bit NOMMU")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d14fa1fcf6 upstream.
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
Fixes: 7db91e57a0 ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327061258.2370291-1-sorear@fastmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d080a08b06 upstream.
These macros did not initialize __kr_err, so they could fail even if
the access did not fault.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d464118cdc ("riscv: implement __get_kernel_nofault and __put_user_nofault")
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312022030.320789-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 680341382d upstream.
CALLER_ADDRx returns caller's address at specified level, they are used
for several tracers. These macros eventually use
__builtin_return_address(n) to get the caller's address if arch doesn't
define their own implementation.
In RISC-V, __builtin_return_address(n) only works when n == 0, we need
to walk the stack frame to get the caller's address at specified level.
data.level started from 'level + 3' due to the call flow of getting
caller's address in RISC-V implementation. If we don't have additional
three iteration, the level is corresponding to follows:
callsite -> return_address -> arch_stack_walk -> walk_stackframe
| | | |
level 3 level 2 level 1 level 0
Fixes: 10626c32e3 ("riscv/ftrace: Add basic support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202015102.26251-1-zong.li@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a11dd49dcb ]
Offset vmemmap so that the first page of vmemmap will be mapped
to the first page of physical memory in order to ensure that
vmemmap’s bounds will be respected during
pfn_to_page()/page_to_pfn() operations.
The conversion macros will produce correct SV39/48/57 addresses
for every possible/valid DRAM_BASE inside the physical memory limits.
v2:Address Alex's comments
Suggested-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Vlachos <dvlachos@ics.forth.gr>
Reported-by: Dimitris Vlachos <dvlachos@ics.forth.gr>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20240202135030.42265-1-csd4492@csd.uoc.gr
Fixes: d95f1a542c ("RISC-V: Implement sparsemem")
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229191723.32779-1-dvlachos@ics.forth.gr
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 68fb3ca0e4 upstream.
We've had issues with gcc and 'asm goto' before, and we created a
'asm_volatile_goto()' macro for that in the past: see commits
3f0116c323 ("compiler/gcc4: Add quirk for 'asm goto' miscompilation
bug") and a9f180345f ("compiler/gcc4: Make quirk for
asm_volatile_goto() unconditional").
Then, much later, we ended up removing the workaround in commit
43c249ea0b ("compiler-gcc.h: remove ancient workaround for gcc PR
58670") because we no longer supported building the kernel with the
affected gcc versions, but we left the macro uses around.
Now, Sean Christopherson reports a new version of a very similar
problem, which is fixed by re-applying that ancient workaround. But the
problem in question is limited to only the 'asm goto with outputs'
cases, so instead of re-introducing the old workaround as-is, let's
rename and limit the workaround to just that much less common case.
It looks like there are at least two separate issues that all hit in
this area:
(a) some versions of gcc don't mark the asm goto as 'volatile' when it
has outputs:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=98619https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=110420
which is easy to work around by just adding the 'volatile' by hand.
(b) Internal compiler errors:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=110422
which are worked around by adding the extra empty 'asm' as a
barrier, as in the original workaround.
but the problem Sean sees may be a third thing since it involves bad
code generation (not an ICE) even with the manually added 'volatile'.
The same old workaround works for this case, even if this feels a
bit like voodoo programming and may only be hiding the issue.
Reported-and-tested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240208220604.140859-1-seanjc@google.com/
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Pinski <quic_apinski@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 64bac5ea17 ]
The prototype was hidden in an #ifdef on x86, which causes a warning:
kernel/irq_work.c:72:13: error: no previous prototype for 'arch_irq_work_raise' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Some architectures have a working prototype, while others don't.
Fix this by providing it in only one place that is always visible.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5daa372641 ]
During the refactoring, a bug was introduced in the rarly used
XIP_FIXUP_FLASH_OFFSET macro.
Fixes: bee7fbc385 ("RISC-V CPU Idle Support")
Fixes: e7681beba9 ("RISC-V: Split out the XIP fixups into their own file")
Signed-off-by: Frederik Haxel <haxel@fzi.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212130116.848530-3-haxel@fzi.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b8b2711336 ]
When resetting the linear mapping permissions, we must make sure that we
clear the X bit so that do not end up with WX mappings (since we set
PAGE_KERNEL).
Fixes: 395a21ff85 ("riscv: add ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP support")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213134027.155327-3-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 311cd2f6e2 ]
When STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is set, any change of permissions on any kernel
mapping (vmalloc/modules/kernel text...etc) should be applied on its
linear mapping alias. The problem is that the riscv kernel uses huge
mappings for the linear mapping and walk_page_range_novma() does not
split those huge mappings.
So this patchset implements such split in order to apply fine-grained
permissions on the linear mapping.
Below is the difference before and after (the first PUD mapping is split
into PTE/PMD mappings):
Before:
---[ Linear mapping ]---
0xffffaf8000080000-0xffffaf8000200000 0x0000000080080000 1536K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8000200000-0xffffaf8077c00000 0x0000000080200000 1914M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8077c00000-0xffffaf8078800000 0x00000000f7c00000 12M PMD D A G . . . R V
0xffffaf8078800000-0xffffaf8078c00000 0x00000000f8800000 4M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8078c00000-0xffffaf8079200000 0x00000000f8c00000 6M PMD D A G . . . R V
0xffffaf8079200000-0xffffaf807e600000 0x00000000f9200000 84M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e600000-0xffffaf807e716000 0x00000000fe600000 1112K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e717000-0xffffaf807e71a000 0x00000000fe717000 12K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e71d000-0xffffaf807e71e000 0x00000000fe71d000 4K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e722000-0xffffaf807e800000 0x00000000fe722000 888K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e800000-0xffffaf807fe00000 0x00000000fe800000 22M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807fe00000-0xffffaf807ff54000 0x00000000ffe00000 1360K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807ff55000-0xffffaf8080000000 0x00000000fff55000 684K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8080000000-0xffffaf8400000000 0x0000000100000000 14G PUD D A G . . W R V
After:
---[ Linear mapping ]---
0xffffaf8000080000-0xffffaf8000200000 0x0000000080080000 1536K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8000200000-0xffffaf8077c00000 0x0000000080200000 1914M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8077c00000-0xffffaf8078800000 0x00000000f7c00000 12M PMD D A G . . . R V
0xffffaf8078800000-0xffffaf8078a00000 0x00000000f8800000 2M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8078a00000-0xffffaf8078c00000 0x00000000f8a00000 2M PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8078c00000-0xffffaf8079200000 0x00000000f8c00000 6M PMD D A G . . . R V
0xffffaf8079200000-0xffffaf807e600000 0x00000000f9200000 84M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e600000-0xffffaf807e716000 0x00000000fe600000 1112K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e717000-0xffffaf807e71a000 0x00000000fe717000 12K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e71d000-0xffffaf807e71e000 0x00000000fe71d000 4K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e722000-0xffffaf807e800000 0x00000000fe722000 888K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807e800000-0xffffaf807fe00000 0x00000000fe800000 22M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807fe00000-0xffffaf807ff54000 0x00000000ffe00000 1360K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf807ff55000-0xffffaf8080000000 0x00000000fff55000 684K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8080000000-0xffffaf8080800000 0x0000000100000000 8M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8080800000-0xffffaf8080af6000 0x0000000100800000 3032K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8080af6000-0xffffaf8080af8000 0x0000000100af6000 8K PTE D A G . X . R V
0xffffaf8080af8000-0xffffaf8080c00000 0x0000000100af8000 1056K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8080c00000-0xffffaf8081a00000 0x0000000100c00000 14M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8081a00000-0xffffaf8081a40000 0x0000000101a00000 256K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8081a40000-0xffffaf8081a44000 0x0000000101a40000 16K PTE D A G . X . R V
0xffffaf8081a44000-0xffffaf8081a52000 0x0000000101a44000 56K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8081a52000-0xffffaf8081a54000 0x0000000101a52000 8K PTE D A G . X . R V
...
0xffffaf809e800000-0xffffaf80c0000000 0x000000011e800000 536M PMD D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf80c0000000-0xffffaf8400000000 0x0000000140000000 13G PUD D A G . . W R V
Note that this also fixes memfd_secret() syscall which uses
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() to
remove the pages from the linear mapping. Below is the kernel page table
while a memfd_secret() syscall is running, you can see all the !valid
page table entries in the linear mapping:
...
0xffffaf8082240000-0xffffaf8082241000 0x0000000102240000 4K PTE D A G . . W R .
0xffffaf8082241000-0xffffaf8082250000 0x0000000102241000 60K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8082250000-0xffffaf8082252000 0x0000000102250000 8K PTE D A G . . W R .
0xffffaf8082252000-0xffffaf8082256000 0x0000000102252000 16K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8082256000-0xffffaf8082257000 0x0000000102256000 4K PTE D A G . . W R .
0xffffaf8082257000-0xffffaf8082258000 0x0000000102257000 4K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8082258000-0xffffaf8082259000 0x0000000102258000 4K PTE D A G . . W R .
0xffffaf8082259000-0xffffaf808225a000 0x0000000102259000 4K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf808225a000-0xffffaf808225c000 0x000000010225a000 8K PTE D A G . . W R .
0xffffaf808225c000-0xffffaf8082266000 0x000000010225c000 40K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8082266000-0xffffaf8082268000 0x0000000102266000 8K PTE D A G . . W R .
0xffffaf8082268000-0xffffaf8082284000 0x0000000102268000 112K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf8082284000-0xffffaf8082288000 0x0000000102284000 16K PTE D A G . . W R .
0xffffaf8082288000-0xffffaf808229c000 0x0000000102288000 80K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf808229c000-0xffffaf80822a0000 0x000000010229c000 16K PTE D A G . . W R .
0xffffaf80822a0000-0xffffaf80822a5000 0x00000001022a0000 20K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf80822a5000-0xffffaf80822a6000 0x00000001022a5000 4K PTE D A G . . . R V
0xffffaf80822a6000-0xffffaf80822ab000 0x00000001022a6000 20K PTE D A G . . W R V
...
And when the memfd_secret() fd is released, the linear mapping is
correctly reset:
...
0xffffaf8082240000-0xffffaf80822a5000 0x0000000102240000 404K PTE D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf80822a5000-0xffffaf80822a6000 0x00000001022a5000 4K PTE D A G . . . R V
0xffffaf80822a6000-0xffffaf80822af000 0x00000001022a6000 36K PTE D A G . . W R V
...
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231108075930.7157-3-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Stable-dep-of: b8b2711336 ("riscv: Fix set_direct_map_default_noflush() to reset _PAGE_EXEC")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 749b94b080 ]
After unloading a module, we must reset the linear mapping permissions,
see the example below:
Before unloading a module:
0xffffaf809d65d000-0xffffaf809d6dc000 0x000000011d65d000 508K PTE . .. .. D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf809d6dc000-0xffffaf809d6dd000 0x000000011d6dc000 4K PTE . .. .. D A G . . . R V
0xffffaf809d6dd000-0xffffaf809d6e1000 0x000000011d6dd000 16K PTE . .. .. D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf809d6e1000-0xffffaf809d6e7000 0x000000011d6e1000 24K PTE . .. .. D A G . X . R V
After unloading a module:
0xffffaf809d65d000-0xffffaf809d6e1000 0x000000011d65d000 528K PTE . .. .. D A G . . W R V
0xffffaf809d6e1000-0xffffaf809d6e7000 0x000000011d6e1000 24K PTE . .. .. D A G . X W R V
The last mapping is not reset and we end up with WX mappings in the linear
mapping.
So add VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS to our module_alloc() definition.
Fixes: 0cff8bff7a ("riscv: avoid the PIC offset of static percpu data in module beyond 2G limits")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213134027.155327-2-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
