linux-yocto/fs/fhandle.c
Amir Goldstein b80d9c5208 fhandle: use more consistent rules for decoding file handle from userns
[ Upstream commit bb585591ebf00fb1f6a1fdd1ea96b5848bd9112d ]

Commit 620c266f39 ("fhandle: relax open_by_handle_at() permission
checks") relaxed the coditions for decoding a file handle from non init
userns.

The conditions are that that decoded dentry is accessible from the user
provided mountfd (or to fs root) and that all the ancestors along the
path have a valid id mapping in the userns.

These conditions are intentionally more strict than the condition that
the decoded dentry should be "lookable" by path from the mountfd.

For example, the path /home/amir/dir/subdir is lookable by path from
unpriv userns of user amir, because /home perms is 755, but the owner of
/home does not have a valid id mapping in unpriv userns of user amir.

The current code did not check that the decoded dentry itself has a
valid id mapping in the userns.  There is no security risk in that,
because that final open still performs the needed permission checks,
but this is inconsistent with the checks performed on the ancestors,
so the behavior can be a bit confusing.

Add the check for the decoded dentry itself, so that the entire path,
including the last component has a valid id mapping in the userns.

Fixes: 620c266f39 ("fhandle: relax open_by_handle_at() permission checks")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250827194309.1259650-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-09-19 16:35:41 +02:00

407 lines
11 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/exportfs.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "mount.h"
static long do_sys_name_to_handle(const struct path *path,
struct file_handle __user *ufh,
void __user *mnt_id, bool unique_mntid,
int fh_flags)
{
long retval;
struct file_handle f_handle;
int handle_dwords, handle_bytes;
struct file_handle *handle = NULL;
/*
* We need to make sure whether the file system support decoding of
* the file handle if decodeable file handle was requested.
*/
if (!exportfs_can_encode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb->s_export_op, fh_flags))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (copy_from_user(&f_handle, ufh, sizeof(struct file_handle)))
return -EFAULT;
if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
handle = kzalloc(struct_size(handle, f_handle, f_handle.handle_bytes),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!handle)
return -ENOMEM;
/* convert handle size to multiple of sizeof(u32) */
handle_dwords = f_handle.handle_bytes >> 2;
/* we ask for a non connectable maybe decodeable file handle */
retval = exportfs_encode_fh(path->dentry,
(struct fid *)handle->f_handle,
&handle_dwords, fh_flags);
handle->handle_type = retval;
/* convert handle size to bytes */
handle_bytes = handle_dwords * sizeof(u32);
handle->handle_bytes = handle_bytes;
if ((handle->handle_bytes > f_handle.handle_bytes) ||
(retval == FILEID_INVALID) || (retval < 0)) {
/* As per old exportfs_encode_fh documentation
* we could return ENOSPC to indicate overflow
* But file system returned 255 always. So handle
* both the values
*/
if (retval == FILEID_INVALID || retval == -ENOSPC)
retval = -EOVERFLOW;
/*
* set the handle size to zero so we copy only
* non variable part of the file_handle
*/
handle_bytes = 0;
} else
retval = 0;
/* copy the mount id */
if (unique_mntid) {
if (put_user(real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id_unique,
(u64 __user *) mnt_id))
retval = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (put_user(real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id,
(int __user *) mnt_id))
retval = -EFAULT;
}
/* copy the handle */
if (retval != -EFAULT &&
copy_to_user(ufh, handle,
struct_size(handle, f_handle, handle_bytes)))
retval = -EFAULT;
kfree(handle);
return retval;
}
/**
* sys_name_to_handle_at: convert name to handle
* @dfd: directory relative to which name is interpreted if not absolute
* @name: name that should be converted to handle.
* @handle: resulting file handle
* @mnt_id: mount id of the file system containing the file
* (u64 if AT_HANDLE_MNT_ID_UNIQUE, otherwise int)
* @flag: flag value to indicate whether to follow symlink or not
* and whether a decodable file handle is required.
*
* @handle->handle_size indicate the space available to store the
* variable part of the file handle in bytes. If there is not
* enough space, the field is updated to return the minimum
* value required.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name_to_handle_at, int, dfd, const char __user *, name,
struct file_handle __user *, handle, void __user *, mnt_id,
int, flag)
{
struct path path;
int lookup_flags;
int fh_flags;
int err;
if (flag & ~(AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_HANDLE_FID |
AT_HANDLE_MNT_ID_UNIQUE))
return -EINVAL;
lookup_flags = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) ? LOOKUP_FOLLOW : 0;
fh_flags = (flag & AT_HANDLE_FID) ? EXPORT_FH_FID : 0;
if (flag & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
err = user_path_at(dfd, name, lookup_flags, &path);
if (!err) {
err = do_sys_name_to_handle(&path, handle, mnt_id,
flag & AT_HANDLE_MNT_ID_UNIQUE,
fh_flags);
path_put(&path);
}
return err;
}
static int get_path_from_fd(int fd, struct path *root)
{
if (fd == AT_FDCWD) {
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
spin_lock(&fs->lock);
*root = fs->pwd;
path_get(root);
spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
} else {
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
if (!fd_file(f))
return -EBADF;
*root = fd_file(f)->f_path;
path_get(root);
fdput(f);
}
return 0;
}
enum handle_to_path_flags {
HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS = (1 << 0),
HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE = (1 << 1),
};
struct handle_to_path_ctx {
struct path root;
enum handle_to_path_flags flags;
unsigned int fh_flags;
};
static int vfs_dentry_acceptable(void *context, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx = context;
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
struct dentry *d, *root = ctx->root.dentry;
struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(ctx->root.mnt);
int retval = 0;
if (!root)
return 1;
/* Old permission model with global CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. */
if (!ctx->flags)
return 1;
/*
* Verify that the decoded dentry itself has a valid id mapping.
* In case the decoded dentry is the mountfd root itself, this
* verifies that the mountfd inode itself has a valid id mapping.
*/
if (!privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap, d_inode(dentry)))
return 0;
/*
* It's racy as we're not taking rename_lock but we're able to ignore
* permissions and we just need an approximation whether we were able
* to follow a path to the file.
*
* It's also potentially expensive on some filesystems especially if
* there is a deep path.
*/
d = dget(dentry);
while (d != root && !IS_ROOT(d)) {
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(d);
/*
* We know that we have the ability to override DAC permissions
* as we've verified this earlier via CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. But
* we also need to make sure that there aren't any unmapped
* inodes in the path that would prevent us from reaching the
* file.
*/
if (!privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap,
d_inode(parent))) {
dput(d);
dput(parent);
return retval;
}
dput(d);
d = parent;
}
if (!(ctx->flags & HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE) || d == root)
retval = 1;
WARN_ON_ONCE(d != root && d != root->d_sb->s_root);
dput(d);
return retval;
}
static int do_handle_to_path(struct file_handle *handle, struct path *path,
struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx)
{
int handle_dwords;
struct vfsmount *mnt = ctx->root.mnt;
/* change the handle size to multiple of sizeof(u32) */
handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;
path->dentry = exportfs_decode_fh_raw(mnt,
(struct fid *)handle->f_handle,
handle_dwords, handle->handle_type,
ctx->fh_flags,
vfs_dentry_acceptable, ctx);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(path->dentry)) {
if (path->dentry == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
return -ENOMEM;
return -ESTALE;
}
path->mnt = mntget(mnt);
return 0;
}
/*
* Allow relaxed permissions of file handles if the caller has the
* ability to mount the filesystem or create a bind-mount of the
* provided @mountdirfd.
*
* In both cases the caller may be able to get an unobstructed way to
* the encoded file handle. If the caller is only able to create a
* bind-mount we need to verify that there are no locked mounts on top
* of it that could prevent us from getting to the encoded file.
*
* In principle, locked mounts can prevent the caller from mounting the
* filesystem but that only applies to procfs and sysfs neither of which
* support decoding file handles.
*/
static inline bool may_decode_fh(struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx,
unsigned int o_flags)
{
struct path *root = &ctx->root;
/*
* Restrict to O_DIRECTORY to provide a deterministic API that avoids a
* confusing api in the face of disconnected non-dir dentries.
*
* There's only one dentry for each directory inode (VFS rule)...
*/
if (!(o_flags & O_DIRECTORY))
return false;
if (ns_capable(root->mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
ctx->flags = HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS;
else if (is_mounted(root->mnt) &&
ns_capable(real_mount(root->mnt)->mnt_ns->user_ns,
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
!has_locked_children(real_mount(root->mnt), root->dentry))
ctx->flags = HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS | HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE;
else
return false;
/* Are we able to override DAC permissions? */
if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return false;
ctx->fh_flags = EXPORT_FH_DIR_ONLY;
return true;
}
static int handle_to_path(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
struct path *path, unsigned int o_flags)
{
int retval = 0;
struct file_handle f_handle;
struct file_handle *handle = NULL;
struct handle_to_path_ctx ctx = {};
retval = get_path_from_fd(mountdirfd, &ctx.root);
if (retval)
goto out_err;
if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) && !may_decode_fh(&ctx, o_flags)) {
retval = -EPERM;
goto out_path;
}
if (copy_from_user(&f_handle, ufh, sizeof(struct file_handle))) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out_path;
}
if ((f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) ||
(f_handle.handle_bytes == 0)) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out_path;
}
handle = kmalloc(struct_size(handle, f_handle, f_handle.handle_bytes),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!handle) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out_path;
}
/* copy the full handle */
*handle = f_handle;
if (copy_from_user(&handle->f_handle,
&ufh->f_handle,
f_handle.handle_bytes)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out_handle;
}
retval = do_handle_to_path(handle, path, &ctx);
out_handle:
kfree(handle);
out_path:
path_put(&ctx.root);
out_err:
return retval;
}
static long do_handle_open(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
int open_flag)
{
long retval = 0;
struct path path;
struct file *file;
int fd;
retval = handle_to_path(mountdirfd, ufh, &path, open_flag);
if (retval)
return retval;
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(open_flag);
if (fd < 0) {
path_put(&path);
return fd;
}
file = file_open_root(&path, "", open_flag, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
put_unused_fd(fd);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
} else {
retval = fd;
fd_install(fd, file);
}
path_put(&path);
return retval;
}
/**
* sys_open_by_handle_at: Open the file handle
* @mountdirfd: directory file descriptor
* @handle: file handle to be opened
* @flags: open flags.
*
* @mountdirfd indicate the directory file descriptor
* of the mount point. file handle is decoded relative
* to the vfsmount pointed by the @mountdirfd. @flags
* value is same as the open(2) flags.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open_by_handle_at, int, mountdirfd,
struct file_handle __user *, handle,
int, flags)
{
long ret;
if (force_o_largefile())
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
ret = do_handle_open(mountdirfd, handle, flags);
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
/*
* Exactly like fs/open.c:sys_open_by_handle_at(), except that it
* doesn't set the O_LARGEFILE flag.
*/
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open_by_handle_at, int, mountdirfd,
struct file_handle __user *, handle, int, flags)
{
return do_handle_open(mountdirfd, handle, flags);
}
#endif