linux-yocto/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
Linus Torvalds f3826aa996 guest_memfd:
* Add support for host userspace mapping of guest_memfd-backed memory for VM
   types that do NOT use support KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE (which isn't
   precisely the same thing as CoCo VMs, since x86's SEV-MEM and SEV-ES have
   no way to detect private vs. shared).
 
   This lays the groundwork for removal of guest memory from the kernel direct
   map, as well as for limited mmap() for guest_memfd-backed memory.
 
   For more information see:
   * a6ad54137a ("Merge branch 'guest-memfd-mmap' into HEAD", 2025-08-27)
   * https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
     (guest_memfd in Firecracker)
   * https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250221160728.1584559-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
     (direct map removal)
   * https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250328153133.3504118-1-tabba@google.com/
     (mmap support)
 
 ARM:
 
 * Add support for FF-A 1.2 as the secure memory conduit for pKVM,
   allowing more registers to be used as part of the message payload.
 
 * Change the way pKVM allocates its VM handles, making sure that the
   privileged hypervisor is never tricked into using uninitialised
   data.
 
 * Speed up MMIO range registration by avoiding unnecessary RCU
   synchronisation, which results in VMs starting much quicker.
 
 * Add the dump of the instruction stream when panic-ing in the EL2
   payload, just like the rest of the kernel has always done. This will
   hopefully help debugging non-VHE setups.
 
 * Add 52bit PA support to the stage-1 page-table walker, and make use
   of it to populate the fault level reported to the guest on failing
   to translate a stage-1 walk.
 
 * Add NV support to the GICv3-on-GICv5 emulation code, ensuring
   feature parity for guests, irrespective of the host platform.
 
 * Fix some really ugly architecture problems when dealing with debug
   in a nested VM. This has some bad performance impacts, but is at
   least correct.
 
 * Add enough infrastructure to be able to disable EL2 features and
   give effective values to the EL2 control registers. This then allows
   a bunch of features to be turned off, which helps cross-host
   migration.
 
 * Large rework of the selftest infrastructure to allow most tests to
   transparently run at EL2. This is the first step towards enabling
   NV testing.
 
 * Various fixes and improvements all over the map, including one BE
   fix, just in time for the removal of the feature.
 
 LoongArch:
 
 * Detect page table walk feature on new hardware
 
 * Add sign extension with kernel MMIO/IOCSR emulation
 
 * Improve in-kernel IPI emulation
 
 * Improve in-kernel PCH-PIC emulation
 
 * Move kvm_iocsr tracepoint out of generic code
 
 RISC-V:
 
 * Added SBI FWFT extension for Guest/VM with misaligned delegation and
   pointer masking PMLEN features
 
 * Added ONE_REG interface for SBI FWFT extension
 
 * Added Zicbop and bfloat16 extensions for Guest/VM
 
 * Enabled more common KVM selftests for RISC-V
 
 * Added SBI v3.0 PMU enhancements in KVM and perf driver
 
 s390:
 
 * Improve interrupt cpu for wakeup, in particular the heuristic to decide
   which vCPU to deliver a floating interrupt to.
 
 * Clear the PTE when discarding a swapped page because of CMMA; this
   bug was introduced in 6.16 when refactoring gmap code.
 
 x86 selftests:
 
 * Add #DE coverage in the fastops test (the only exception that's guest-
   triggerable in fastop-emulated instructions).
 
 * Fix PMU selftests errors encountered on Granite Rapids (GNR), Sierra
   Forest (SRF) and Clearwater Forest (CWF).
 
 * Minor cleanups and improvements
 
 x86 (guest side):
 
 * For the legacy PCI hole (memory between TOLUD and 4GiB) to UC when
   overriding guest MTRR for TDX/SNP to fix an issue where ACPI auto-mapping
   could map devices as WB and prevent the device drivers from mapping their
   devices with UC/UC-.
 
 * Make kvm_async_pf_task_wake() a local static helper and remove its
   export.
 
 * Use native qspinlocks when running in a VM with dedicated vCPU=>pCPU
   bindings even when PV_UNHALT is unsupported.
 
 Generic:
 
 * Remove a redundant __GFP_NOWARN from kvm_setup_async_pf() as __GFP_NOWARN is
   now included in GFP_NOWAIT.
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "This excludes the bulk of the x86 changes, which I will send
  separately. They have two not complex but relatively unusual conflicts
  so I will wait for other dust to settle.

  guest_memfd:

   - Add support for host userspace mapping of guest_memfd-backed memory
     for VM types that do NOT use support KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE
     (which isn't precisely the same thing as CoCo VMs, since x86's
     SEV-MEM and SEV-ES have no way to detect private vs. shared).

     This lays the groundwork for removal of guest memory from the
     kernel direct map, as well as for limited mmap() for
     guest_memfd-backed memory.

     For more information see:
       - commit a6ad54137a ("Merge branch 'guest-memfd-mmap' into HEAD")
       - guest_memfd in Firecracker:
           https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
       - direct map removal:
           https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250221160728.1584559-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
       - mmap support:
           https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250328153133.3504118-1-tabba@google.com/

  ARM:

   - Add support for FF-A 1.2 as the secure memory conduit for pKVM,
     allowing more registers to be used as part of the message payload.

   - Change the way pKVM allocates its VM handles, making sure that the
     privileged hypervisor is never tricked into using uninitialised
     data.

   - Speed up MMIO range registration by avoiding unnecessary RCU
     synchronisation, which results in VMs starting much quicker.

   - Add the dump of the instruction stream when panic-ing in the EL2
     payload, just like the rest of the kernel has always done. This
     will hopefully help debugging non-VHE setups.

   - Add 52bit PA support to the stage-1 page-table walker, and make use
     of it to populate the fault level reported to the guest on failing
     to translate a stage-1 walk.

   - Add NV support to the GICv3-on-GICv5 emulation code, ensuring
     feature parity for guests, irrespective of the host platform.

   - Fix some really ugly architecture problems when dealing with debug
     in a nested VM. This has some bad performance impacts, but is at
     least correct.

   - Add enough infrastructure to be able to disable EL2 features and
     give effective values to the EL2 control registers. This then
     allows a bunch of features to be turned off, which helps cross-host
     migration.

   - Large rework of the selftest infrastructure to allow most tests to
     transparently run at EL2. This is the first step towards enabling
     NV testing.

   - Various fixes and improvements all over the map, including one BE
     fix, just in time for the removal of the feature.

  LoongArch:

   - Detect page table walk feature on new hardware

   - Add sign extension with kernel MMIO/IOCSR emulation

   - Improve in-kernel IPI emulation

   - Improve in-kernel PCH-PIC emulation

   - Move kvm_iocsr tracepoint out of generic code

  RISC-V:

   - Added SBI FWFT extension for Guest/VM with misaligned delegation
     and pointer masking PMLEN features

   - Added ONE_REG interface for SBI FWFT extension

   - Added Zicbop and bfloat16 extensions for Guest/VM

   - Enabled more common KVM selftests for RISC-V

   - Added SBI v3.0 PMU enhancements in KVM and perf driver

  s390:

   - Improve interrupt cpu for wakeup, in particular the heuristic to
     decide which vCPU to deliver a floating interrupt to.

   - Clear the PTE when discarding a swapped page because of CMMA; this
     bug was introduced in 6.16 when refactoring gmap code.

  x86 selftests:

   - Add #DE coverage in the fastops test (the only exception that's
     guest- triggerable in fastop-emulated instructions).

   - Fix PMU selftests errors encountered on Granite Rapids (GNR),
     Sierra Forest (SRF) and Clearwater Forest (CWF).

   - Minor cleanups and improvements

  x86 (guest side):

   - For the legacy PCI hole (memory between TOLUD and 4GiB) to UC when
     overriding guest MTRR for TDX/SNP to fix an issue where ACPI
     auto-mapping could map devices as WB and prevent the device drivers
     from mapping their devices with UC/UC-.

   - Make kvm_async_pf_task_wake() a local static helper and remove its
     export.

   - Use native qspinlocks when running in a VM with dedicated
     vCPU=>pCPU bindings even when PV_UNHALT is unsupported.

  Generic:

   - Remove a redundant __GFP_NOWARN from kvm_setup_async_pf() as
     __GFP_NOWARN is now included in GFP_NOWAIT.

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (178 commits)
  KVM: s390: Fix to clear PTE when discarding a swapped page
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Cover ID_AA64ISAR3_EL1 in set_id_regs
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Remove a duplicate register listing in set_id_regs
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Cope with arch silliness in EL2 selftest
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Add basic test for running in VHE EL2
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Enable EL2 by default
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Initialize HCR_EL2
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Use the vCPU attr for setting nr of PMU counters
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Use hyp timer IRQs when test runs at EL2
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Select SMCCC conduit based on current EL
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Provide helper for getting default vCPU target
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Alias EL1 registers to EL2 counterparts
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Create a VGICv3 for 'default' VMs
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Add unsanitised helpers for VGICv3 creation
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Add helper to check for VGICv3 support
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Initialize VGICv3 only once
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Provide kvm_arch_vm_post_create() in library code
  KVM: selftests: Add ex_str() to print human friendly name of exception vectors
  selftests/kvm: remove stale TODO in xapic_state_test
  KVM: selftests: Handle Intel Atom errata that leads to PMU event overcount
  ...
2025-10-04 08:52:16 -07:00

576 lines
16 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2012,2013 - ARM Ltd
* Author: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
*
* Derived from arch/arm/kvm/handle_exit.c:
* Copyright (C) 2012 - Virtual Open Systems and Columbia University
* Author: Christoffer Dall <c.dall@virtualopensystems.com>
*/
#include <linux/kvm.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/ubsan.h>
#include <asm/esr.h>
#include <asm/exception.h>
#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
#include <asm/kvm_nested.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/stacktrace/nvhe.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <kvm/arm_hypercalls.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include "trace_handle_exit.h"
typedef int (*exit_handle_fn)(struct kvm_vcpu *);
static void kvm_handle_guest_serror(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 esr)
{
if (!arm64_is_ras_serror(esr) || arm64_is_fatal_ras_serror(NULL, esr))
kvm_inject_serror(vcpu);
}
static int handle_hvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
trace_kvm_hvc_arm64(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, 0),
kvm_vcpu_hvc_get_imm(vcpu));
vcpu->stat.hvc_exit_stat++;
/* Forward hvc instructions to the virtual EL2 if the guest has EL2. */
if (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu)) {
if (vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, HCR_EL2) & HCR_HCD)
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
else
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
return 1;
}
return kvm_smccc_call_handler(vcpu);
}
static int handle_smc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
* Forward this trapped smc instruction to the virtual EL2 if
* the guest has asked for it.
*/
if (forward_smc_trap(vcpu))
return 1;
/*
* "If an SMC instruction executed at Non-secure EL1 is
* trapped to EL2 because HCR_EL2.TSC is 1, the exception is a
* Trap exception, not a Secure Monitor Call exception [...]"
*
* We need to advance the PC after the trap, as it would
* otherwise return to the same address. Furthermore, pre-incrementing
* the PC before potentially exiting to userspace maintains the same
* abstraction for both SMCs and HVCs.
*/
kvm_incr_pc(vcpu);
/*
* SMCs with a nonzero immediate are reserved according to DEN0028E 2.9
* "SMC and HVC immediate value".
*/
if (kvm_vcpu_hvc_get_imm(vcpu)) {
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, 0, ~0UL);
return 1;
}
/*
* If imm is zero then it is likely an SMCCC call.
*
* Note that on ARMv8.3, even if EL3 is not implemented, SMC executed
* at Non-secure EL1 is trapped to EL2 if HCR_EL2.TSC==1, rather than
* being treated as UNDEFINED.
*/
return kvm_smccc_call_handler(vcpu);
}
/*
* This handles the cases where the system does not support FP/ASIMD or when
* we are running nested virtualization and the guest hypervisor is trapping
* FP/ASIMD accesses by its guest guest.
*
* All other handling of guest vs. host FP/ASIMD register state is handled in
* fixup_guest_exit().
*/
static int kvm_handle_fpasimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (guest_hyp_fpsimd_traps_enabled(vcpu))
return kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
/* This is the case when the system doesn't support FP/ASIMD. */
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/**
* kvm_handle_wfx - handle a wait-for-interrupts or wait-for-event
* instruction executed by a guest
*
* @vcpu: the vcpu pointer
*
* WFE[T]: Yield the CPU and come back to this vcpu when the scheduler
* decides to.
* WFI: Simply call kvm_vcpu_halt(), which will halt execution of
* world-switches and schedule other host processes until there is an
* incoming IRQ or FIQ to the VM.
* WFIT: Same as WFI, with a timed wakeup implemented as a background timer
*
* WF{I,E}T can immediately return if the deadline has already expired.
*/
static int kvm_handle_wfx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
bool is_wfe = !!(esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFE);
if (guest_hyp_wfx_traps_enabled(vcpu))
return kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
if (is_wfe) {
trace_kvm_wfx_arm64(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), true);
vcpu->stat.wfe_exit_stat++;
} else {
trace_kvm_wfx_arm64(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), false);
vcpu->stat.wfi_exit_stat++;
}
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFxT) {
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_RV) {
u64 val, now;
now = kvm_arm_timer_get_reg(vcpu, KVM_REG_ARM_TIMER_CNT);
val = vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_sys_get_rt(vcpu));
if (now >= val)
goto out;
} else {
/* Treat WFxT as WFx if RN is invalid */
esr &= ~ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFxT;
}
}
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFE) {
kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, vcpu_mode_priv(vcpu));
} else {
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_WFxT)
vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, IN_WFIT);
kvm_vcpu_wfi(vcpu);
}
out:
kvm_incr_pc(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/**
* kvm_handle_guest_debug - handle a debug exception instruction
*
* @vcpu: the vcpu pointer
*
* We route all debug exceptions through the same handler. If both the
* guest and host are using the same debug facilities it will be up to
* userspace to re-inject the correct exception for guest delivery.
*
* @return: 0 (while setting vcpu->run->exit_reason)
*/
static int kvm_handle_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
if (!vcpu->guest_debug && forward_debug_exception(vcpu))
return 1;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
run->debug.arch.hsr = lower_32_bits(esr);
run->debug.arch.hsr_high = upper_32_bits(esr);
run->flags = KVM_DEBUG_ARCH_HSR_HIGH_VALID;
switch (ESR_ELx_EC(esr)) {
case ESR_ELx_EC_WATCHPT_LOW:
run->debug.arch.far = vcpu->arch.fault.far_el2;
break;
case ESR_ELx_EC_SOFTSTP_LOW:
*vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) |= DBG_SPSR_SS;
break;
}
return 0;
}
static int kvm_handle_unknown_ec(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
kvm_pr_unimpl("Unknown exception class: esr: %#016llx -- %s\n",
esr, esr_get_class_string(esr));
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/*
* Guest access to SVE registers should be routed to this handler only
* when the system doesn't support SVE.
*/
static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (guest_hyp_sve_traps_enabled(vcpu))
return kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/*
* Two possibilities to handle a trapping ptrauth instruction:
*
* - Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not
* turn into a NOP). If we get here, it is because we didn't enable
* ptrauth for the guest. This results in an UNDEF, as it isn't
* supposed to use ptrauth without being told it could.
*
* - Running an L2 NV guest while L1 has left HCR_EL2.API==0, and for
* which we reinject the exception into L1.
*
* Anything else is an emulation bug (hence the WARN_ON + UNDEF).
*/
static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) {
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
if (is_nested_ctxt(vcpu)) {
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
return 1;
}
/* Really shouldn't be here! */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
static int kvm_handle_eret(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (esr_iss_is_eretax(kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu)) &&
!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu))
return kvm_handle_ptrauth(vcpu);
/*
* If we got here, two possibilities:
*
* - the guest is in EL2, and we need to fully emulate ERET
*
* - the guest is in EL1, and we need to reinject the
* exception into the L1 hypervisor.
*
* If KVM ever traps ERET for its own use, we'll have to
* revisit this.
*/
if (is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu))
kvm_emulate_nested_eret(vcpu);
else
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
return 1;
}
static int handle_svc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
* So far, SVC traps only for NV via HFGITR_EL2. A SVC from a
* 32bit guest would be caught by vpcu_mode_is_bad_32bit(), so
* we should only have to deal with a 64 bit exception.
*/
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
return 1;
}
static int kvm_handle_gcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* We don't expect GCS, so treat it with contempt */
if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, GCS, IMP))
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
static int handle_other(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
bool allowed, fwd = is_nested_ctxt(vcpu);
u64 hcrx = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, HCRX_EL2);
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
u64 iss = ESR_ELx_ISS(esr);
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
/*
* We only trap for two reasons:
*
* - the feature is disabled, and the only outcome is to
* generate an UNDEF.
*
* - the feature is enabled, but a NV guest wants to trap the
* feature used by its L2 guest. We forward the exception in
* this case.
*
* What we don't expect is to end-up here if the guest is
* expected be be able to directly use the feature, hence the
* WARN_ON below.
*/
switch (iss) {
case ESR_ELx_ISS_OTHER_ST64BV:
allowed = kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, LS64, LS64_V);
fwd &= !(hcrx & HCRX_EL2_EnASR);
break;
case ESR_ELx_ISS_OTHER_ST64BV0:
allowed = kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, LS64, LS64_ACCDATA);
fwd &= !(hcrx & HCRX_EL2_EnAS0);
break;
case ESR_ELx_ISS_OTHER_LDST64B:
allowed = kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, LS64, LS64);
fwd &= !(hcrx & HCRX_EL2_EnALS);
break;
case ESR_ELx_ISS_OTHER_TSBCSYNC:
allowed = kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, TraceBuffer, TRBE_V1P1);
fwd &= (__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, HFGITR2_EL2) & HFGITR2_EL2_TSBCSYNC);
break;
case ESR_ELx_ISS_OTHER_PSBCSYNC:
allowed = kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, PMSVer, V1P5);
fwd &= (__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, HFGITR_EL2) & HFGITR_EL2_PSBCSYNC);
break;
default:
/* Clearly, we're missing something. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
allowed = false;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(allowed && !fwd);
if (allowed && fwd)
kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, esr);
else
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
return 1;
}
static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = kvm_handle_unknown_ec,
[ESR_ELx_EC_WFx] = kvm_handle_wfx,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = kvm_handle_cp15_32,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_64] = kvm_handle_cp15_64,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_MR] = kvm_handle_cp14_32,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_LS] = kvm_handle_cp14_load_store,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP10_ID] = kvm_handle_cp10_id,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_64] = kvm_handle_cp14_64,
[ESR_ELx_EC_OTHER] = handle_other,
[ESR_ELx_EC_HVC32] = handle_hvc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SMC32] = handle_smc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_HVC64] = handle_hvc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SMC64] = handle_smc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SVC64] = handle_svc,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64] = kvm_handle_sys_reg,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SVE] = handle_sve,
[ESR_ELx_EC_ERET] = kvm_handle_eret,
[ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW] = kvm_handle_guest_abort,
[ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW] = kvm_handle_guest_abort,
[ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR] = kvm_handle_vncr_abort,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SOFTSTP_LOW]= kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_WATCHPT_LOW]= kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_BREAKPT_LOW]= kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_BKPT32] = kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64] = kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD] = kvm_handle_fpasimd,
[ESR_ELx_EC_PAC] = kvm_handle_ptrauth,
[ESR_ELx_EC_GCS] = kvm_handle_gcs,
};
static exit_handle_fn kvm_get_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
u8 esr_ec = ESR_ELx_EC(esr);
return arm_exit_handlers[esr_ec];
}
/*
* We may be single-stepping an emulated instruction. If the emulation
* has been completed in the kernel, we can return to userspace with a
* KVM_EXIT_DEBUG, otherwise userspace needs to complete its
* emulation first.
*/
static int handle_trap_exceptions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int handled;
/*
* See ARM ARM B1.14.1: "Hyp traps on instructions
* that fail their condition code check"
*/
if (!kvm_condition_valid(vcpu)) {
kvm_incr_pc(vcpu);
handled = 1;
} else {
exit_handle_fn exit_handler;
exit_handler = kvm_get_exit_handler(vcpu);
handled = exit_handler(vcpu);
}
return handled;
}
/*
* Return > 0 to return to guest, < 0 on error, 0 (and set exit_reason) on
* proper exit to userspace.
*/
int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
if (ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
/*
* The SError is handled by handle_exit_early(). If the guest
* survives it will re-execute the original instruction.
*/
return 1;
}
exception_index = ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(exception_index);
switch (exception_index) {
case ARM_EXCEPTION_IRQ:
return 1;
case ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR:
return 1;
case ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP:
return handle_trap_exceptions(vcpu);
case ARM_EXCEPTION_HYP_GONE:
/*
* EL2 has been reset to the hyp-stub. This happens when a guest
* is pre-emptied by kvm_reboot()'s shutdown call.
*/
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
return 0;
case ARM_EXCEPTION_IL:
/*
* We attempted an illegal exception return. Guest state must
* have been corrupted somehow. Give up.
*/
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
return -EINVAL;
default:
kvm_pr_unimpl("Unsupported exception type: %d",
exception_index);
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* For exit types that need handling before we can be preempted */
void handle_exit_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
{
if (ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN)) {
u64 disr = kvm_vcpu_get_disr(vcpu);
kvm_handle_guest_serror(vcpu, disr_to_esr(disr));
} else {
kvm_inject_serror(vcpu);
}
return;
}
exception_index = ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(exception_index);
if (exception_index == ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR)
kvm_handle_guest_serror(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
}
static void print_nvhe_hyp_panic(const char *name, u64 panic_addr)
{
kvm_err("nVHE hyp %s at: [<%016llx>] %pB!\n", name, panic_addr,
(void *)(panic_addr + kaslr_offset()));
}
static void kvm_nvhe_report_cfi_failure(u64 panic_addr)
{
print_nvhe_hyp_panic("CFI failure", panic_addr);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE))
kvm_err(" (CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE ignored for hyp failures)\n");
}
void __noreturn __cold nvhe_hyp_panic_handler(u64 esr, u64 spsr,
u64 elr_virt, u64 elr_phys,
u64 par, uintptr_t vcpu,
u64 far, u64 hpfar) {
u64 elr_in_kimg = __phys_to_kimg(elr_phys);
u64 hyp_offset = elr_in_kimg - kaslr_offset() - elr_virt;
u64 mode = spsr & PSR_MODE_MASK;
u64 panic_addr = elr_virt + hyp_offset;
if (mode != PSR_MODE_EL2t && mode != PSR_MODE_EL2h) {
kvm_err("Invalid host exception to nVHE hyp!\n");
} else if (ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64 &&
esr_brk_comment(esr) == BUG_BRK_IMM) {
const char *file = NULL;
unsigned int line = 0;
/* All hyp bugs, including warnings, are treated as fatal. */
if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled() ||
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVHE_EL2_DEBUG)) {
struct bug_entry *bug = find_bug(elr_in_kimg);
if (bug)
bug_get_file_line(bug, &file, &line);
}
if (file)
kvm_err("nVHE hyp BUG at: %s:%u!\n", file, line);
else
print_nvhe_hyp_panic("BUG", panic_addr);
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CFI) && esr_is_cfi_brk(esr)) {
kvm_nvhe_report_cfi_failure(panic_addr);
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UBSAN_KVM_EL2) &&
ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64 &&
esr_is_ubsan_brk(esr)) {
print_nvhe_hyp_panic(report_ubsan_failure(esr & UBSAN_BRK_MASK),
panic_addr);
} else {
print_nvhe_hyp_panic("panic", panic_addr);
}
/* Dump the nVHE hypervisor backtrace */
kvm_nvhe_dump_backtrace(hyp_offset);
/* Dump the faulting instruction */
dump_kernel_instr(panic_addr + kaslr_offset());
/*
* Hyp has panicked and we're going to handle that by panicking the
* kernel. The kernel offset will be revealed in the panic so we're
* also safe to reveal the hyp offset as a debugging aid for translating
* hyp VAs to vmlinux addresses.
*/
kvm_err("Hyp Offset: 0x%llx\n", hyp_offset);
panic("HYP panic:\nPS:%08llx PC:%016llx ESR:%016llx\nFAR:%016llx HPFAR:%016llx PAR:%016llx\nVCPU:%016lx\n",
spsr, elr_virt, esr, far, hpfar, par, vcpu);
}