libbpf: upgrade 1.5.0 -> 1.6.2

Dropped patches which are now merged in the upstream

Changelog:
https://github.com/libbpf/libbpf/releases/tag/v1.5.1
https://github.com/libbpf/libbpf/releases/tag/v1.6.0
https://github.com/libbpf/libbpf/releases/tag/v1.6.1
https://github.com/libbpf/libbpf/releases/tag/v1.6.2

Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ankur Tyagi 2025-11-14 22:46:59 +13:00 committed by Khem Raj
parent 78f49691d7
commit 11a10b9661
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: BB053355919D3314
3 changed files with 2 additions and 150 deletions

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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From ff2eb6e134ebfc225b97b46182af3cc58ed481f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 11:50:04 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] libbpf: check for empty BTF data section in btf_parse_elf
A valid ELF file may contain a SHT_NOBITS .BTF section. This case is
not handled correctly in btf_parse_elf, which leads to a segfault.
Add a null check for a buffer returned by elf_getdata() before
proceeding with its processing.
Bug report: https://github.com/libbpf/libbpf/issues/894
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf-rc/commit/b02b669fd9398d246c8c9ae901c0d8f5bb36a588]
Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
---
btf.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/btf.c b/btf.c
index e9673c0e..21d38dcf 100644
--- a/btf.c
+++ b/btf.c
@@ -1199,6 +1199,12 @@ static struct btf *btf_parse_elf(const char *path, struct btf *base_btf,
goto done;
}
+ if (!secs.btf_data->d_buf) {
+ pr_warn("BTF data is empty in %s\n", path);
+ err = -ENODATA;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
if (secs.btf_base_data) {
dist_base_btf = btf_new(secs.btf_base_data->d_buf, secs.btf_base_data->d_size,
NULL);
--
2.34.1

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@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
From 806b4e0a9f658d831119cece11a082ba1578b800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 17:50:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] libbpf: Fix buffer overflow in bpf_object__init_prog
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.
Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end = prog_start + prog_size
prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end
| | | |
v v v v
.....................|################################|............
The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:
$ readelf -S crash
Section Headers:
[Nr] Name Type Address Offset
Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align
...
[ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040
0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8
$ readelf -s crash
Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name
...
6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp
Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.
This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:
=================================================================
==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
#0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
#1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
#2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
#3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
#4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
#5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)
0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
#1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
#2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
#3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740
The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947c1b3c ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").
Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.
[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Fixes: 6245947c1b3c ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
CVE: CVE-2025-29481
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libbpf/libbpf/commit/806b4e0a9f658d831119cece11a082ba1578b800]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
src/libbpf.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/libbpf.c b/src/libbpf.c
index b2591f5..56250b5 100644
--- a/src/libbpf.c
+++ b/src/libbpf.c
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ bpf_object__add_programs(struct bpf_object *obj, Elf_Data *sec_data,
return -LIBBPF_ERRNO__FORMAT;
}
- if (sec_off + prog_sz > sec_sz) {
+ if (sec_off + prog_sz > sec_sz || sec_off + prog_sz < sec_off) {
pr_warn("sec '%s': program at offset %zu crosses section boundary\n",
sec_name, sec_off);
return -LIBBPF_ERRNO__FORMAT;

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@ -8,11 +8,8 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://../LICENSE.LGPL-2.1;md5=b370887980db5dd40659b50909238
DEPENDS = "zlib elfutils"
SRC_URI = "git://github.com/libbpf/libbpf.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
file://0001-libbpf-check-for-empty-BTF-data-section-in-btf_parse.patch \
file://CVE-2025-29481.patch;striplevel=2 \
"
SRCREV = "09b9e83102eb8ab9e540d36b4559c55f3bcdb95d"
SRC_URI = "git://github.com/libbpf/libbpf.git;protocol=https;branch=${BPN}-${PV}"
SRCREV = "45e89348ec74617c11cd5241ccd0ffc91dfd03c4"
PACKAGE_ARCH = "${MACHINE_ARCH}"
COMPATIBLE_HOST = "(x86_64|i.86|arm|aarch64|riscv64|powerpc|powerpc64|mips64).*-linux"