mirror of
https://github.com/openembedded/meta-openembedded.git
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8b438a9d7b
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39330
Upstream-patch:
2b00edc015
Signed-off-by: Saravanan <saravanan.kadambathursubramaniyam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
182 lines
7.6 KiB
Diff
182 lines
7.6 KiB
Diff
From 2b00edc0151a660d1eb86da4059904a0fc4e095e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Natalia <124304+nessita@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 13:55:21 -0300
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Subject: [PATCH] Fixed CVE-2024-39330 -- Added extra file name validation in
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Storage's save method.
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Thanks to Josh Schneier for the report, and to Carlton Gibson and Sarah
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Boyce for the reviews.
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CVE: CVE-2024-39330
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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https://github.com/django/django/commit/2b00edc0151a660d1eb86da4059904a0fc4e095e
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Signed-off-by: Saravanan <saravanan.kadambathursubramaniyam@windriver.com>
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---
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django/core/files/storage.py | 11 ++++++
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django/core/files/utils.py | 7 ++--
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docs/releases/2.2.28.txt | 12 ++++++
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tests/file_storage/test_base.py | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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tests/file_storage/tests.py | 6 ---
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5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
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create mode 100644 tests/file_storage/test_base.py
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diff --git a/django/core/files/storage.py b/django/core/files/storage.py
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index ea5bbc8..8c633ec 100644
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--- a/django/core/files/storage.py
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+++ b/django/core/files/storage.py
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@@ -50,7 +50,18 @@ class Storage:
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if not hasattr(content, 'chunks'):
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content = File(content, name)
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+ # Ensure that the name is valid, before and after having the storage
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+ # system potentially modifying the name. This duplicates the check made
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+ # inside `get_available_name` but it's necessary for those cases where
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+ # `get_available_name` is overriden and validation is lost.
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+ validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)
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+
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+ # Potentially find a different name depending on storage constraints.
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name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)
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+ # Validate the (potentially) new name.
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+ validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)
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+
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+ # The save operation should return the actual name of the file saved.
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name = self._save(name, content)
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# Ensure that the name returned from the storage system is still valid.
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validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)
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diff --git a/django/core/files/utils.py b/django/core/files/utils.py
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index f28cea1..a1fea44 100644
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--- a/django/core/files/utils.py
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+++ b/django/core/files/utils.py
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@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ def validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=False):
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raise SuspiciousFileOperation("Could not derive file name from '%s'" % name)
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if allow_relative_path:
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- # Use PurePosixPath() because this branch is checked only in
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- # FileField.generate_filename() where all file paths are expected to be
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- # Unix style (with forward slashes).
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- path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(name)
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+ # Ensure that name can be treated as a pure posix path, i.e. Unix
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+ # style (with forward slashes).
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+ path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(str(name).replace("\\", "/"))
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if path.is_absolute() or '..' in path.parts:
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raise SuspiciousFileOperation(
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"Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'" % name
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diff --git a/docs/releases/2.2.28.txt b/docs/releases/2.2.28.txt
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index 22fa80e..3503f38 100644
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--- a/docs/releases/2.2.28.txt
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+++ b/docs/releases/2.2.28.txt
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@@ -131,3 +131,15 @@ The :meth:`~django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend.authenticate()` method
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allowed remote attackers to enumerate users via a timing attack involving login
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requests for users with unusable passwords.
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+CVE-2024-39330: Potential directory-traversal via ``Storage.save()``
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+====================================================================
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+
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+Derived classes of the :class:`~django.core.files.storage.Storage` base class
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+which override :meth:`generate_filename()
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+<django.core.files.storage.Storage.generate_filename()>` without replicating
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+the file path validations existing in the parent class, allowed for potential
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+directory-traversal via certain inputs when calling :meth:`save()
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+<django.core.files.storage.Storage.save()>`.
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+
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+Built-in ``Storage`` sub-classes were not affected by this vulnerability.
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+
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diff --git a/tests/file_storage/test_base.py b/tests/file_storage/test_base.py
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new file mode 100644
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index 0000000..c5338b8
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/tests/file_storage/test_base.py
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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
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+import os
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+from unittest import mock
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+
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+from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousFileOperation
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+from django.core.files.storage import Storage
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+from django.test import SimpleTestCase
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+
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+
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+class CustomStorage(Storage):
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+ """Simple Storage subclass implementing the bare minimum for testing."""
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+
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+ def exists(self, name):
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+ return False
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+
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+ def _save(self, name):
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+ return name
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+
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+
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+class StorageValidateFileNameTests(SimpleTestCase):
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+ invalid_file_names = [
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+ os.path.join("path", "to", os.pardir, "test.file"),
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+ os.path.join(os.path.sep, "path", "to", "test.file"),
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+ ]
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+ error_msg = "Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'"
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+
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+ def test_validate_before_get_available_name(self):
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+ s = CustomStorage()
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+ # The initial name passed to `save` is not valid nor safe, fail early.
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+ for name in self.invalid_file_names:
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+ with (
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+ self.subTest(name=name),
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+ mock.patch.object(s, "get_available_name") as mock_get_available_name,
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+ mock.patch.object(s, "_save") as mock_internal_save,
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+ ):
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+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(
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+ SuspiciousFileOperation, self.error_msg % name
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+ ):
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+ s.save(name, content="irrelevant")
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+ self.assertEqual(mock_get_available_name.mock_calls, [])
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+ self.assertEqual(mock_internal_save.mock_calls, [])
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+
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+ def test_validate_after_get_available_name(self):
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+ s = CustomStorage()
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+ # The initial name passed to `save` is valid and safe, but the returned
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+ # name from `get_available_name` is not.
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+ for name in self.invalid_file_names:
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+ with (
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+ self.subTest(name=name),
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+ mock.patch.object(s, "get_available_name", return_value=name),
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+ mock.patch.object(s, "_save") as mock_internal_save,
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+ ):
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+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(
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+ SuspiciousFileOperation, self.error_msg % name
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+ ):
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+ s.save("valid-file-name.txt", content="irrelevant")
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+ self.assertEqual(mock_internal_save.mock_calls, [])
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+
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+ def test_validate_after_internal_save(self):
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+ s = CustomStorage()
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+ # The initial name passed to `save` is valid and safe, but the result
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+ # from `_save` is not (this is achieved by monkeypatching _save).
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+ for name in self.invalid_file_names:
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+ with (
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+ self.subTest(name=name),
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+ mock.patch.object(s, "_save", return_value=name),
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+ ):
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+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(
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+ SuspiciousFileOperation, self.error_msg % name
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+ ):
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+ s.save("valid-file-name.txt", content="irrelevant")
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diff --git a/tests/file_storage/tests.py b/tests/file_storage/tests.py
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index 4c6f692..0e69264 100644
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--- a/tests/file_storage/tests.py
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+++ b/tests/file_storage/tests.py
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@@ -291,12 +291,6 @@ class FileStorageTests(SimpleTestCase):
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self.storage.delete('path/to/test.file')
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- def test_file_save_abs_path(self):
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- test_name = 'path/to/test.file'
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- f = ContentFile('file saved with path')
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- f_name = self.storage.save(os.path.join(self.temp_dir, test_name), f)
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- self.assertEqual(f_name, test_name)
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-
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def test_save_doesnt_close(self):
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with TemporaryUploadedFile('test', 'text/plain', 1, 'utf8') as file:
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file.write(b'1')
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--
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2.48.1
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