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libvirt: Five security fixes
Affects <= 4.9.0 This affectively moves sources to tip Fixes the following cves. CVE-2019-10132 CVE-2019-10161 CVE-2019-10166 CVE-2019-10167 CVE-2019-10168 Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
2c6f451aa2
commit
10ef706f61
63
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10132_p1.patch
Normal file
63
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10132_p1.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
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From b0f788c2d3d9930015258a7df95dde80a498e657 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 17:26:13 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 1/7] admin: reject clients unless their UID matches the
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current UID
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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The admin protocol RPC messages are only intended for use by the user
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running the daemon. As such they should not be allowed for any client
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UID that does not match the server UID.
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Fixes CVE-2019-10132
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Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 96f41cd765c9e525fe28ee5abbfbf4a79b3720c7)
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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CVE: CVE-2019-10132 patch #1
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Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
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---
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src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c b/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
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index b78ff90..9f25813 100644
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--- a/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
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+++ b/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
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@@ -66,6 +66,28 @@ remoteAdmClientNew(virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
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void *opaque)
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{
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struct daemonAdmClientPrivate *priv;
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+ uid_t clientuid;
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+ gid_t clientgid;
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+ pid_t clientpid;
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+ unsigned long long timestamp;
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+
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+ if (virNetServerClientGetUNIXIdentity(client,
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+ &clientuid,
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+ &clientgid,
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+ &clientpid,
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+ ×tamp) < 0)
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+ return NULL;
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+
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+ VIR_DEBUG("New client pid %lld uid %lld",
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+ (long long)clientpid,
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+ (long long)clientuid);
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+
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+ if (geteuid() != clientuid) {
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+ virReportRestrictedError(_("Disallowing client %lld with uid %lld"),
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+ (long long)clientpid,
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+ (long long)clientuid);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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if (VIR_ALLOC(priv) < 0)
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return NULL;
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--
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2.7.4
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55
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10132_p2.patch
Normal file
55
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10132_p2.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
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From ea014c9fcf19539c75a7cb6926b14858426746a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 16:51:37 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 2/7] locking: restrict sockets to mode 0600
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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The virtlockd daemon's only intended client is the libvirtd daemon. As
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such it should never allow clients from other user accounts to connect.
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The code already enforces this and drops clients from other UIDs, but
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we can get earlier (and thus stronger) protection against DoS by setting
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the socket permissions to 0600
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Fixes CVE-2019-10132
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Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit f111e09468693909b1f067aa575efdafd9a262a1)
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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CVE: CVE-2019-10132 patch #2
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Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
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---
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src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in | 1 +
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src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in | 1 +
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2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in b/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
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index 2a7500f..f674c49 100644
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--- a/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
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+++ b/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
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[Socket]
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ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlockd-admin-sock
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Service=virtlockd.service
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+SocketMode=0600
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[Install]
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WantedBy=sockets.target
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diff --git a/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in b/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
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index 45e0f20..d701b27 100644
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--- a/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
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+++ b/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
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[Socket]
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ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlockd-sock
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+SocketMode=0600
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[Install]
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WantedBy=sockets.target
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--
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2.7.4
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55
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10132_p3.patch
Normal file
55
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10132_p3.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
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From a474f18dceed61d562508980999e5f2d7445d683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 17:27:41 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 3/7] logging: restrict sockets to mode 0600
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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The virtlogd daemon's only intended client is the libvirtd daemon. As
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such it should never allow clients from other user accounts to connect.
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The code already enforces this and drops clients from other UIDs, but
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we can get earlier (and thus stronger) protection against DoS by setting
|
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the socket permissions to 0600
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|
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Fixes CVE-2019-10132
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Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit e37bd65f9948c1185456b2cdaa3bd6e875af680f)
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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CVE: CVE-2019-10132 patch #3
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Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
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---
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src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in | 1 +
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src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in | 1 +
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2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in b/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
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index 595e6c4..5c41dfe 100644
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--- a/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
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+++ b/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
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[Socket]
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ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlogd-admin-sock
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Service=virtlogd.service
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+SocketMode=0600
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[Install]
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WantedBy=sockets.target
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diff --git a/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in b/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
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index 22b9360..ae48cda 100644
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--- a/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
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+++ b/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
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[Socket]
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ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlogd-sock
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+SocketMode=0600
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[Install]
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WantedBy=sockets.target
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--
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2.7.4
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|
101
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10161.patch
Normal file
101
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10161.patch
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
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From 568c735d7b0ccb55f9476c86f8603eb3a5c9fc5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:47:42 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 4/7] api: disallow virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc on read-only
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connections
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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The virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc API is taking a path parameter,
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which can point to any path on the system. This file will then be
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read and parsed by libvirtd running with root privileges.
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Forbid it on read-only connections.
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Fixes: CVE-2019-10161
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Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
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Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit aed6a032cead4386472afb24b16196579e239580)
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Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Conflicts:
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src/libvirt-domain.c
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src/remote/remote_protocol.x
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Upstream commit 12a51f372 which introduced the VIR_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_XML_SECURE
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alias for VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE is not backported.
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Just skip the commit since we now disallow the whole API on read-only
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connections, regardless of the flag.
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Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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CVE: CVE-2019-19161
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Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
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---
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src/libvirt-domain.c | 11 ++---------
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src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 2 +-
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src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 3 +--
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3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
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index 7690339..c188239 100644
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--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
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+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
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@@ -1073,9 +1073,7 @@ virDomainRestoreFlags(virConnectPtr conn, const char *from, const char *dxml,
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* previously by virDomainSave() or virDomainSaveFlags().
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*
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* No security-sensitive data will be included unless @flags contains
|
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- * VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE; this flag is rejected on read-only
|
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- * connections. For this API, @flags should not contain either
|
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- * VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE or VIR_DOMAIN_XML_UPDATE_CPU.
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+ * VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE.
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*
|
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* Returns a 0 terminated UTF-8 encoded XML instance, or NULL in case of
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* error. The caller must free() the returned value.
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@@ -1091,12 +1089,7 @@ virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *file,
|
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|
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virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
|
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virCheckNonNullArgGoto(file, error);
|
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-
|
||||
- if ((conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) && (flags & VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE)) {
|
||||
- virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, "%s",
|
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- _("virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc with secure flag"));
|
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- goto error;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
|
||||
|
||||
if (conn->driver->domainSaveImageGetXMLDesc) {
|
||||
char *ret;
|
||||
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
index a52e249..f7656e5 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
@@ -6798,7 +6798,7 @@ qemuDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path,
|
||||
if (fd < 0)
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDescEnsureACL(conn, def, flags) < 0)
|
||||
+ if (virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDescEnsureACL(conn, def) < 0)
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = qemuDomainDefFormatXML(driver, def, flags);
|
||||
diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
|
||||
index 28c8feb..52b9233 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
|
||||
+++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
|
||||
@@ -5226,8 +5226,7 @@ enum remote_procedure {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @generate: both
|
||||
* @priority: high
|
||||
- * @acl: domain:read
|
||||
- * @acl: domain:read_secure:VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE
|
||||
+ * @acl: domain:write
|
||||
*/
|
||||
REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_GET_XML_DESC = 235,
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.7.4
|
||||
|
43
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10166.patch
Normal file
43
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10166.patch
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
|||
From 0a744e15517d727c7f473fabe32ca6b0dbb7b7d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:14:53 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/7] api: disallow virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML on read-only
|
||||
connections
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
The virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML can be used to alter the domain's
|
||||
config used for managedsave or even execute arbitrary emulator binaries.
|
||||
Forbid it on read-only connections.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2019-10166
|
||||
Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit db0b78457f183e4c7ac45bc94de86044a1e2056a)
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2019-19166
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/libvirt-domain.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
|
||||
index c188239..d8b64c0 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
|
||||
@@ -9490,6 +9490,7 @@ virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML(virDomainPtr domain, const char *dxml,
|
||||
|
||||
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
|
||||
conn = domain->conn;
|
||||
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
|
||||
|
||||
if (conn->driver->domainManagedSaveDefineXML) {
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.7.4
|
||||
|
41
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10167.patch
Normal file
41
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10167.patch
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
|||
From 6452b9fdff7988024a6157ca0a973ac3abf54468 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:16:14 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on
|
||||
read-only connections
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
|
||||
Forbid it on read-only connections.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2019-19167
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/libvirt-domain.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
|
||||
index d8b64c0..1e1c4e3 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
|
||||
@@ -11282,6 +11282,7 @@ virConnectGetDomainCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn,
|
||||
virResetLastError();
|
||||
|
||||
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
|
||||
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
|
||||
|
||||
if (conn->driver->connectGetDomainCapabilities) {
|
||||
char *ret;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.7.4
|
||||
|
49
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10168.patch
Normal file
49
recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2019-10168.patch
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
|||
From dd88b69a207c1ed6e89d7e9fa6b5f4a9ec4db97c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:17:39 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only
|
||||
connections
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
|
||||
Forbid them on read-only connections.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
|
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Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
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Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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CVE: CVE-2019-19168
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Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
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---
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src/libvirt-host.c | 2 ++
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/libvirt-host.c b/src/libvirt-host.c
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index e20d6ee..2978825 100644
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--- a/src/libvirt-host.c
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+++ b/src/libvirt-host.c
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@@ -1041,6 +1041,7 @@ virConnectCompareHypervisorCPU(virConnectPtr conn,
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virCheckConnectReturn(conn, VIR_CPU_COMPARE_ERROR);
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virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xmlCPU, error);
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+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
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if (conn->driver->connectCompareHypervisorCPU) {
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int ret;
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@@ -1234,6 +1235,7 @@ virConnectBaselineHypervisorCPU(virConnectPtr conn,
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virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
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virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xmlCPUs, error);
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+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
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if (conn->driver->connectBaselineHypervisorCPU) {
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char *cpu;
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--
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2.7.4
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|
|
@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libvirt.org/sources/libvirt-${PV}.tar.xz;name=libvirt \
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file://0001-ptest-Remove-Windows-1252-check-from-esxutilstest.patch \
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file://configure.ac-search-for-rpc-rpc.h-in-the-sysroot.patch \
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file://hook_support.py \
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file://CVE-2019-10132_p1.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-10132_p2.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-10132_p3.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-10161.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-10166.patch \
|
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file://CVE-2019-10167.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-10168.patch \
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"
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_URI[libvirt.md5sum] = "aaf7b265ac2013d6eb184a86b5f7eeb9"
|
||||
|
|
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user