xen: TPM Emulator for Xen stubdoms

TPM Emulator is a software-based TPM and MTM emulator. This TPM Emulator
recipe creates a static library that is cross-compiled against MiniOS,
Xen, LWIP, Newlib, PolarSSL, and the stubdom-specific GMP headers and
subsequently used during the cross-compilation and linking of the Xen
vTPM and vTPM Manager stubdomains.

The current Xen source code is hardcoded to fetch a specific version of
this package. The patch files originate from the Xen/stubdom source
tree. This recipe provides the flexibility to change version or modify
the patches.

Signed-off-by: Kurt Bodiker <kurt.bodiker@braintrust-us.com>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@windriver.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kurt Bodiker 2018-05-01 10:05:33 -04:00 committed by Bruce Ashfield
parent 299c5243dd
commit 230198a7d1
10 changed files with 679 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -Naur tpm_emulator-x86_64-back/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.c tpm_emulator-x86_64/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.c
--- a/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.c 2012-04-27 10:55:46.581963398 -0400
+++ b/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.c 2012-04-27 10:56:02.193034152 -0400
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@
#else /* TPM_NO_EXTERN */
int (*tpm_extern_init)(void) = NULL;
-int (*tpm_extern_release)(void) = NULL;
+void (*tpm_extern_release)(void) = NULL;
void* (*tpm_malloc)(size_t size) = NULL;
void (*tpm_free)(/*const*/ void *ptr) = NULL;
void (*tpm_log)(int priority, const char *fmt, ...) = NULL;

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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
index d16a997..8088a2a 100644
--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#define TPM_STORAGE_NAME "${TPM_STORAGE_NAME}"
#define TPM_DEVICE_NAME "${TPM_DEVICE_NAME}"
#define TPM_LOG_FILE "${TPM_LOG_FILE}"
-#define TPM_CMD_BUF_SIZE 4096
+#define TPM_CMD_BUF_SIZE 4088
#endif /* _CONFIG_H_ */

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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
---
CMakeLists.txt | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Index: tpm_emulator-x86_64/CMakeLists.txt
===================================================================
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ set(TPM_STORAGE_NAME "/var/lib/tpm/tpm_e
set(TPM_DEVICE_NAME "/dev/tpm")
endif()
configure_file(${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/config.h.in ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h)
-add_definitions(-Wall -Werror -Wno-unused-parameter -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings)
+add_definitions(-Wall -Werror)
if("${CMAKE_SYSTEM}" MATCHES "Linux")
add_definitions(-Wextra)
endif()
+add_definitions(-Wno-unused-parameter -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings)
if(USE_OPENSSL)
add_definitions(-DUSE_OPENSSL)
endif()

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@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
index 69511d1..7545d51 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
@@ -3347,12 +3347,13 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
{
TPM_NONCE nonce;
TPM_RESULT res;
- UINT32 sigSize;
- BYTE *sig;
+ UINT32 quote_blob_size;
+ BYTE *quote_blob;
BYTE *ptr;
UINT32 len;
TPM_PCR_SELECTION myPCR;
TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptPCR;
+ UINT32 extraInfoFlags = 0;
tpm_compute_in_param_digest(req);
@@ -3361,17 +3362,19 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_NONCE(&ptr, &len, &nonce)
|| tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &myPCR)
|| tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &ptPCR)
+ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_DEEP_QUOTE_INFO(&ptr, &len, &extraInfoFlags)
|| len != 0) return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
- res = TPM_DeepQuote(&nonce, &myPCR, &ptPCR, &req->auth1, &sigSize, &sig);
+ res = TPM_DeepQuote(&nonce, &myPCR, &ptPCR, &req->auth1, extraInfoFlags,
+ &quote_blob_size, &quote_blob);
if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
- rsp->paramSize = len = sigSize;
+ rsp->paramSize = len = quote_blob_size;
rsp->param = ptr = tpm_malloc(len);
- if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, sig, sigSize)) {
+ if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, quote_blob, quote_blob_size)) {
tpm_free(rsp->param);
res = TPM_FAIL;
}
- tpm_free(sig);
+ tpm_free(quote_blob);
return res;
}
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_commands.h b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
index 328d1be..a56dd5f 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
@@ -3077,6 +3077,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(
* @myPCR: [in] PCR selection for the virtual TPM
* @ptPCR: [in] PCR selection for the hardware TPM
* @auth1: [in, out] Authorization protocol parameters
+ * @extraInfoFlags [in] Flags for including, kernel hash, group info, etc
* @sigSize: [out] The length of the returned digital signature
* @sig: [out] The resulting digital signature and PCR values
* Returns: TPM_SUCCESS on success, a TPM error code otherwise.
@@ -3086,6 +3087,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(
TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR,
TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+ UINT32 extraInfoFlags,
UINT32 *sigSize,
BYTE **sig
);
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
index c0d62e7..6586c22 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
@@ -183,7 +183,8 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub(TPM_KEY_HANDLE keyHandle, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
int endorsementKeyFresh = 0;
-TPM_RESULT VTPM_GetParentQuote(TPM_DIGEST* data, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig);
+TPM_RESULT VTPM_GetParentQuote(TPM_NONCE *data, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
+ UINT32 extraInfoFlags, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig);
TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
TPM_AUTH *auth1, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
TPM_PUBKEY pubKey;
TPM_RESULT res;
TPM_DIGEST hres;
-
+ UINT32 extraInfoFlags = 0;
info("TPM_ParentSignEK()");
res = tpm_verify_auth(auth1, tpmData.permanent.data.ownerAuth, TPM_KH_OWNER);
@@ -206,7 +207,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
res = TPM_FAIL;
if (res == TPM_SUCCESS)
- res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, sel, sigSize, sig);
+ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote((TPM_NONCE*)&hres, sel, extraInfoFlags, sigSize, sig);
free_TPM_PUBKEY(pubKey);
return res;
@@ -218,7 +219,7 @@ static const BYTE dquot_hdr[] = {
TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
- UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
+ UINT32 extraInfoFlags, UINT32 *quote_blob_size, BYTE **quote_blob)
{
TPM_RESULT res;
TPM_DIGEST hres;
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
tpm_free(buf);
- res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, ptPCR, sigSize, sig);
+ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote((TPM_NONCE*)&hres, ptPCR, extraInfoFlags, quote_blob_size, quote_blob);
return res;
}
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_marshalling.h b/tpm/tpm_marshalling.h
index d510ebe..2e0c008 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_marshalling.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_marshalling.h
@@ -268,6 +268,8 @@ static inline int tpm_unmarshal_BOOL(BYTE **ptr, UINT32 *length, BOOL *v)
#define tpm_unmarshal_TPM_REDIR_COMMAND tpm_unmarshal_UINT32
#define tpm_marshal_DAAHANDLE tpm_marshal_UINT32
#define tpm_unmarshal_DAAHANDLE tpm_unmarshal_UINT32
+#define tpm_marshal_TPM_DEEP_QUOTE_INFO tpm_marshal_UINT32
+#define tpm_unmarshal_TPM_DEEP_QUOTE_INFO tpm_unmarshal_UINT32
int tpm_marshal_UINT32_ARRAY(BYTE **ptr, UINT32 *length, UINT32 *v, UINT32 n);
int tpm_unmarshal_UINT32_ARRAY(BYTE **ptr, UINT32 *length, UINT32 *v, UINT32 n);

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@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
index 0fabf98..69511d1 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
@@ -3343,6 +3343,39 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
return res;
}
+static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+{
+ TPM_NONCE nonce;
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+ UINT32 sigSize;
+ BYTE *sig;
+ BYTE *ptr;
+ UINT32 len;
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION myPCR;
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptPCR;
+
+ tpm_compute_in_param_digest(req);
+
+ ptr = req->param;
+ len = req->paramSize;
+ if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_NONCE(&ptr, &len, &nonce)
+ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &myPCR)
+ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &ptPCR)
+ || len != 0) return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
+
+ res = TPM_DeepQuote(&nonce, &myPCR, &ptPCR, &req->auth1, &sigSize, &sig);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+ rsp->paramSize = len = sigSize;
+ rsp->param = ptr = tpm_malloc(len);
+ if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, sig, sigSize)) {
+ tpm_free(rsp->param);
+ res = TPM_FAIL;
+ }
+ tpm_free(sig);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
static void tpm_setup_rsp_auth(TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
{
tpm_hmac_ctx_t hmac;
@@ -4098,6 +4131,11 @@ void tpm_execute_command(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
res = execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(req, rsp);
break;
+ case TPM_ORD_DeepQuote:
+ debug("[TPM_ORD_DeepQuote]");
+ res = execute_TPM_DeepQuote(req, rsp);
+ break;
+
default:
#ifdef MTM_EMULATOR
res = mtm_execute_command(req, rsp);
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_commands.h b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
index 7fef934..328d1be 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
@@ -3071,6 +3071,25 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(
BYTE **sig
);
+/**
+ * TPM_DeepQuote - gets a hardware TPM quote of a vTPM's PCRs
+ * @externalData: [in] AntiReplay nonce to prevent replay of messages
+ * @myPCR: [in] PCR selection for the virtual TPM
+ * @ptPCR: [in] PCR selection for the hardware TPM
+ * @auth1: [in, out] Authorization protocol parameters
+ * @sigSize: [out] The length of the returned digital signature
+ * @sig: [out] The resulting digital signature and PCR values
+ * Returns: TPM_SUCCESS on success, a TPM error code otherwise.
+ */
+TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(
+ TPM_NONCE *externalData,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR,
+ TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+ UINT32 *sigSize,
+ BYTE **sig
+);
+
/*
* Error handling
* [tpm_error.c]
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
index 01f29e6..c0d62e7 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
@@ -211,3 +211,49 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
free_TPM_PUBKEY(pubKey);
return res;
}
+
+static const BYTE dquot_hdr[] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 'D', 'Q', 'U', 'T'
+};
+
+TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+ UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
+{
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+ TPM_DIGEST hres;
+ TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT pcrData;
+ tpm_sha1_ctx_t ctx;
+ BYTE *buf, *ptr;
+ UINT32 size, len;
+
+ info("TPM_DeepQuote()");
+
+ res = tpm_verify_auth(auth1, tpmData.permanent.data.ownerAuth, TPM_KH_OWNER);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+
+ res = tpm_compute_pcr_digest(myPCR, &pcrData.digestAtRelease, NULL);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+
+ pcrData.pcrSelection.sizeOfSelect = myPCR->sizeOfSelect;
+ memcpy(pcrData.pcrSelection.pcrSelect, myPCR->pcrSelect, myPCR->sizeOfSelect);
+ pcrData.localityAtRelease = 1 << tpmData.stany.flags.localityModifier;
+
+ size = len = sizeof_TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT(pcrData);
+ buf = ptr = tpm_malloc(size);
+ if (buf == NULL) return TPM_NOSPACE;
+ if (tpm_marshal_TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT(&ptr, &len, &pcrData))
+ return TPM_FAIL;
+
+ tpm_sha1_init(&ctx);
+ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, dquot_hdr, 8);
+ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, externalData->nonce, 20);
+ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, buf, size);
+ tpm_sha1_final(&ctx, hres.digest);
+
+ tpm_free(buf);
+
+ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, ptPCR, sigSize, sig);
+
+ return res;
+}
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_structures.h b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
index b0f4625..dfb1894 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
@@ -660,6 +660,42 @@ typedef struct tdTPM_CMK_MA_APPROVAL {
/* VTPM-only commands: */
/*
+ * Deep Quote - Create quote of PCRs
+ * Input:
+ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
+ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of request
+ * TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal TPM_ORD_DeepQuote
+ * TPM_NONCE externData 20 bytes of external data
+ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION vtSel PCR selection for virtual TPM
+ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptSel PCR selection for physical TPM
+ * ---
+ * UINT32 authHandle Owner authorization session (OIAP)
+ * TPM_NONCE nonceOdd Nonce for authHandle
+ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
+ * TPM_AUTHDATA privAuth Authorization digest for command
+ *
+ * Output:
+ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
+ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of response
+ * TPM_RESULT returnCode Return code of the operation
+ * BYTE[] sig Signature provided by physical TPM
+ * TPM_PCRVALUE[] pcrValue Values of hardware PCRs used in the quote
+ * ---
+ * TPM_NONCE nonceEven Nonce for authHandle
+ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
+ * TPM_AUTHDATA resAuth Authorization digest for response
+ *
+ * The values of the virutal TPM's PCRs are not included in the response.
+ * The signature is a standard TPM_Quote response from the physical TPM; its
+ * externalData is the SHA1 hash of the following structure:
+ * TPM_STRUCT_VER version MUST be 0.0.0.0
+ * BYTE[4] fixed MUST be the string "DQUT"
+ * TPM_NONCE externData From input to the deep quote
+ * TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT pcrData Virtual TPM's PCRs
+ */
+#define TPM_ORD_DeepQuote (TPM_VENDOR_COMMAND | TPM_ORD_Quote)
+
+/*
* ParentSignEK - Proof of fresh provisioning and EK value
*
* Input:

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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c.orig 2017-04-27 13:37:14.408000000 +0200
+++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c 2017-04-27 13:39:53.585000000 +0200
@@ -3397,6 +3397,7 @@
sizeof(rsp->auth2->nonceOdd.nonce));
tpm_hmac_update(&hmac, (BYTE*)&rsp->auth2->continueAuthSession, 1);
tpm_hmac_final(&hmac, rsp->auth2->auth);
+ /* fall-thru */
case TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND:
tpm_hmac_init(&hmac, rsp->auth1->secret, sizeof(rsp->auth1->secret));
tpm_hmac_update(&hmac, rsp->auth1->digest, sizeof(rsp->auth1->digest));

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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_capability.c b/tpm/tpm_capability.c
index 60bbb90..f8f7f0f 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_capability.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_capability.c
@@ -949,6 +949,8 @@ static TPM_RESULT set_vendor(UINT32 subCap, BYTE *setValue,
UINT32 setValueSize, BOOL ownerAuth,
BOOL deactivated, BOOL disabled)
{
+ if (tpmData.stany.flags.localityModifier != 8)
+ return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
/* set the capability area with the specified data, on failure
deactivate the TPM */
switch (subCap) {
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
index 288d1ce..9e1cfb4 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
@@ -4132,7 +4132,7 @@ void tpm_emulator_shutdown()
tpm_extern_release();
}
-int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint32_t *out_size)
+int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint32_t *out_size, int locality)
{
TPM_REQUEST req;
TPM_RESPONSE rsp;
@@ -4140,7 +4140,9 @@ int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint3
UINT32 len;
BOOL free_out;
- debug("tpm_handle_command()");
+ debug("tpm_handle_command(%d)", locality);
+ if (locality != -1)
+ tpmData.stany.flags.localityModifier = locality;
/* we need the whole packet at once, otherwise unmarshalling will fail */
if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_REQUEST((uint8_t**)&in, &in_size, &req) != 0) {
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_emulator.h b/tpm/tpm_emulator.h
index eed749e..4c228bd 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_emulator.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_emulator.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ void tpm_emulator_shutdown(void);
* its usage. In case of an error, all internally allocated memory
* is released and the the state of out and out_size is unspecified.
*/
-int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint32_t *out_size);
+int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint32_t *out_size, int locality);
#endif /* _TPM_EMULATOR_H_ */

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@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
index 9e1cfb4..0fabf98 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
@@ -3312,6 +3312,37 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_OwnerReadPubek(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp
return res;
}
+static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+{
+ TPM_NONCE nonce;
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+ UINT32 sigSize;
+ BYTE *sig;
+ BYTE *ptr;
+ UINT32 len;
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION targetPCR;
+
+ tpm_compute_in_param_digest(req);
+
+ ptr = req->param;
+ len = req->paramSize;
+ if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_NONCE(&ptr, &len, &nonce)
+ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &targetPCR)
+ || len != 0) return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
+
+ res = TPM_ParentSignEK(&nonce, &targetPCR, &req->auth1, &sigSize, &sig);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+ rsp->paramSize = len = sigSize;
+ rsp->param = ptr = tpm_malloc(len);
+ if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, sig, sigSize)) {
+ tpm_free(rsp->param);
+ res = TPM_FAIL;
+ }
+ tpm_free(sig);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
static void tpm_setup_rsp_auth(TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
{
tpm_hmac_ctx_t hmac;
@@ -4062,6 +4093,11 @@ void tpm_execute_command(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
res = execute_TPM_OwnerReadPubek(req, rsp);
break;
+ case TPM_ORD_ParentSignEK:
+ debug("[TPM_ORD_ParentSignEK]");
+ res = execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(req, rsp);
+ break;
+
default:
#ifdef MTM_EMULATOR
res = mtm_execute_command(req, rsp);
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_commands.h b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
index a7666f6..7fef934 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
@@ -3054,6 +3054,23 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_OwnerReadPubek(
TPM_PUBKEY *pubEndorsementKey
);
+/**
+ * TPM_ParentSignEK - gets a hardware TPM quote of a vTPM's EK
+ * @externalData: [in] AntiReplay nonce to prevent replay of messages
+ * @sel: [in] PCR selection for the hardware TPM's quote
+ * @auth1: [in, out] Authorization protocol parameters
+ * @sigSize: [out] The length of the returned digital signature
+ * @sig: [out] The resulting digital signature and PCR values
+ * Returns: TPM_SUCCESS on success, a TPM error code otherwise.
+ */
+TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(
+ TPM_NONCE *externalData,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
+ TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+ UINT32 *sigSize,
+ BYTE **sig
+);
+
/*
* Error handling
* [tpm_error.c]
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
index 9cd64af..01f29e6 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
@@ -180,3 +180,34 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub(TPM_KEY_HANDLE keyHandle, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
}
}
+
+int endorsementKeyFresh = 0;
+
+TPM_RESULT VTPM_GetParentQuote(TPM_DIGEST* data, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig);
+
+TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
+ TPM_AUTH *auth1, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
+{
+ TPM_PUBKEY pubKey;
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+ TPM_DIGEST hres;
+
+ info("TPM_ParentSignEK()");
+
+ res = tpm_verify_auth(auth1, tpmData.permanent.data.ownerAuth, TPM_KH_OWNER);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+
+ if (!endorsementKeyFresh) return TPM_DISABLED_CMD;
+
+ res = tpm_get_pubek(&pubKey);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+
+ if (tpm_compute_pubkey_checksum(externalData, &pubKey, &hres))
+ res = TPM_FAIL;
+
+ if (res == TPM_SUCCESS)
+ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, sel, sigSize, sig);
+
+ free_TPM_PUBKEY(pubKey);
+ return res;
+}
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_data.c b/tpm/tpm_data.c
index 50c9697..6a0c499 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_data.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_data.c
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ static void init_timeouts(void)
tpmData.permanent.data.cmd_durations[2] = 1000;
}
+extern int endorsementKeyFresh;
+
void tpm_init_data(void)
{
/* endorsement key */
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ void tpm_init_data(void)
if (tpmConf & TPM_CONF_GENERATE_EK) {
/* generate a new endorsement key */
tpm_rsa_generate_key(&tpmData.permanent.data.endorsementKey, 2048);
+ endorsementKeyFresh = 1;
} else {
/* setup endorsement key */
tpm_rsa_import_key(&tpmData.permanent.data.endorsementKey,
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_structures.h b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
index f746c05..b0f4625 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
@@ -658,6 +658,49 @@ typedef struct tdTPM_CMK_MA_APPROVAL {
#define TPM_ORD_TickStampBlob 242
#define TPM_ORD_MAX 256
+/* VTPM-only commands: */
+/*
+ * ParentSignEK - Proof of fresh provisioning and EK value
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
+ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of request
+ * TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal TPM_ORD_ParentSignEK
+ * TPM_NONCE externData 20 bytes of external data
+ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptSel PCR selection for physical TPM
+ * ---
+ * UINT32 authHandle Owner authorization session (OIAP)
+ * TPM_NONCE nonceOdd Nonce for authHandle
+ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
+ * TPM_AUTHDATA privAuth Authorization digest for command
+ *
+ * Output:
+ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
+ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of response
+ * TPM_RESULT returnCode Return code of the operation
+ * BYTE[] sig Signature provided by physical TPM
+ * TPM_PCRVALUE[] pcrValue Values of hardware PCRs used in the quote
+ * ---
+ * TPM_NONCE nonceEven Nonce for authHandle
+ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
+ * TPM_AUTHDATA resAuth Authorization digest for response
+ *
+ * This command is only valid on the first boot of a vTPM; on any subsequent
+ * boot, the command returns TPM_DISABLED_CMD. It is intended to be used to
+ * provide evidence of proper platform configuration to the verifier/CA which is
+ * responsible for the creation of the vTPM's endorsement credential, which will
+ * be used on subsequent boots to certify AIKs via the usual Privacy CA protocol.
+ *
+ * The values of the virtual TPM's PCRs are not included in the response.
+ * The signature is a standard TPM_Quote response from the physical TPM; its
+ * externalData is the SHA1 hash of the following structure:
+ * TPM_PUBKEY pubEK The vTPM's public EK
+ * TPM_NONCE externData From input to the deep quote
+ *
+ * This structure was chosen to match the return of TPM_ReadPubek
+ */
+#define TPM_ORD_ParentSignEK (TPM_VENDOR_COMMAND | TPM_ORD_ReadPubek)
+
/*
* TCS Ordinals ([TPM_Part2], Section 17.1)
*

View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
# Copyright (C) 2017 Kurt Bodiker <kurt.bodiker@braintrust-us.com>
# Released under the MIT license (see COPYING.MIT for the terms)
require stubdom.inc
DEPENDS += "\
cmake-native \
newlib \
stubdom-gmp \
"
# nothing to configure
do_configure[noexec] = "1"
export CMAKE_C_FLAGS = "\
-std=c99 \
-DTPM_NO_EXTERN \
${STUBDOM_CPPFLAGS} \
${STUBDOM_CFLAGS} \
-Wno-declaration-after-statement \
-Wno-implicit-fallthrough \
"
do_compile() {
CC="${HOST_PREFIX}gcc --sysroot=${RECIPE_SYSROOT}" cmake .. -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS:STRING="${CMAKE_C_FLAGS}"
${MAKE} VERBOSE=1 tpm_crypto tpm
}
do_install() {
install -d ${D}/${libdir}
install -m 644 -t ${D}/${libdir} ${B}/crypto/libtpm_crypto.a
install -m 644 -t ${D}/${libdir} ${B}/tpm/libtpm.a
install -D -m 644 -t ${D}/${includedir}/tpm-emulator/build ${S}/build/config.h
install -D -m 644 -t ${D}/${includedir}/tpm-emulator/crypto ${S}/crypto/*.h
install -D -m 644 -t ${D}/${includedir}/tpm-emulator/tpm ${S}/tpm/*.h
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
# Copyright (C) 2017 Kurt Bodiker <kurt.bodiker@braintrust-us.com>
# Released under the MIT license (see COPYING.MIT for the terms)
DESCRIPTION = "TPM Emulator"
HOMEPAGE = "http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles"
LICENSE = "GPLv2"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://README;md5=eeabd77cf8fd8a8bc42983884cb09863"
SRC_URI = "\
http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles/tpm_emulator-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tpm-emulator \
file://tpmemu-0.7.4.patch \
file://vtpm-bufsize.patch \
file://vtpm-locality.patch \
file://vtpm-parent-sign-ek.patch \
file://vtpm-deepquote.patch \
file://vtpm-deepquote-anyloc.patch \
file://vtpm-cmake-Wextra.patch \
file://vtpm-implicit-fallthrough.patch \
"
SRC_URI[tpm-emulator.md5sum] = "e26becb8a6a2b6695f6b3e8097593db8"
SRC_URI[tpm-emulator.sha256sum] = "4e48ea0d83dd9441cc1af04ab18cd6c961b9fa54d5cbf2c2feee038988dea459"
S="${WORKDIR}/tpm_emulator-${PV}"
B="${S}/build"
require tpm-emulator.inc