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ovmf: fix CVE-2024-38797

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According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/security/advisories/GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/10928

(From OE-Core rev: a94550098d821e0055020a7d866648a761efcade)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Hongxu Jia 2025-06-12 20:43:17 -07:00 committed by Richard Purdie
parent 6ed03701e3
commit c169e5d26a
5 changed files with 306 additions and 0 deletions
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43
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38797-1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 2c8fb3e5164effc8a370e800fe91db7341e69116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 11:23:41 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] SecurityPkg: Update SecurityFixes.yaml for CVE-2024-38797
This commit updates the SecurityFixes.yaml file to include
information about the CVE-2024-38797 vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <DougFlick@microsoft.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-38797
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/10928/commits/519366f542e9370bee982b1c3687ffedb5cabc21]
Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
---
SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
index b4006b4..06b597a 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
@@ -40,3 +40,18 @@ CVE_2022_36764:
- Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
links:
- https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4118
+CVE_2024_38797:
+ commit-titles:
+ - "SecurityPkg: Out of bound read in HashPeImageByType()"
+ - "SecurityPkg: Improving HashPeImageByType () logic"
+ - "SecurityPkg: Improving SecureBootConfigImpl:HashPeImageByType () logic"
+ cve: CVE-2024-38797
+ date_reported: 2024-06-04 12:00 UTC
+ description: Out of bound read in HashPeImageByType()
+ note:
+ files_impacted:
+ - SecurityPkg\Library\DxeImageVerificationLib\DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+ - SecurityPkg\VariableAuthenticated\SecureBootConfigDxe\SecureBootConfigImpl.c
+ links:
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2214
+ - https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/security/advisories/GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
--
2.34.1

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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38797-2.patch Normal file
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From 1a7be26382c4a34504875f094e15fe371d44192e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2024 09:37:18 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] SecurityPkg: Out of bound read in HashPeImageByType()
In HashPeImageByType(), the hash of PE/COFF image is calculated.
This function may get untrusted input.
Inside this function, the following code verifies the loaded image has
the correct format, by reading the second byte of the buffer.
```c
if ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {
...
}
```
The input image is not trusted and that may not have the second byte to
read. So this poses an out of bound read error.
With below fix we are assuring that we don't do out of bound read. i.e,
we make sure that AuthDataSize is greater than 1.
```c
if (AuthDataSize > 1
&& (*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE){
...
}
```
AuthDataSize size is verified before reading the second byte.
So if AuthDataSize is less than 2, the second byte will not be read, and
the out of bound read situation won't occur.
Tested the patch on real platform with and without TPM connected and
verified image is booting fine.
Authored-by: Raj AlwinX Selvaraj <Alw...@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <DougFlick@microsoft.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-38797
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/10928/commits/2dcdb41b564aa3cb846644b4b1722a0b3ae5e06b]
Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
---
.../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index b05da19..2afa2c9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ HashPeImageByType (
// This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
// Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
//
- if ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {
+ if ((AuthDataSize > 1) && ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE)) {
//
// Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
//
--
2.34.1

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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38797-3.patch Normal file
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From 4db363db013a92937431234252fc9d84e44fc120 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2024 10:16:57 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] SecurityPkg: Improving HashPeImageByType () logic
Namely:
(1) The TWO_BYTE_ENCODE check is independent of Index. If it evalutes
to TRUE for Index==0, then it will evaluate to TRUE for all other
Index values as well. As a result, the (Index == HASHALG_MAX)
condition will fire after the loop, and we'll return
EFI_UNSUPPORTED.
While this is correct, functionally speaking, it is wasteful to
keep re-checking TWO_BYTE_ENCODE in the loop body. The check
should be made at the top of the function, and EFI_UNSUPPORTED
should be returned at once, if appropriate.
(2) If the hash algorithm selected by Index has such a large OID that
the OID comparison cannot even be performed (because AuthDataSize
is not large enough for containing the OID in question, starting
at offset 32), then the function returns EFI_UNSUPPORTED at once.
This is bogus; this case should simply be treated as an OID
mismatch, and the loop should advance to the next Index value /
hash algorithm candidate. A remaining hash algo may have a shorter
OID and yield an OID match.
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <DougFlick@microsoft.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-38797
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/10928/commits/5df518ec510324f48ed1cf0376150960644b41f0]
Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
---
.../DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 37 ++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 2afa2c9..2eca39d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -618,6 +618,7 @@ Done:
@param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
+ @retval EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE AuthData provided is invalid size.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
**/
@@ -629,28 +630,28 @@ HashPeImageByType (
{
UINT8 Index;
- for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
+ // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ // version Version,
+ // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+ // contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ // .... }
+ // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
+ // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
+ // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
+ //
+ if ((AuthDataSize > 1) && ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE)) {
//
- // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
- // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
- // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
- // version Version,
- // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
- // contentInfo ContentInfo,
- // .... }
- // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
- // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
- // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
+ // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
//
- if ((AuthDataSize > 1) && ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE)) {
- //
- // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
- //
- continue;
- }
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
if (AuthDataSize < 32 + mHash[Index].OidLength) {
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ continue;
}
if (CompareMem (AuthData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {
--
2.34.1

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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38797-4.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
From cb3342702c5c1f8a4ddbb6d503a98ed720d14eb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 11:30:17 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] SecurityPkg: Improving
SecureBootConfigImpl:HashPeImageByType () logic
Namely:
(1) The TWO_BYTE_ENCODE check is independent of Index. If it evalutes
to TRUE for Index==0, then it will evaluate to TRUE for all other
Index values as well. As a result, the (Index == HASHALG_MAX)
condition will fire after the loop, and we'll return
EFI_UNSUPPORTED.
While this is correct, functionally speaking, it is wasteful to
keep re-checking TWO_BYTE_ENCODE in the loop body. The check
should be made at the top of the function, and EFI_UNSUPPORTED
should be returned at once, if appropriate.
(2) If the hash algorithm selected by Index has such a large OID that
the OID comparison cannot even be performed (because AuthDataSize
is not large enough for containing the OID in question, starting
at offset 32), then the function returns EFI_UNSUPPORTED at once.
This is bogus; this case should simply be treated as an OID
mismatch, and the loop should advance to the next Index value /
hash algorithm candidate. A remaining hash algo may have a shorter
OID and yield an OID match.
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <DougFlick@microsoft.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-38797
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/10928/commits/8676572908b950dd4d1f8985006011be99c0a5b6]
Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
---
.../SecureBootConfigImpl.c | 37 +++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
index 6d4560c..155e755 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
@@ -2096,30 +2096,35 @@ HashPeImageByType (
{
UINT8 Index;
WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
+ UINT32 PkcsCertSize;
PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);
+ PkcsCertSize = mSecDataDir->SizeOfCert;
- for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
+ // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ // version Version,
+ // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+ // contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ // .... }
+ // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
+ // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
+ // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
+ //
+ if ((PkcsCertSize > 1) && ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE)) {
//
- // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
- // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
- // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
- // version Version,
- // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
- // contentInfo ContentInfo,
- // .... }
- // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
- // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
- // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
+ // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
//
- if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {
- //
- // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
- //
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
+ if (PkcsCertSize < 32 + mHash[Index].OidLength) {
continue;
}
- //
if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {
break;
}
--
2.34.1

4
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb
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@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
file://0003-debug-prefix-map.patch \
file://0004-reproducible.patch \
file://CVE-2025-2295.patch \
file://CVE-2024-38797-1.patch \
file://CVE-2024-38797-2.patch \
file://CVE-2024-38797-3.patch \
file://CVE-2024-38797-4.patch \
"
PV = "edk2-stable202502"