eudev: backport patch to fix udevd hanging while trying to access /dev/urandom

Linux kernel commit 48bff1053c17 ("random: opportunistically initialize
on /dev/urandom reads") introduced a change where /dev/urandom blocks if
the random pool is insufficiently initialized during hardware boot. This
behavior causes /dev/urandom reads to hang for approximately 5 seconds,
delaying the boot process with eudev init script (when it calls udevd).

This issue has already been solved upstream, therefore backport the
upstream patch to fix this.

(From OE-Core rev: cd5f630581f3e38645a92ad75b496bce92b679cb)

Signed-off-by: Hiago De Franco <hiago.franco@toradex.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Hiago De Franco 2025-01-13 20:31:40 -03:00 committed by Richard Purdie
parent 15d005ccbf
commit e330214c2c
2 changed files with 139 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
From 95c871b7b912f39539777ac222ef7f8798bb0225 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Masahisa Kojima <kojima.masahisa@socionext.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 17:23:10 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] random-util.c: sync dev_urandom implementation to
systemd-udev
Current dev_urandom() assumes that reading /dev/urandom
will never block regardless if the random pool is fully
initialized or not.
This assumption is no longer applicable since linux kerrnel
enforces the /dev/urandom entropy initialization from
v5.18-rc2 with the commit:
48bff1053c17 ("random: opportunistically initialize on /dev/urandom reads").
With this, when we use the linux v5.18-rc2 or later,
dev_urandom() will block if enough random pool is not supplied.
It causes the boot delay, typically 1024msec(4msec * 256 = 1024msec)
delay to fill the 256 bits entropy for the case CONFIG_HZ=250.
To prevent this boot delay, this commit syncs dev_urandom()
implementation to the systemd-udev.
The systemd-udev implementation of reading /dev/urandom is as follows.
- Try to get random with calling getrandom(GRND_INSECURE)
- If kernel does not support GRND_INSECURE, fallback to GRND_NONBLOCK
- If enough entropy is not supplied, fallback to reading /dev/urandom,
this will block when the kernel version is v5.18-rc2 or later
With this modification, dev_urandom() tries not to block
as much as possible.
This modification still keeps the backword compatibility,
dev_random() will never block if the commit(48bff1053c17) is not
applied to the linux kernel, the behavior is same as before
in this case.
Upstream-Status: Backport [a49a3aaa460add6ae7ea208b4cac630e56fe1180]
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <kojima.masahisa@socionext.com>
---
src/shared/missing.h | 4 +++
src/shared/random-util.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/shared/missing.h b/src/shared/missing.h
index 1967840cdbf3..1caec0f9207c 100644
--- a/src/shared/missing.h
+++ b/src/shared/missing.h
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ static inline int getrandom(void *buffer, size_t count, unsigned flags) {
#define GRND_RANDOM 0x0002
#endif
+#ifndef GRND_INSECURE
+#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004
+#endif
+
#ifndef BTRFS_IOCTL_MAGIC
#define BTRFS_IOCTL_MAGIC 0x94
#endif
diff --git a/src/shared/random-util.c b/src/shared/random-util.c
index 01a28c8ef4e9..852b00e4ce2b 100644
--- a/src/shared/random-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/random-util.c
@@ -31,45 +31,37 @@
#include "util.h"
int dev_urandom(void *p, size_t n) {
- static int have_syscall = -1;
-
- _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
- int r;
-
- /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel. This call will
- * never block, and will always return some data from the
- * kernel, regardless if the random pool is fully initialized
- * or not. It thus makes no guarantee for the quality of the
- * returned entropy, but is good enough for or usual usecases
- * of seeding the hash functions for hashtable */
-
- /* Use the getrandom() syscall unless we know we don't have
- * it, or when the requested size is too large for it. */
- if (have_syscall != 0 || (size_t) (int) n != n) {
- r = getrandom(p, n, GRND_NONBLOCK);
- if (r == (int) n) {
- have_syscall = true;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (r < 0) {
- if (errno == ENOSYS)
- /* we lack the syscall, continue with
- * reading from /dev/urandom */
- have_syscall = false;
- else if (errno == EAGAIN)
- /* not enough entropy for now. Let's
- * remember to use the syscall the
- * next time, again, but also read
- * from /dev/urandom for now, which
- * doesn't care about the current
- * amount of entropy. */
- have_syscall = true;
- else
- return -errno;
- } else
- /* too short read? */
- return -ENODATA;
+ static bool have_getrandom = true, have_grndinsecure = true;
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
+
+ if (n == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ ssize_t l;
+
+ if (!have_getrandom)
+ break;
+
+ l = getrandom(p, n, have_grndinsecure ? GRND_INSECURE : GRND_NONBLOCK);
+ if (l > 0) {
+ if ((size_t) l == n)
+ return 0; /* Done reading, success. */
+ p = (uint8_t *) p + l;
+ n -= l;
+ continue; /* Interrupted by a signal; keep going. */
+ } else if (l == 0)
+ break; /* Weird, so fallback to /dev/urandom. */
+ else if (errno == ENOSYS) {
+ have_getrandom = false;
+ break; /* No syscall, so fallback to /dev/urandom. */
+ } else if (errno == EINVAL && have_grndinsecure) {
+ have_grndinsecure = false;
+ continue; /* No GRND_INSECURE; fallback to GRND_NONBLOCK. */
+ } else if (errno == EAGAIN && !have_grndinsecure)
+ break; /* Will block, but no GRND_INSECURE, so fallback to /dev/urandom. */
+
+ break; /* Unexpected, so just give up and fallback to /dev/urandom. */
}
fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);

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@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/v${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://netifnames.patch \
file://init \
file://local.rules \
file://0001-random-util.c-sync-dev_urandom-implementation-to-sys.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8da4319102f24abbf7fff5ce9c416af848df163b29590e666d334cc1927f006f"